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Introduction 
 
 
This thesis assesses how processes of social closure enhance intergenerational 
immobility in the regulated professions and thus promote persistence at the top of 
the occupational hierarchy. It considers various European countries (Great Britain, 
Germany, Denmark and Sweden and Italy) that diverge considerably in their 
degree of professional regulation and in their broader institutional arrangements. 
This thesis traces the implications of social closure devices for intergenerational 
immobility by employing different social class approaches (Erikson and 
Goldthorpe 1992; Grusky 2005). 
A vast literature documents the influence of social class on life chances by 
using a big-class approach in several domains: unemployment, occupational 
attainment and education (Cobalti and Schizzerotto 1994; Erikson and Jonsson 
1996a; Sieben and de Graaf 2001). 
Furthermore, systematic comparisons across time and space reveal that these 
inequalities were highly resilient over time across a variety of institutional 
contexts (Müller, Lüttinger, and Karle 1989; Treiman and Yip 1989; Müller and 
Karle 1993; Shavit and Blossfeld 1993; Lauer 2003; Breen 2004; Barone, 
Lucchini and Schizzerotto 2011). The key tenet of the standard big-class approach 
has been that, if social classes are perhaps declining as collective actors, for 
example in a context of weakness of the union membership, they are still in very 
good shape as generators of inequalities (see Barone 2012; Weeden and Grusky 
2012).  
Literature regarding the upper class only is instead very restricted and it 
mostly concerns the intergenerational mobility of meso-classes: professional 
employment, managerial and entrepreneurial jobs (see Schizzerotto 1993; 
Barbagli and Schizzerotto 1997; Patterson et. al 2003). This thesis is placed in this 
research and it specifically concerns some occupational categories that have 
escaped from a proper consideration. This is probably to impute to the 
aggregation of different professional categories into a meso-class. Thus, this work 
goes beyond traditional studies, integrating the big-class approach with the micro-
class approach. 
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The major source of inspiration of this thesis is the ongoing debate on how 
social inequalities regarding high level professionals in contemporary societies are 
theorized and measured. Therefore the understanding of processes behind this 
possible form of inequality of opportunity is of primary importance, and it has 
been obscured by employing a big-class approach, or a gradational approach. 
It has to be clarified that every approach considered in this thesis is useful 
according to the hypothesis it is going to falsify. According to the topic of 
research, some studies prefer the parsimony of the big-class approach, others 
instead are in favour of a micro-class approach because it allows to reach 
inequalities at micro-level. This is why in this work most of the attention is paid 
on the micro-class approach, but its critiques are also considered. 
Going into details on how social inequalities have been measured in the 
sociological literature on social mobility and social stratification, there are at least 
three ways in which the association between social origin and social destination 
(OD henceforth) can be examined. 
First, occupations can be grade or scale to signal the general desirability of 
the labour market position, with the OD association that reveals the extent to 
which those born into families in which parents have desirable occupations are 
likely themselves to assume equal standing occupations (Treiman 1977; 
Ganzeboom, de Graaf and Treiman 1992). But, in order to disclose social 
inequalities of highly regulated professionals, scaling occupations cannot be the 
most useful way for the purpose of this thesis; for example ISEI classifies 
accountants with a score of 65 and lawyers (or doctors) with a score of 80 even if 
both these professional groups have a similar level of legal closure as the first 
chapter illustrates.  
Second, the attention is paid on the influence of occupation-specific resources 
when children from two professional groups of similar general desirability do not 
have the same social mobility probability (Grusky and Weeden 2005). Indeed, the 
basic claim of the micro-class approach is that the forces that make people in one 
occupation different to another are primarily specific to that particular job or 
micro-class (Grusky 2005). 
According to Grusky and Weeden (2012) sociologists can be a very good 
example that makes clear the micro-class point of view. They are characterized 
by: the left-leaning reputation of sociology and the consequent self-selection of 
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left-leaning recruits; the inculcation of a liberal worldview through lengthy 
professional training and socialization; the reinforcing effects of interaction with 
like-minded colleagues. Otherwise, why would economists be different to 
sociologists? 
However, it has to be pointed out that in Grusky and Weeden’ paper in 2005 
by looking at 82 micro-classes, and across 30 years of data (1972-2002), the 
authors argue that «micro-classes trends proved to be relatively weak» (Grusky 
and Weeden 2005, p.155). While lately they get to the conclusion that micro-
classes are useful for the understanding of life-course social inequalities and 
hence of social mobility (Grusky and Weeden 2012). Thus, Grusky and Weeden 
do not assert that the gradational or the big-class approaches are not useful, but 
they assert that micro-classes should considered too. 
Third, a widely used way in which sociologists deploy occupations for the 
purpose of studying social mobility is to aggregate them into big-classes and then 
analyse the exchanges among these classes (Erikson and Goldthorpe 1992; 
Cobalti and Schizzerotto 1994, Breen 2004). Most of big-class schemes do not 
rely exclusively on occupational information, but they rely on additional 
information about self-employment, agricultural sector and other characteristics 
about a job. With the combination of these information, occupations have been 
understood as a class position: the Erikson and Goldthorpe class-scheme (EGP 
scheme henceforth) is almost universally adopted in social stratification research 
(Breen, Goldthorpe and Jonsson, 1997; Breen, Goldthorpe, Luijkx, Müller, and 
Pollak 2009; Barone, Luijkx and Schizzerotto 2010; Barone and Schizzerotto 
2011). 
Even if the big-class tradition draws attention to the argument for which 
children from two big-classes of similar general desirability do not necessarily 
have the same mobility chances, the limitation of this approach in studying 
detailed occupations is that professional groups are presumed to be similar enough 
in working conditions, employment form, or culture to preclude any need to 
differentiate them. 
The micro-class approach claim, indeed, is that unit occupations or licensed 
professions, such as lawyers or medical doctors are more deeply institutionalize, 
than any big-class combinations of those professions (Weeden and Grusky 2001). 
Thus, by using a micro-class view, it comes to light that professional parents tend 
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to bring home their occupations, and children accordingly learn occupation-
specific skills, profit from occupations-specific networks, and develop occupation 
specific aspirations (Grusky 2005). For example, the probability that an architect’ 
child will become an architect is accordingly high when compared to the 
corresponding probabilities of children of other social classes. 
The major critique to the micro-class approach is pointed out by Goldthorpe 
(2002); Goldthorpe (2002:214) notes that «we want to be able to explain, for 
example, not so much why doctors’ children have a high propensity to become 
doctors […], but rather why those doctors’ children (the majority) who do not 
become doctors are far more likely to move into other kinds of professional or 
managerial employment, instead of becoming manual wage workers». In standard 
accounts of social inequality, children of the upper class probably enjoy high 
chances of persistence in this class because of larger amounts of cognitive, 
cultural, social and economic resources to reach higher levels of education and 
higher occupations of any kind. But a critical observation here is that micro-class 
analysis entails an analytical shift from the overall amount of family resources 
available for social reproduction to qualitative type of resources offered for this 
purpose. 
Some notes of conceptual clarifications and definitions may be warranted at 
this point. In this context, the term licensed professions refers to highly regulated 
professions (i.e. lawyers, notaries, doctors, architects, engineers), organized in 
professional associations, which require a mandatory license in order to practice a 
given set of exclusive tasks in the market sector of professional services 
(Pellizzari and Orsini 2012). Whereas professionals without a professional 
associations, which are institutionally unrecognized, are defined as unlicensed 
professionals. 
Furthermore, the analytical strategy has to be clarified, as an important tool 
that the reader can use to get a better understanding of the empirical chapters of 
this thesis. 
The first step of the analytical strategy in the analysis of the Origin-
Education-Destination (OED henceforth) is to integrate the EGP big-class scheme 
with micro-classes of licensed and unlicensed professionals. In other words, I 
decompose into three distinct processes operating at different analytical levels 
macro-, meso- and micro-class rigidities and I assess how social closure affects 
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intergenerational immobility in professional employment. As Jonsson et. al (2009) 
suggested, analytically speaking, micro-classes are nested in the meso-classes and 
in the big-classes, thus when comparing social immobility of licensed and 
unlicensed professionals, it is more appropriate to use the net micro-classes social 
immobility. In other words big-class are purged by meso-class effects, and 
professional meso-class is purge by micro-class effects1.  
The second step of the analytical strategy is to link the social immobility of a 
licensed professional group to his level of legal closure; of course, then it is 
necessary to compare results of this link with the ones obtained by unlicensed 
professional groups.  
This is accomplished with a comparison of the intergenerational immobility 
of licensed and unlicensed professionals across four European countries in chapter 
two (Denmark, Germany, Great Britain and Sweden) and in Italy in chapter 
three2.  
The analytical strategy of chapter four does not differ very much from chapter 
two and three; but using a very large sample representative of the Italian graduates 
it allows to use different techniques of analysis and social immobility is calculated 
at each analytical level. This chapter does not link the level of professionals’ 
social immobility to the degree of professional regulation, but it focuses on the 
entire OED triangle. Thus, this chapter does not repeat the analysis of the previous 
one, but it improves its results going into details of the social reproduction of 
professionals. 
As suggested in the last two paragraphs, the structure of this thesis can be 
summarized as follows. 
The theoretical section (chapter 1) delineates an interpretative line to the 
empirical section (chapter 2, 3, and 4). Indeed, the first chapter provides the 
theoretical framework of the thesis by using a combination of theories at 
institutional and individual level which allows to delineate the general hypothesis 
regarding each empirical chapter. 
Chapter 2 proceeds with an international comparison of professional groups 
in the OED triangle and chapter 3 considers Italian men in the OD association.  
                                                 
1 Empirically this is realized through log-linear models and the implementation of different design 
matrixes.  
2 In these chapters, samples which represent the entire population of these countries are used (except 
for Italy because it was not possible to include the female population as explained in the third chapter). 
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Chapter 4 shows by using a sample of Italian graduates the OED triangle 
disentangling both the Education, and the Origin and Destination. It also checks 
for gender differences and employment conditions (employed and liberal 
professionals) within micro-classes. Finally, the theoretical framework and the 
empirical analyses lead to the conclusion of this work. 
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1. Theoretical framework: social reproduction of licensed professionals in 
five European countries 
 
 
1.1. Introduction 
 
 
This chapter focuses on licensed professionals, specifically it takes into 
consideration various theories capable in explaining professional structuration and 
social inequalities deriving from professionals’ social reproduction. As already 
pointed out in the introduction, professionals across Europe and specifically in 
Italy have studied as single professions, such as notaries or architect and 
engineers, but just few times comparing professions one another (Chiesi 2008; 
Santoro 1998). Therefore this theoretical framework need to be inclusive of the 
necessary theories and logical tools that allow the reader to understand the other 
empirical chapters as well as the comparison of the different professions.  
As already mentioned, licensed professions are institutionally well defined 
across European countries and this is because their institutionalization processes 
originated at the beginning of the 1900’s, and for some of them even before, such 
as doctors and lawyers. These two latest professions, indeed, have seen as very 
important professions that could not be included in the competition regime, 
because doctors save people’ life and lawyers have to deal with their freedom. 
Thus, since a long time ago a special consideration and a different competition 
treatment have given to these professionals. 
From a sociological point of view, functionalists, starting with Durkheim, 
assume that these professions are able to concentrate the mechanical solidarity, 
something very difficult to find in any other occupations; then, from Weber and 
neo-weberians originate another concept concerning these professionals groups: 
the social closure. They assert that interested groups reduce the labour market 
competition, and thus the pool of candidates, in order to get advantages from 
closure (Weber 1978 [1922]; Parkin 1979). Obviously, this thesis goes into details 
of the neo-weberian perspective, first because is strictly linked to the micro-class 
approach, and second because to highly institutionalized professions correspond 
forms of legal closure. Indeed, social closure and the credentialism of Collins 
(1979) are the theories which define the institutional level of this thesis theoretical 
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framework; this is because the thesis purpose concerns the disclosure of 
educational and occupational inequalities; nonetheless, professional closure 
strategies, such as the legal closure in the five European countries are considered.  
Then, individual decision-making is taken into account with a combination of 
theories. Indeed, licensed professions embody processes (e.g. social closure) and 
traits, such as culture, typically attributed to traditional social classes (Erikson and 
Goldthorpe 1992; Grusky 2005). Thus, the transmission of the cultural capital is a 
theory that in this chapter is combined with another one concerning the rational 
choice theory. Of course, these two theories cover just a little part of the literature 
able to give an explanation of the individual decision-making, but in order to 
provide efficient tools to the reader we opt for the two theories. Moreover, this 
choice is because we believe that the rational choice theory and the cultural 
capital reproduction give a more complete picture of children of professionals 
opting to follow in their parents’ footsteps. 
This chapter is very important because thank to the definition of the macro- 
and micro-level theories it is easier for the reader to understand and interpret 
results of empirical chapters. Indeed, the three major hypotheses concerning each 
chapter are defined. 
The structure of this chapter is as follows.  
The first part delineates the institutional level through social closure and 
credentialism theories also considering their lacks in the articulation of processes 
thorough which social and economic advantages are secured to these occupational 
groups; moreover, the social class structure and professional closure strategies for 
the main licensed professions are discussed referring to five European countries: 
Germany, Denmark, Great Britain, Sweden and Italy (paragraph 1.2. and 
paragraph 1.3.). 
In the second part the individual process of decision making is considered 
through a combination of theories, namely the rational choice theory, and 
specifically the relative risk aversion hypothesis (RRA henceforth), and the 
cultural reproduction theory, highlighting Grusky’s (2005) specification of 
cultural resources transmission at occupational level (paragraph 1.4.). 
The third part of this chapter considers how individual processes affect 
societal outcomes at the macro-level. The so called Origin-Education-Destination 
triangle is declined following the big-, the meso- and the micro-class perspective 
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(paragraph 1.5.), and then general hypotheses are reported in order to shed light 
on each chapter focus (paragraph 1.6.); thus, it will also lead me to the concluding 
remarks (paragraph 1.7.). 
 
 
1.2. Institutional level: combining theories 
 
 
1.2.1. Social closure  
 
Social closure, according to Weber ([1922] 1978, pp. 339–48, 926–55), 
occurs whenever the competition for a livelihood creates groups interested in 
reducing that competition. These groups try to monopolize sectors of market and 
maximize their advantages by closing off opportunities to outsiders. Such 
exclusion can be based on any characteristic, including race, social background, 
and gender. However, according to closure theorists, exclusion based on ascribed 
criteria is being increasingly replaced by exclusion based on «individualistic» 
criteria, such as educational credentials and knowledge (Larson 1977; Parkin 
1979; Collins 1979; Murphy 1988, Abbott 1988; Weeden 2002, Grusky 2005).  
Occupational closure is an instance of the more general social closure. The 
professional groups shaped around occupational positions in the division of labour 
construct and defend social and legal boundaries in order to get advantages from 
occupational closure (Weeden 2002; Grusky 2005).  
As this discussion suggests, closure theory is predicated on the assumption 
that social groups can and do act to further their collective economic interests 
(Sorensen 1996, 2000; Sorensen and Grusky 1998, 2001). Furthermore, 
recognition of the benefits of occupational collective action may be scattered 
among the membership of a licensed profession (Weeden 2002; Weeden and 
Grusky 2005). In many occupations, the collective action function has been 
centralized in a distinct organization, such as professional associations (Grusky 
2005).  
Occupational closure secures advantages to professionals at the expense of 
other groups, whose members do not have access to the profession (Sørensen 
1996, 2000). As a result, the privileged group has to constantly protect its control 
over an asset against attempts by other groups to usurp that asset (Parkin 1979).  
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According to Sorensen (2000) closure theory has much in common with 
theories of exploitation: «advantaged exploitation classes are positions in the 
social structure that allows individuals to gain control over assets or attributes of 
assets that generate rents» (p. 1545). These rents are defined as payments attached 
to positions which are independent from the real efforts of a person occupying a 
position (Sorensen 1998; 2000). The holders of a rent producing asset have 
interest in securing the continued flow of benefits. In fact, professionals have 
created professional organizations and processes to entry into a profession to 
protect rent benefits.  
Focusing on professions within a system of licenses, these arrangements 
bring to the creation of artificial monopolies over the supply of an asset. For 
example, a reduced number of architects have the right to offer a service and 
consequently the opportunity to fix the price of a professional performance. This 
mechanism would not have generated in the absence of an artificial monopoly. 
Thus, professional associations are interested in erecting systematic barriers to the 
access to a profession such as credentials which serve to limit supply.  
Moreover, it is arguable that there are no analogous organizations within the 
labour market that represent aggregate classes. For this reason, I claim that it is 
worth differentiating professional groups in order to investigate the role that 
various forms of closure play for their social reproduction.  
Of course, also closure theory comes with its own limitations. As Murphy 
(1988) pointed out, internal failings have vanished the effort to launch closure 
theory into a central place in the stratification research.  
Closure theorists have not given enough attention to the process through 
which closure devices translate into tangible advantages to professionals. As well, 
closure theory is not able to explain why some professional groups succeeded in 
assuring closure strategies and the related institutional recognition while others 
failed (e.g. accountants and labour consultants). And still, there are no empirical 
evaluations of its core predictions, although closure argumentations have been 
considered by contemporary stratification researches that apply a micro-class 
approach in order to evaluate positional inequalities in modern society (e.g. 
Grusky and Sorensen 1998; Weeden 2002; Grusky and Weeden 2005). This thesis 
indeed contributes to providing empirical evidence of social closure 
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argumentations by using various social class approaches and by focusing on 
professional groups of the upper class of different European countries.  
 
 
1.2.2. Credentialism theory 
 
A variety of advantages emerge when employment and jobs are closed to 
outsiders by the collective action of professional associations, by government-
approved certification of professions, and by occupational licenses. Professional 
associations create rent benefits when they gain control over recruitment to a 
profession through managing the in takings of educational institutions. For 
instance, only a fixed number of students have access to the medical school.  
Credentials as means used to restrict the labour supply can be analysed from 
two distinct perspectives (Collins 1979, Weeden 2002). From a human capital 
perspective, educational credentials certify the acquisition of skills and 
competences, therefore any restrictions of opportunities to attain these credentials 
will shrink the pool of candidates who can access a given profession. In other 
words, the point of restrictions in access in closure theory is that more persons 
may have the capacity and the ability to be a prepared professional, but that they 
lack the certificates to perform the relevant occupations. 
Policy makers and professionals themselves, in turn, support credentials as a 
necessary device for the quality of the service providers and consequently to 
protect the consumer from the service providers incompetence. In fact, 
professionals operate in a delicate market characterized by asymmetrical 
information and strong externalities (Pellizzari and Pica 2011). In this case 
credentials are necessary in order to guarantee a good professional performance 
and protect clients from incompetence.  
From an alternative perspective, educational credentials are only loosely, 
related to the knowledge a person needs to be competent in practicing a profession 
(Collins 1979, Weeden 2002). Educational credentials are used as rationing 
devices for access to employment-specific education for professions. This creates 
advantages linked to the artificial monopoly for those who hold the credentials. 
Educational credentialing refers to the use of the familiar symbols or markers of 
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knowledge (e.g., degrees as standard social constructs) conferred by formal 
educational institutions to monitor entry into professions (Collins 1979).  
In this perspective, credentials just serve as a cultural currency that proves the 
membership to be a specific status group (Collins 1979; Bourdieu and Passeron 
1979; Parkin 1979). From this point of view, credentials restrict the labour supply 
because consumers value the underlying cultural currency and believe that the 
credentials certify a unique competence to practice a profession. Since educational 
credentials lead to a licensed system, largely enforced through norms and 
behavioural rules, they are a means used to restrict access to a profession, capable 
in excluding candidates who have not met some criteria (Tousijn 1979, 1987; 
Weeden 2002, Grusky 2005). Thus, certificates are not signal of a high quality 
performance but they just prove the membership of a given profession.  
Moreover, the credentialism literature (e.g. Collins 1979) indicates that 
credentials are linked to class analysis and cultural capital reproduction (Bourdieu 
and Passeron 1979). Since «cultural endowments are important for learning, but 
hard to learn for those not socialized into a given culture» (Sorensen 2000, p. 
1547), they can be seen as a source of inequality because they facilitate those who 
were exposed to the relevant forms of cultural capital needed to obtain the 
corresponding educational credentials. In fact, those possessing high credentials 
wish to secure an advantage to their children, providing specific cultural capital 
employable in the training for the same profession.  
Closure theorists, indeed, have specified how economic, cultural and social 
resources can be used by children of professionals for the purpose of obtaining 
credentials. These resources give strong advantages and incentives to 
professionals’ offspring to follow in the footsteps of their parents. 
Credentials, then, are likely to increase the ability of high status groups, such 
as licensed professionals, to confer their advantages to their offspring (Parkin 
1979; Collins 1979; Murphy 1988). 
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1.3. Professionals closure strategies in Italy and in Europe 
 
1.3.1. Professionals closure strategies across four European countries 
 
Although closure theory lacks a clear articulation of the processes thorough 
which social and economic advantages are secured to some occupational groups, 
little explanation is given to how and why closure strategies differ among these 
groups. However, the main assumption of closure theory is straightforward: the 
higher the extent of closure of an occupational group, the greater the social and 
economic benefits. For members of licensed professions, closure strategies are 
strong and effective. In most of the European countries, professions are 
characterized by deeply institutionalized practices through which professional 
closure is secured. 
The supply restriction (the limited number of professionals who can operate 
in a professional service market) is produced by two main devices: educational 
credentialing and licensure3. These processes are strictly linked with the core of 
the closure theory, for which «closure generates and artificial scarcity of 
individuals who have the legal, technical, or socially recognized ability to perform 
the bundle of tasks provided by that occupation» (Weeden 2002, p. 61). 
Credentials as precondition for entry into a profession are supported by the 
state as legitimate basis of social exclusion. In fact, a professional can be 
identified as a real member of a profession able to perform specific skills and 
tasks only after obtaining a list of educational and training certifications and, for 
some countries, also succeeding in the state examination, a professional can be 
identified as a real member of a profession, able to perform specific skills and 
tasks.  
The legislation, regulations and codes of practice of a range of professional 
services, such as legal, accountancy, technical, medical and pharmacy services, 
vary across European countries as well as across these professions (Paterson et al. 
2003). A specific regulatory framework of professions exists in all European 
                                                 
3 Entry-market regulation concerns formal certifications and qualifications, such as educational 
credentials, length of practice, professional examinations and registration in a professional body and 
rules on areas of reserve practice, in other words the right of a profession to offer a specific service on 
the market. 
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member states, but the regulatory scope and intensity vary considerably across 
these countries4.  
The aim of this study does not concern why or to what extent this regulation 
differs between countries, but how licensed professions legislation5 affects social 
phenomenon, such as the social reproduction of professionals’ categories and, 
consequently, its contribution to the social immobility within the service class. 
As research on social class mobility and social stratification pointed out that 
European countries are predominately structured in big-classes because 
institutional organizations, such union membership help the strength of this kind 
of structure (Erikson and Goldthorpe 1992). According to Grusky (2005) the U.S. 
is more inclined be structured in micro-classes, this is because in this country the 
role played by firms in created this structure is very strong. Jonsson and 
colleagues’ (2009) suggest that Germany is structured in both big- and micro-
classes, that it also could be the case of Denmark and that in Sweden micro-
classes seem to be not strong. They also suggest that other countries should be 
study in order to discover whether a structure of micro-classes is strong even with 
the pre-existence of a big-class structure (see Jonsson et. al 2009). Therefore, even 
if these studies do not properly focus on licensed professionals, they are used as a 
starting point for the comparative purpose of this thesis (Jonsson et al. 2009). 
Indeed, by comparing five European countries (Germany, Sweden, Denmark, 
Great Britain and Italy), characterized by different class structures and by 
different levels of licensed professions’ regulations, this work argues and 
empirically shows that micro-level processes of professionals’ social production, 
such as the connection between levels of regulation and the intergenerational 
                                                 
4 If the recent trends in many European countries concern an overall decrease in the conduct market 
regulation, the entry market legislation seems persistent over time. Market-conduct regulations regard 
regulation on prices (such as fixed prices or a minimum/maximum price), regulation on advertising, 
regulation of location or diversification (e.g. geographical restriction on offering services, such as for Latin 
notary profession) and restrictions on inter-professional cooperation. Moreover, as I will explain in the next 
paragraph, in Italy even if formally conduct regulations of professionals have consistently decreased, 
professional associations still maintain in their Codes of Conduct rather than restrictive recommendations on 
professionals’ behaviours. 
5 The OECD’s index of professional closure regards entry-market regulations for most of the European 
countries in 2013 (even though it has been calculated for 4 years 1998, 2003, 2008, 2013). This index has 
been constructed in order to facilitate the comparison between European countries. The interpretation is 
straightforward: firstly, the index ranks from 0 to 6, where 6 represents the highest level of professional 
closure; secondly, the respective index score reflects the number of restrictions that are applied and the 
relative importance of those restrictions; thirdly, the higher the respective index score, the more 
restrictive the regulation system for that profession. 
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social immobility of licensed professionals, come to light evidently. This study 
expects that the relevance of micro-class structuration for intergenerational 
reproduction at the top varies cross-nationally, reflecting differences between 
countries in the regulation of the relationship between education and the labour 
market, in the context of a specific welfare regime. The four countries selected for 
the comparative analyses are Sweden, Germany, Great Britain and Denmark, 
which are briefly discussed below.  
The German educational system emphasizes occupational specificity to the 
highest degree. Access to occupations is tightly related to the possession of 
specific vocational certificates. This applies also to the liberal professions, which 
have a well-established tradition of professional associations that have managed to 
impose and preserve strict access regulations (starting with access to its selective 
university system).  
At the opposite extreme, Sweden has a comprehensive educational system in 
which vocational training is under-developed. Industrial relations involve 
negotiations between centralized trade unions and employer federations, and even 
professionals have created a collective organization that represents them all 
centrally. For most professions, entry regulations are absent or comparatively 
weak.  
Denmark and Great Britain may be seen as intermediate cases, between 
Germany and Sweden. Denmark has delayed tracking to the age of 16, but has a 
well-developed vocational system that involves more than 40% of upper 
secondary students. The British educational system is comprehensive until the age 
of 16, and vocational training is less developed than in Germany and Denmark. 
Professional regulation in Denmark and Great Britain is not as high as in 
Germany, but is definitively more structured than in Sweden. 
To measure the degree of entry market regulation, the relevant index 
developed by the OECD can be used for the following professions: engineers, 
architects, accountants, lawyers, and pharmacists (Patterson et al. 2003). The 
index is based on the following indicators for each profession6: entry 
requirements, which include duration of university courses or of other higher 
                                                 
6 The compilation of the original indicators draws on multiple sources, including data provided by 
national statistical offices, questionnaires to professional bodies and national policy documents; see 
Patterson et al. (2003) for more details.  
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degrees needed to access the profession, duration of compulsory practice, number 
of professional exams, and number of entry routes to each profession; licensing, 
including the number of exclusive and shared tasks in each professional field; and 
the existence of quotas for each profession. The weights of these three dimensions 
in the overall index score are 40%, 40% and 20%, respectively. Hence, the OECD 
score reflects the number of access restrictions that are applied and the relative 
importance of these restrictions. The index ranges from 0 to 6, where 6 represent 
the highest level of regulation theoretically possible.  
The OECD index has two potential limitations. First, it assumes without any 
empirical validation that different indicators of entry requirements pertain to a 
common underlying dimension and that therefore they can be summarized by a 
single summary score. Second, this score does not incorporate two indicators of 
entry requirements that have been used in previous analyses (Weeden 2002): 
voluntary certification and association representation. I have recovered these two 
indicators from Patterson et al. (2003) and I have carried out a factor analysis with 
these two additional indicators and the two indicators of entry requirements 
common to the index and to Weeden’s analysis (educational credentialing and 
licensing). I have thus obtained a single dimension that displays a high Pearson 
correlation (0,78) with the overall index of professional closure. This suggests that 
the assumption that different indicators form a single dimension of entry 
requirements is empirically sound7.  
The index developed by the OECD does not cover some professional groups 
for various reasons. First, it does not consider regulation in the so-called new 
professions (social workers, nurses, etc.). These occupations belong to the lower 
service class of the Erikson and Goldthorpe (1992) schema and are therefore not 
relevant for this analysis, which focuses on immobility in the higher service class 
encompassing the liberal professions.  
Second, doctors are not covered by the index because it is well-established 
that this profession displays a high degree of regulation Europe-wide. Indeed, 
access to this profession always requires completion of long university courses 
that typically entail access restrictions and numerus clausus, as well as internship 
periods and additional certificates. 
                                                 
7 That means that the inclusion or exclusion of single indicators is not very consequential for results in 
the next empirical chapters of the thesis. 
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I have reconstructed the value of the regulation index for this occupational 
category in the selected countries using the same indicators and definitions 
employed by the OECD for the other professions. As regards licensing, doctors 
have the full monopoly on medical tasks in our four countries (Rowe and Garcia-
Barbero 2005). Hence, their value for the number of exclusive tasks is always 2.4. 
In contrast, entry requirements vary cross-nationally. I exploit the following data 
sources to recover the values of the corresponding indicators: Faure et al. (1993), 
Garoupa (2006) and Rowe, Garcia-Barbero (2005). The third dimension (quotas) 
applies only to pharmacists and notaries (Patterson et al. 2003) and therefore takes 
a value of zero for doctors. 
Finally, professions in the pure sciences (e.g., physicists) and in the social 
sciences (e.g., sociologists, communication experts) are not covered by the OECD 
index for the opposite reason; that is, legal regulation is virtually absent. For the 
analysis, I will impute to these two categories a value of zero, which I regard as an 
accurate approximation8.  
As shown in Table 1.1., there are marked differences in the degree of 
regulation both between countries and between different professions within 
countries. For all professions but pharmacists, regulation is highest in Germany. 
Sweden consistently displays low values for all professions but pharmacists9, and 
Denmark and Great Britain lie in between these two extremes. 
 
 
Table 1.1. The index of entry-market regulations by country and profession (1998) 
 Engineers Architects Legal 
professionals 
Accountants Pharmacists* Doctors 
Denmark 0.0 0.4* 4.0 1.9 2.3 3.5 
Germany 2.7 4.11 5.2 5.8 1.6 3.7 
G. Britain  0.0 1.5* 2.5 4.1 2.7 3.4 
Sweden 0.0 0.0 0.0* 2.4 6.0 3.5 
Source: OECD sector indicators of regulatory conditions in professional services (see: product 
                                                 
8 There are some professions in these two categories that display some form of regulation, but these are 
minor exceptions. In particular, using the data provided by the European Commission (see 
ec.europa.eu/internal_market.htm), I have found that, in the category of unregulated professions in the 
social sciences, only psychologists have some form of regulation, but they account for less than 10% of 
this category (Bednar et al. 2004). As regards scientific unregulated professions, only actuaries in Great 
Britain and Denmark (2% of the scientific professions) and chemists in Great Britain (8%) display some 
form of regulation. 
9 In Sweden, only pharmacies are allowed to sell medicinal products, and there is a state monopoly over 
pharmacies. In Germany, Great Britain and Denmark, retail shops are allowed to sell medicinal 
products. In Germany, the maximum number of community pharmacies is not fixed. 
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market regulation – service market at http://stats.oecd.org/) 
*The closure index of pharmacists has been calculated by Patterson et al. in 2003. 
 
 
Architects and engineers are the least regulated professions, while legal 
professionals, accountants and doctors are the most regulated groups. Following 
the arguments advanced in this section, professionals’ regulation in Italy is taken 
into consideration, for which high level of professionals’ micro-classes 
structuration and social immobility is expected due to the institutional assets, 
regulation level and previous research on social stratification.  
 
  
1.3.2. Professionals closure strategies in Italy 
 
Although there are no studies on micro-class reproduction and just little 
research with regards to professional groups (most of them concern a single 
profession) in Italy, there is a vast literature on social mobility in terms of big-
classes that shows high levels of intergenerational and intra-generational social 
immobility (Breen 2004; Schizzerotto 2002; Barone and Schizzerotto 2011). 
According to the closure index (referring again to the entry-market 
regulations), licensed professionals in Italy reach one of the highest level of 
professional regulations across European countries.  
 
 
Table 1.2. Index of professional closure considering entry-market regulations in Italy 
 Index of professional closure (entry-market regulations)  
 Engineers Architects Legal 
prof. 
Accountants Pharmacists Doctors 
(2013) 3.92 3.92 4.04 4.17 4.80* 4.26 
(1998) 3.92 3.92 4.33 3.96 4.80* 4.26 
Source: OECD organization’s calculation 
*The closure index of pharmacists has been calculated by Patterson et al. in 2003. 
 
 
In Italy the main entry barriers to licensed professions include the attainment 
of a specific degree (for some professions, the first step is passing the university 
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entrance exams, as for Medicine and Architecture), specialization courses, 
professional training and state examinations10. 
 
 
 
 
Table 1.3. Professions’ entry barriers: professional associations’ year of introduction, 
tertiary educational level, compulsory training and state examination. 
 Professional closure in Italy  
Professional 
association 
Year of 
introd. 
5 years 
degree 
Uni. entr. 
test 
Compul. 
practice 
State examination S. exam. pass 
rate (2010) 
Accountant 2005 Yes* No 3 years Annual;1 practical 
, 2 written, 1 oral 
test  
Total 48% 
(100% Naples, 
8% Venice) 
Doctor 1946 Yes Yes 3 months Annual; 2 tests –3 
months practice 
Total 98% 
Pharmacist 1946 Yes Yes 6 months Annual; 1 written, 
3 practical, 1 oral 
test 
Total 97% 
Veterinarian 1946 Yes Yes 6 months Annual; 3 oral 
and practical tests 
N. a. 
Lawyer 1933 Yes No  2 years Annual; 3 written, 
1 oral test 
Total 26%  
Notary 1913 Yes No 18 
months 
Irregular; 3 
written, 1 oral 
test, limit age 50 – 
Rome 
Total 6% 
Architect 1923 Yes Yes 6 months Annual; 2 written, 
1 practical, 1 oral 
test 
Total 49% 
Engineer 1923 Yes No 6 months Annual; 2 written, 
1 practical, 1 oral 
test 
N. a. 
Source: Pellizzari and Orsini (2012), their elaboration of OECD regulatory conditions in the 
professional services. 
* Regulatory condition on compulsory requirement recently changed. 
 
 
After the attainment of the compulsory educational level, potential 
professionals need to attend a period of compulsory practice, required before 
taking the professional exam, necessary to be admitted in a licensed profession.  
                                                 
10 The closure index of entry market regulation for medical doctors has been calculated (following the 
methodology based on Patterson et al. in 2003) as previously explained for the other four European 
countries.  
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This training consists of on-the-job training under the supervision of a 
profession’s member. At the end of the period, the apprentice usually receives a 
certificate of attendance (Pellizzari and Pica 2011). The main justification behind 
this requirement is that apprentices need to acquire practical job training before 
entering into a profession.  
It is worth specifying that there are differences among professions and they 
can be quite large. For example, pharmacists and doctors need a compulsory 
training that lasts six and three months respectively. Other professions such as 
notaries or lawyers require two years of compulsory training, and accountants 
required a training period of three years. Moreover, for some professions this 
training period is part of the educational careers (e.g. for architects).  
There are also specialization courses that characterize some professions, such 
as accountants. Moreover, notary schools offer a two year course, a voluntary and 
very expensive course, which is very successful in preparing potential notaries for 
the compulsory state’s examination (Santoro 1998). 
Before formally entering into a profession’s register («Albo professionale»), 
applicants are required to pass a state examination in order to be qualified to 
practice the said profession and become a full member of it.  
For most of the Italian licensed professions, the state examination takes place 
simultaneously once a year, except for notaries (it is irregular, most of the times 
every two years). 
Another difference among professions with regards to how many candidates 
successfully pass the state examination: the lowest rate of successful candidates 
was observed with regards to notary profession and medical doctors recorded the 
highest successful rate (Orsini and Pellizzari 2012). 
After obtaining the license, professionals have to respect a code of conduct 
and for some professions there are also other quantitative constraints (Orsini and 
Pellizzari 2012). Indeed, pharmacy and notary professions are subject to 
quantitative entry restrictions based on demographic or geographic criteria. For 
notaries, in particular, the maximum number of notary seats («Sedi notarili») is 
fixed by the law, and the total number of notary positions depends on population, 
level of economic activity and size of the geographical area where notaries can 
operate (Tousijn 1979, Santoro 1998). The law also imposes strict quantitative 
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restrictions on the number of pharmacies; even their location is highly regulated 
(Pellizzari and Pica 2011). 
In Italy, licensed professions are subject to a public regulation concerning 
professionals’ behaviour. Professionals are organized into associations (called 
«Ordini professionali»), which are officially recognized by public bodies and are 
governed by a self-regulated authority. Membership in professional associations is 
compulsory for all qualified professionals. Professional associations are in charge 
of implementing existing rules and elaborating new regulations, often to be 
subsequently endorsed by public authorities. All associations enforce codes of 
conduct («Codice deontologico»), formally to ensure standards of competence and 
accountability of their members. Codes of conduct typically include several 
restrictions on the economic conduct of members of a profession and also regulate 
disciplinary procedures, such as the price setting of the professional services. The 
regulation of members’ behaviour specifically concerns: restrictions on price 
setting, limitations on advertising and competition.  
 
 
Table 1.4. Professional associations’ recommendations contained in code of conducts: fee 
schedule, advertising, internal competition and quantitative restrictions   
 Professional conduct regulations in Italy 
Professional 
association 
Fee schedule 
(“tariffario”) 
Advertising 
regulation 
Competition 
between colleagues 
Compulsory 
practice 
Accountant Yes Yes* Yes (generic) No 
Doctor Yes Yes* Yes No 
Pharmacist Yes No Yes Yes** 
Veterinarian Yes Yes Yes No 
Lawyer Yes Yes* Yes No 
Notary Yes Yes* Yes Yes** 
Architect Yes No Yes (generic) No 
Engineer Yes No Yes (generic) No 
Source: Pellizzari and Orsini (2012), codes of conduct of licensed professions.  
* With reference to the decorum principle: decency («buon gusto»), sobriety, decorum («decoro») 
** For the Italian law there is a notary seat for 7000 inhabitants and a minimum annual income of 
the notary of 50.000 Euros. The law also fixed a ratio of 3.300 inhabitants for a pharmacy; 
moreover, the distance between two pharmacies cannot be less than 200 meters. 
 
 
Professional associations consider price competition unethical, justifying their 
impositions to the public with the necessity to maintain high quality services and 
to protect consumers from inadequate performance. Even after the Bersani reform 
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of 2006 and the Monti law of 2011 (called «Pacchetto Salva Italia») that abolished 
minimum prices of professional services, codes of conduct of licensed professions 
still have standard fee schedules («Tariffario»), suggested to all the members of 
the professions11. 
A similar situation can be found in the advertising regulation, which typically 
aims to limit commercial purpose, also abolished in the Bersani reform of 2006. 
Nevertheless, professional associations did not entirely apply this reform. More 
specifically, «professional associations opposed to the reform by interpreting it in 
a restrictive way» (Pellizzari and Pica 2011, p. 26). Moreover, most of these codes 
of conduct include different kinds of generic recommendations that limit the 
competition among members of a profession. This competition is judged by 
professional associations as unfair behaviour12. 
All these limitations of the competition can generate higher level of licensed 
professionals’ career stability, especially for those operating as self-employed 
professionals13. When actors (such as professional associations) create artificial 
monopolies over the supply of an asset, thereby «increasing the returns on the 
asset over what it would have generated in the absence of a monopoly» (Sørensen 
2000, p. 23), they also provide a higher propensity of remaining in a specific 
service-market permanently.  
The high level of licensed professionals’ social reproduction, as well as their 
high level of career stability can be associated with entry barriers and behavioural 
rules imposed by professional associations. These regulations, indeed, penalize 
newcomers who need to create their own clients portfolio and advantage 
professionals (definable as insiders) who have been practicing the profession for a 
long time. 
 
 
 
                                                 
11 Indeed, the OECD’s index on conduct-market regulations in 2013, formally based on the legislation, 
Italy presents low scores of conduct regulations for every licensed profession. 
12 For example, many professionals, such as psychologists, lawyers and notaries cannot steal clients 
from their colleagues, because it is judged as an unfair public behaviour by their professional 
associations («divieto di accaparramento clientela»). 
13 The implementation of liberalization policies takes place in several European countries. Indeed, 
these legal changes can be interpreted both as country specific and as part of the European Union 
homogenization process. 
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1.4. Decision making processes: combining theories  
 
 
Going into detail of the micro-level theories, we can obtain precious 
suggestions on individuals’ decision-making. If the macro-level theories reported 
above help us to understand to what extent children of professionals decide to 
become professionals as well, here it is necessary to provide theories that see 
individuals deciding from different points of view. To be clear a child of a 
professional can rationally decide to follow in his or her parent’s footsteps but she 
or he can also be pushed from behind. Then, theories about the transmission of 
cultural capital and other resources have to be considered. Indeed, the literature on 
educational and occupational inequalities often recurs to a micro-level 
explanation, namely rational choice theory, to interpret individual choices 
(Boudon 1974; Gambetta 1987). According to this model, individual choices are 
determined by a cost-benefit comparison, such as the probability of success for 
educational alternatives or advantages in operating on a specific sector of the 
market, which for licensed professionals is often characterized by limited 
competition.  
Furthermore, it is also useful to borrow Breen and Goldthorpe’s (1997) model 
of Relative Risk Aversion (RRA), a rational action theory of inequality in 
educational opportunity, based on Boudon’s (1974) work. This theoretical model, 
has received significant attention in the recent literature (Breen and Goldthorpe 
1997; Becker 2003; van de Werfhorst and Andersen 2005; Breen and Yaish 
2006).  
The central argument in the RRA theory is that educational choices reflect the 
individual’s desire to preserve the social status of the family over generations and 
to avoid downward social mobility. In this case, children of professionals act in 
order to maximize the probability of maintaining intergenerational status quo 
(understood as an equal standing social position).  
According to the RRA model, education is an instrument with which 
individuals attempt to maximize the probability of entry into at least the same 
social class position as that of their parents. Accordingly, inequalities in 
educational attainment persist even when higher education is formally available to 
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everyone, because members of different social classes require different levels of 
education to avoid downward social mobility. 
Thus, children of professionals need higher levels of education than children 
who belong to lower social classes. Moreover, it can be supposed that children of 
licensed professionals enroll more in the academic track at the upper secondary 
level to gain an advantage for the university career, while children of the other 
social classes more often choose differently (Pannichella and Triventi 2014). 
The RRA theory links inequalities in educational and positional outcomes to 
the status-preserving strategies used by members of different social classes. This 
assertion seems to be more suitable for the higher classes than the lower ones. 
Indeed, this is linked to professions entry barriers which are able to discourage 
individuals from every social class and with a different socioeconomic 
background from entering into a regulated profession.  
However, the rational choice model has also some limitations in explaining 
the development of aspirations, motivations and ambitions to become a 
professional (Barone 2012). This is because of the cultural capital transmission. 
Indeed, children of lower social origins, and consequently with a lower cultural 
background, need to be more ambitious than children of professionals, to continue 
schooling at, particularly higher, educational transitions.  
Nonetheless, variations in educational aspirations across social classes are 
then hypothesized to be reducible to differences in economic resources and 
opportunities. In this respect, the RRA approach disregards cultural reproduction 
theory suggesting that intrinsic social class differences in norms, values, and 
cultural capital constitute an important source of intergenerational educational 
inequality (Bourdieu and Passeron 1977). 
In order to circumvent this limitation, this study also consider social class 
differences in norms and cultural capital, starting by the consideration of the 
cultural capital reproduction (Bourdieu and Passeron 1977) and then going into 
details of micro-classes reproduction in terms of various kinds of capital, such as 
social or cultural ones. 
As already asserted in addressing the question of why the children of 
professionals more likely become professionals themselves, the RRA model is not 
enough; indeed, the reference to the resources available to the children can be 
better understood by taking an approach in which constraints can channel their 
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behaviour to different extents (Gambetta 1967, Bourdieu and Passeron 1979). 
Thus, for children of professionals there is a certain socialization at home which 
makes it is plausible that among educational and professional options they likely 
consider becoming a licensed professional.  
According to Bourdieu’s (1984) social reproduction theory, education plays a 
central role in the reproduction of social inequality and social exclusion. Cultural 
reproduction refers to the tendency of parents who transmit tastes, values, and 
orientations that make their children want to hold the same class or occupation as 
their parents (Bourdieu 1979, 1984, Bourdieu and Passeron 1977).  
Thus, cultural capital plays a central role in class transmission and 
inequalities in cultural capital reflect inequalities in social classes. Focusing on 
licensed professionals’ social reproduction, a basic argument is that professionals’ 
families transmit specific resources, cultures and abilities that pay off in specific 
professional positions (Weeden and Grusky 2005). The importance of such 
abilities are presumably stressed by parents that frequently discuss newspapers 
and written texts at home, providing hands-on instruction in writing (Weeden and 
Grusky 2001). A similar discussion can be made about the ability to make abstract 
argumentations and critical debates on various topics (Grusky 2005). But before 
going into details of cultural reproduction of professionals in terms of micro-
classes it is needed to point out that this transmission of different resource also 
occurs at big- and meso- levels with different characteristics. In other word, 
transmission of resources can pay off in professional positions or in the upper 
class position. Indeed, professional families also transmit abilities, such as writing 
or verbal skills that are useful in many professional occupations (meso-class 
level).  
Generally, children of professionals are also exposed to an abstract cultural 
capital that lead them to develop abilities in line with that big-class. This is 
referred to a wide-class culture with which children of professionals are prepared 
to upper class destinations – big-class level (Erikson and Jonsson 1996, 
Goldthorpe 1998, Jonsson et al. 2009).  
However, according to Jonsson et. al (2009) for professionals social 
reproduction it is not enough the transmission of abstract skills (e.g. cognitive 
skills), abstract culture (e.g. culture of critical discourse), class-wide networks or 
economic resources (as liquid resource) which are typical of big-class 
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reproduction. Indeed, children growing up in professional families are also 
exposed to specific professional culture and tastes, including for example 
aspirations to become a doctor, a point that is clearly missing in the RRA. 
Moreover, professional networks that may have a similar effect on their 
aspirations. Simply because they come in frequent contact with other professional 
families, they will learn about the world of professions and tend to orient 
themselves to that world (Jonsson et. al 2009). Of course, the more the profession 
is structured, as a law firm, the more the social networks facilitate micro-class 
social reproduction.  
Furthermore, these social advantages can be exploited by children of 
professionals because they have the economic resources that make it easier to 
secure professional credentials or positions. Indeed, Jonsson et. al (2009) assert 
that this transmission also concern fixed economic resources, such a law firm. 
Along with the discussion, the transmission from parents to children of concrete 
occupation-specific cultures and skills that lead to micro-class social reproduction 
(Grusky 2005). For example, engineers may bring home toys of building 
constructions, architects can focus on drawing parks or houses with their children, 
and so on. In other words, specific profession commitments of parents can affect 
children in a more specific way (micro-level transmission of capitals).  
The cultural reproduction of micro-classes is widely discussed also in 
Bourdieu (1979) even if the author does not properly refers to micro-classes. But 
the Distinction of Bourdieu (1979) gives a major contribution to current debates 
on the theory of culture transmitted between social classes and micro-classes; it 
can also be interpreted as one of former challenge to the major theoretical schools 
in contemporary sociology, specifically in contemporary social stratification 
studies on social class reproduction from a cultural point of view. 
Professional cultures at micro-level are created under specific conditions of 
closure and training. Indeed, the main conditions under which such cultures are 
formed and maintained are: a training regime that inculcates a set of values and 
way of life, that reminds Bourdieu’s concept of habitus, and some closure 
processes that ensure professional members interact principally with one another, 
protecting their social environment against outsiders’ influences and values 
(Bourdieu and Passeron 1979; Bourdieu 1984; Grusky 2005). These two 
conditions are more reliable within detailed professions than big-classes. Lawyers, 
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for example, undergo intensive training within law school and interact frequently 
with one another in a relatively closed workplace (e.g., the closure condition), 
thus creating and sustaining a specific professional culture (Jonsson et. al 2009).  
These professional cultures do not affect just tastes, preferences, aspirations 
of children of professionals, but also their perceptions of professions desirability; 
and again these factors tend to improve the level of their micro-class reproduction 
(see Bourdieu and Passeron 1979). 
Finally, these mechanisms that act at different analytical level are investigated 
empirically in next chapters, and next paragraphs go into details of the analytical 
and empirical strategies linking this theoretical framework with the empirical 
analyses. 
 
 
1.5. The ‘Origin - Education – Destination’ association from a big-class 
to a micro-class perspective: previous research 
 
 
Comparing four European countries and then focusing on the Italian case, the 
Origin-Education-Destination triangle will be employed as a starting point to be 
declined following the micro-class perspective (Blau and Duncan 1967, Treiman 
1970; Erikson and Goldthorpe 1992, Breen 2004; Jonsson et al. 2009). The main 
step in understanding the empirical strategy of the next three chapters (in studying 
the social reproduction of licensed professionals) can be graphically illustrated as 
Figure 1.1. below. 
 
 
Parents’ social position O                          D Respondents’ social position 
Big-class Service Class I    Service Class I Big-class 
Meso-class Entrepreneurs    Entrepreneurs Meso-class 
 Managers               E  Managers 
 Professionals   Tertiary 
education: fields 
of study 
 Professionals  
Micro-
class 
Architects  Architecture  Architects Micro-
class 
 Engineers  Engineering  Engineers 
 Medical 
doctors 
 Medicine  Medical 
doctors  
 Veterinarians  Veterinary  Veterinarians 
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 Pharmacists  Pharmaceutical 
science 
 Pharmacists 
 Legal 
professionals  
 Law  Legal 
professionals  
 Accountants  Economics  Accountants 
 Non–licensed 
professionals 
 Other fields   Non–licensed 
professionals 
Figure 1.1. Origin - Education – Destination of licensed professionals of the 
higher service class: from a big to a micro-class perspective 
 
 
Figure 1.1. illustrates that the OED triangle in the case of licensed 
professionals is highly structured. For example, to become architects individuals 
have to graduate in architecture and they can also be facilitate if they have an 
architect as a parent. In this case architects’ children are provided with 
professional cultural and social capital, and architectural skills and aspirations.  
Moreover, some authors have focused on social reproduction of micro-classes 
in a comparative perspective, but have disregarded licensed professions and the 
level of their regulations. Jonsson et. al (2009) have compared four countries with 
different big-class and micro-class structures. In this study 82 micro-classes were 
used and it shows that a micro-class reproduction exists, even if at a 
comparatively low level, and even in countries such as Sweden in which the 
micro-classes social reproduction would have been suppressed.  
The first aim of this thesis is to fill the lack of studies in the social mobility’s 
literature concerning licensing professionals’ social reproduction in a comparative 
perspective and for the Italian case.  
Furthermore, in Italy as well, the literature on social mobility often focuses on 
the relationship between social origins, education, and destinations (OED) using a 
big-class approach (Fabbri and Rossi 1997, Barbagli and Schizzerotto 1997, 
Pellizzari and Pica 2011; Pellizari and Orsini 2012); and research on the Italian 
licensed professions mainly focuses on the anticompetitive effect of licensure 
(Timmons and Thornton 2008, 2010; Pagliero 2010; Pellizzari and Pica 2011).  
Some of the studies on the intergenerational mobility of professionals as a 
meso-class have been implemented within more general analyses of the Italian 
higher social classes (Fabbri and Rossi 1997, Barbagli and Schizzerotto 1997, 
Chiesi 1998), whereas other studies focus on a specific professional group, such 
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as notaries (Santoro 1998), architects and engineers (Checchi 2010, Tousijn 
1987), and lawyers (Pica and Pellizzari 2011, Tousijn 1987).   
Some of these studies (Tousijn 1987; Fabbri and Rossi 1997; Chiesi 2008; 
Orsini and Pellizari 2012;) show a high level of intergenerational immobility for 
the high professional social class, underlining the effect of social origins on the 
chances of becoming a member of a licensed profession (Santoro 1998; Checchi 
2010; Pellizzari and Pica 2011). 
The purpose of this thesis is also to improve the understanding of 
professionals’ social reproduction in Italy focusing on both educational and 
professional careers of children of licensed professionals.  
Even if the social mobility literature is vast, studies on educational and 
occupational inequalities are needed in specifying these inequalities at the 
horizontal level. In other words, I focus on educational fields of study and micro-
classes of licensed professionals, differentiating the big-class of professionals as 
shown in Figure 1.1. In this way it is possible to highlight how horizontal micro-
processes of social reproduction affect social inequalities in a vertical dimension. 
Moreover, most of the studies on intergenerational mobility of liberal 
professionals (self-employed professionals) in Italy have shown high rigidities in 
their mobility regime (Schizzerotto 1993, 1994, Fabbri and Rossi 1997).  
However, no studies have focused on micro-classes of liberal professionals. 
Thus, to improve the understanding of this topic, it is useful to compare the social 
reproduction of liberal professionals and employed professionals within a micro-
class and between micro-classes. 
The next paragraph helps the reader to connect the theoretical framework 
with the three empirical chapters through the elaboration of the general 
hypotheses. 
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1.6. General hypotheses 
 
 
According to the theoretical framework illustrated above, three main 
hypotheses which delineate three empirical chapters of the thesis are specified14. 
The study of Jonsson at el. (2009) can be used as a starting point, because 
using Germany and Sweden as the two ideal-types of countries with high and low 
micro-classes structure it allows: to consider other two countries that, in terms of 
micro-class structures, can be placed in the middle of these two poles; to compare 
professionals’ social reproduction according to the level of closure of professions 
between the four countries and between professions in each country. 
 
 
Figure 1.2. Professional closure and micro-class structuration in four 
European countries. 
Intergenerational transmission of specific occupational skills 
High   Low 
Germany Denmark Great Britain Sweden 
Professional closure 
High   Low 
Germany Great Britain Denmark Sweden 
Vocational and stratified educational system 
High   Low 
Germany Denmark Great Britain Sweden 
 
 
Thus, Germany can be considered as the country in which both big-classes 
and micro-classes are well structured and in which professional closure is very 
high. In Denmark this vocational tradition is well established too and the age 
selection of 16 has recently been established, thus it is difficult to expect weaker 
processes of intergenerational professional skill transmission. In Great Britain the 
educational system is comprehensive, as well as Sweden. A strong vocational 
system and the level of stratification of educational systems in these countries can 
assure the persistence of a resources transmission model which can establish 
micro-classes within big-classes. 
Professional closure in both Great Britain and in Denmark is lower, than 
Germany15. On the contrary, in Sweden the micro-class structure is suppressed as 
                                                 
14 The three main hypotheses will be specified into details in each chapter of the thesis.  
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suggested by the industrial relations system and its more comprehensive 
educational system. Also the level of professional entry-market regulations is 
lower than the other countries. Of course, the presence of a vocational or a more 
comprehensive educational system, professional regulation and social 
stratification are linked to different welfare regime: from the social democratic 
model of Sweden and Denmark to liberal of Great Britain and to the conservative 
of Germany (see Esping-Andersen 1990). Along with these dimensions, 
professional regulations and the specific professionals skills transmission that 
implies the micro-class structure, the main hypothesis of chapter 2 follows: 
 
Hypothesis 1: the more structured the micro-classes and the higher the 
professional closure, the stronger is the social reproduction of licensed 
professionals between countries and between professional groups within a 
country. 
 
Analyzing the OED association in the four countries, with specific attention 
to micro-classes of licensed professionals, would reveal higher rigidities in the 
mobility regime of these professional groups according to their level of legal 
closure16. 
Thus, according to the two dimensions concerning the micro-class 
reproduction and professionals regulations, I expect Italy to be considered with a 
high immobility rigidities that it goes beyond the comprehensive educational 
system. The formal selection concerning the educational choices it is about the 
field of study at tertiary level. In order to specify the hypotheses about the social 
reproduction of licensed professionals in Italy, I consider how their educational 
careers differ from those of other higher social classes. In following the parent’s 
occupational careers, children of licensed professionals need to obtain higher 
educational credentials than children of high entrepreneurs and high managers, 
because of the entry barriers of licensed professions.  
Moreover, according to the theory of specific cultural capital reproduction, I 
expect that children of licensed professionals are more likely to graduate in the 
same field of study as their parents than the children of every other social class.  
                                                                                                                                     
15 Indeed, the strong vocational tradition of the educational system and the early age selection 
can increase the transmission from parents to children of specific professional skills. 
16 All this is done using the other fractions of the High Service class as reference categories (High 
entrepreneurs, High managers, other low regulated professions).   
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Given their advantages in terms of cultural, economic and social capital, 
professionals’ children are more likely to follow the same professional trajectory 
as their parents. According to the previous paragraphs, specific educational 
choices can be rationally made as well as culturally guided, in as much as 
professionals’ children are pushed from behind by structural factors.  
According to the relative risk aversion model, licensed professionals’ children 
try to avoid downwards social mobility. Thus, it can be hypothesized that in terms 
of big-classes, they try to remain in the higher service class, by exploiting the 
extra advantages in terms of economic, social, and cultural resources provided by 
their families (which pay off at wider level).  
Then, getting in depth of micro-dynamics of the social reproduction, they can 
also try to benefit from the advantages related to licensed professions, such as 
operating in a market with limited competition or inheriting the existing 
professional activity of the parent. Thus, dynamics of intergenerational 
professional social reproduction needs to be analyzed at both big-class and micro-
class levels. 
According to social closure theory the entry barriers of licensed professions, 
such as credentials and certifications, the arduousness in becoming a licensed 
professional varies from a profession to another depending on the restrictiveness 
of their regulation. They also gain advantages from high level of regulation during 
their professional career, such as code of conduct which in turn are able to 
decrease the level of the internal competition. 
Thus, it is expected that the effect of having a licensed professional father 
varies the propensity in becoming a full member of a profession according to the 
restrictiveness of the entry barriers (legal closure). 
Then, considering the intergenerational social reproduction of licensed 
professionals, liberal professionals (self-employed professionals) and employed 
professionals also differ within each micro-class. According to Pellizzari and 
Orsini (2012), indeed, the opportunity to enter into the professional market within 
an existing activity is a great advantage that professionals’ children are inclined to 
exploit. In addition also conduct regulation improves licensed professionals career 
stability. 
37 
 
The hypothesis 2 regards chapter 3 in which the social reproduction and the 
intra-generational immobility of Italian male professionals are analysed; while 
with a sample of graduates, hypothesis 3 concerns chapter 4.  
 
Hypothesis 2: Children of licensed professionals are more likely to obtain a 
social position in the high service class by following the same professional 
trajectory as their parents; and the higher the regulation level during 
professionals’ career the higher is their intra-generational immobility of these 
professionals.  
 
Hypothesis 3: Children of licensed professionals are more likely to have a 
master degree in the same field of study as their parents than other fractions of 
the upper class; professionals’ daughters obtain the same educational credentials 
and social position as their parents as professionals sons. These processes are 
exacerbated when the professional parent is self-employed for both sons and 
daughters. 
 
 
 
 
1.7. Concluding remarks 
 
 
A combination of theories and social class approaches has been considered in 
this chapter as an appropriate way to focus on licensed professionals’ social 
reproduction. Specifically, this chapter has illustrated the guide line of this thesis 
for the investigation of these occupational groups social reproduction, linking it to 
their social closure strategies. Indeed, it has been shown how these prestigious 
professional categories differentiate themselves from all the other fractions of the 
higher class, including non-licensed professionals. 
The connection between micro-dynamics of intergenerational transmission of 
specific occupational skills and the level of institutionalization of professional 
groups was discussed as a central point in the investigation of the mobility regime 
of these highly regulated professionals. Indeed, taking into consideration fractions 
of the higher service class (including licensed professionals and unlicensed 
professionals) it is possible to understand how structural forms of social closure 
are able to produce high levels of social inequalities. 
Of course, it has pointed out that intergenerational mobility of the upper class 
and professionals is studied in next chapters at macro-, meso and micro-level 
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because of the different mechanisms of each level, such as more or less abstract 
culture transmission. 
Moreover, according to Jonsson et. al (2009) social closure conditions are 
found at micro-level as well as for the legal closure of licensed professionals. 
This chapter, thus, is the theoretically framework for the other three empirical 
chapters of this thesis, as also pointed out by the three general hypotheses: firstly, 
comparing licensed professionals’ social reproduction across four European 
countries (Sweden, Great Britain, Denmark and Germany) according to the 
Origin-Education-Destination association; secondly, going into details of their 
social reproduction in Italy by using a sample representative of the men and 
thirdly by using another large sample representative of the Italian graduates with 
which I conclude in a more complete way the empirical analysis of these 
professionals. The reason why this study gives more space to Italy, rather than 
staying on cross-national comparison is because, although literature on social 
mobility in Italy is vast, no specific attention has been given to these professionals 
groups, especially employing a micro-class approach. Thus, to be specific, this 
thesis pays much attention to the educational career of professionals’ children in 
Italy, considering the graduation in a field of study as the first step to become a 
licensed professional, and finally, focusing on social stratification through an 
horizontal perspective and the related social inequalities considering the 
beginning of professionals occupational careers.  
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2. Social closure, micro-class immobility and the intergenerational 
reproduction of the upper class: a comparative study 
 
 
2.1. Introduction  
 
 
This chapter provides a twofold contribution to the debate encouraged by big-
class and micro-class theorists on how social mobility should be studied. It 
assesses how social closure affects intergenerational immobility in professional 
employment across four European countries: Great Britain, Germany, Denmark 
and Sweden. Indeed, it follows the analytical and empirical strategies explained in 
the introduction and in the theoretical framework (chapter one). 
It documents that children of professionals display a strong propensity to 
reproduce the specific micro-class of their parents. However, when they do not 
follow in their parents’ footsteps, as is often the case, they also display a 
particularly high propensity to move into other professional occupations (meso-
class rigidities), rather than into the other fractions of the upper service class 
(managerial and entrepreneurial employment) or into lower classes. 
Indeed, it argues that previous research has paid limited attention to meso-
class rigidities: the intense exchanges occurring within professional employment 
are the key process of intergenerational reproduction at the top. 
The chapter also asserts that the social reproduction of professionals notably 
differs across these countries and as explained in the theoretical chapter this is in 
line with their social openness and institutional arrangements. Degree of 
professional regulation also have significant implications for inequality of 
occupational opportunity. 
The structure of this chapter is the following: I derive the hypotheses after a 
briefly theoretical debate (paragraph  2.2.) and then I describe data, variable and 
methods employed in the analysis (paragraph 2.3.); results section is composed by 
three main parts, starting with the analysis of the contribution of the micro-class 
intergenerational immobility to those of the meso-, and big-classes (paragraph 
2.4.); then I concentrate the attention on the association between professionals’ 
micro-classes immobility and their specific level of professional regulation 
(paragraph 2.5.); before concluding, I study the Origin-Education association by 
using fields of study and fathers’ profession (paragraph 2.6.). 
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2.2. Deriving the hypotheses  
 
 
As mentioned in the first chapter, if regulated professions are particularly 
rewarding, they enhance the incentives for children from these professions to 
follow in their parents’ footsteps. This mechanism is reinforced considerably if 
professional parents can transfer a family professional business to their children 
and, most importantly, a client portfolio.  
Moreover, stringent entry restrictions in the form of long university courses, 
compulsory practice and selective entry exams make the investment in training for 
these professions both extremely costly and risky for outsiders.  
I expect that the relevance of micro-class structuration for intergenerational 
reproduction at the top varies cross-nationally, reflecting differences between 
countries in their institutional arrangements concerning their welfare state. Indeed, 
as reported in the theoretical framework, also the choice of these four European 
countries was made because of the institutional variety. Nonetheless, the emphasis 
that the first chapter put on educational systems characteristics is needed because 
education is the starting point to delineate if access to occupations is related or not 
to the possession of specific vocational certificates. By using the German 
educational system as example the reader can better understand this 
argumentation. Indeed, in Germany the educational system accentuates 
occupational specificity to the highest degree. Access to occupations is tightly 
related to the possession of specific vocational certificates. This applies also to the 
liberal professions, which have a well-established tradition of professional 
associations that have managed to impose and preserve strict access regulations - 
starting with access to its selective university system (Patterson et. al 2003; 
Jonsson et. al 2009).  
At the opposite extreme, Sweden has a comprehensive educational system in 
which vocational training is under-developed. Industrial relations involve 
negotiations between centralized trade unions and employer federations, and even 
professionals have created a collective organization that represents them all 
centrally. For most professions, entry regulations are absent or comparatively 
weak (Patterson et. al 2003). 
Denmark and Great Britain may be seen as intermediate cases, between 
Germany and Sweden. Denmark has delayed tracking to the age of 16, but has a 
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well-developed vocational system. Consequently also access to occupations with 
vocational certificate characterizes this country, indeed, there is a well developed 
system of professional licenses. For these characteristics I can expect that 
Denmark it is more similar to Germany. Whereas the British educational system is 
comprehensive until the age of 16, and vocational training is less developed than 
in Germany and Denmark (Breen 2004). Professional regulation Great Britain is 
not as high as in Germany, but is definitively more structured than in Sweden in 
terms of professionals regulation (Jonsson et. al 2009).  
At the same time, these entry barriers enhance the competitive value of the 
skills and cultural resources acquired in the family of origin and of the social and 
information resources to successfully navigate these professional careers. Hence, I 
can expect that micro-class immobility is higher for regulated professions than for 
non-regulated professions and that the former, therefore, displays a higher degree 
of immobility in the higher service class. I also can expect a higher degree of 
professional social immobility in countries like Germany and Denmark than Great 
Britain and Sweden. 
However, micro-class immobility is not the sole mechanism of social 
immobility at the top of the class hierarchy. Alternative routes to immobility at the 
top become of critical importance. Indeed Jonsson et al. (2009, pp.980) note that 
the four types of professionals family resources (cultural, cognitive, economic and 
network, see. paragraph. 1.4.) can also operate on a broader basis, that is, for the 
entire meso-class of professionals. More generally, there is abundant evidence that 
professionals as a whole differ from managers and entrepreneurs in terms of value 
orientations, political attitudes and lifestyles (Dalton and Klingemann 2007; 
Lambert and Griffiths 2011). 
Finally, the cultural, social, cognitive and economic resources can act also as 
a generalized means of intergenerational reproduction for individuals who cross 
the boundaries of their micro- and meso-classes of origin. This is the standard 
explanatory approach taken in social stratification research. For instance, children 
of professionals may enjoy higher chances of access to managerial employment 
(and vice versa) than the lower classes because they are endowed with higher 
cognitive skills, cultural resources and financial resources to support their 
educational and occupational careers.  
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This kind of explanation focuses on the amount of resources relevant for a 
broad range of occupations, while the micro-class approach focuses on 
occupation-specific resources that are valued in a narrow set of occupations. 
These latter occupations specific resources ensure strong competitive advantages, 
but only if children are willing to follow in their parents’ footsteps.  
Meso-class rigidities arise due to resources that are qualitatively differentiated 
but relevant in a broader set of occupations. Hence, rather than engaging in a 
contest between micro- and big-class approaches, I see three distinct sets of 
mechanisms that work as complementary routes to social immobility. 
As shown in the theoretical chapter, Germany and Sweden can be seen as the 
two ideal-types of countries with high and low micro-classes structure and Great 
Britain and Denmark are in between.  
Analyzing the Origin-Destination association in the four countries, with 
specific attention to micro-classes of licensed professionals, would reveal higher 
rigidities in the mobility regime of these professional groups according to their 
level of legal closure17.  
Following the arguments advanced in this section and previously in the 
theoretical chapter, I expect that micro-class immobility varies accordingly across 
countries and across occupations. 
Before presenting data and methods in the next section, I summarize the 
hypotheses that guide this chapter’s analyses as reported below: 
 
Hypothesis 2.1. micro-class immobility is stronger in more regulated 
professions; 
 
Hypothesis 2.2. micro-class immobility is strongest in Germany and weakest 
in Sweden; 
 
Hypothesis 2.3. professional regulation enhances the immobility of children 
of professionals in the higher service class; 
 
Hypothesis 2.4. among children of professionals who leave their micro-
classes of origin, immobility in the higher service class is further enhanced by 
strong meso-class rigidities. 
 
                                                 
17 All this is done using the other fractions of the high service class as reference categories (high 
entrepreneurs, high managers, other low regulated professions).   
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Hypothesis 2.5. micro-class immobility for more regulated professions is 
visible since children of professionals graduate in a field of study in line with the 
domain of parents’ profession; 
 
Hypothesis 2.6. sons and daughters are both more likely to graduate in a 
field of study in affinity with their fathers’ profession than children of the other 
social classes; 
 
 
2.3. Data, variables and methods 
 
 
For the analyses, a cumulative dataset that pools three international surveys is 
used: the European Social Survey (five waves every other year from 2002 to 
2010), the European Value Study (wave 2008) and the International Social Survey 
Programme (wave 2009). These surveys involve nationally representative samples 
of the populations of a large number of European countries18.  
A cumulative dataset is relied upon in order to enlarge sample size for the 
detailed analyses of immobility within single occupations, and the only four 
countries that have large enough samples to run these analyses are selected. 
Although country selection is driven by data constraints, I have already noted that 
these countries display substantial variability in terms of educational, labor market 
and welfare arrangements.  
These surveys and these specific waves have been selected because they 
provide detailed measurements of origins and destinations, with four-digit ISCO 
titles for the occupation of the father19 (when the respondent was 14) and of the 
respondent, as well as information on employment status and supervision tasks 
that can be used to build the Erikson-Goldthorpe class schema.  
Unfortunately, not all surveys have information on mother’s employment, a 
limitation that could be particularly harmful for the analysis of women’s 
occupational attainment. 
                                                 
18 I do not report the information on the sampling designs and data collection methods, as they vary 
across surveys, waves and countries. However, this information is easily accessible online. In particular, 
for the ESS refer to http://www.europeansocialsurvey.org/methodology/; for EVS, see 
http://www.europeanvaluesstudy.eu; and for ISSP, see http://zacat.gesis.org . 
19 The issue of only measuring father’s occupation, though standard, still warrants some discussion of 
the limitations for the analysis, especially for daughters. Daughters may well be micro-class-
reproducing their mothers’ occupations, but I have no way to know; sons may be as well, in which case 
both the rates and the patterns of micro-class reproduction would be very much underestimated in this 
paper. 
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The wording of the questions concerning social origins and occupational 
destinations is highly comparable across the three original surveys. Therefore, an 
additional advantage offered by this cumulative dataset over previous cross-
national studies of macro- and micro-class mobility is the higher level of 
comparability. 
In preliminary analyses, logistic regression models were used to assess 
whether the different surveys measure the influence of origins on access to higher 
service class positions differentially, but these three-way interactions are not 
statistically significant based on a likelihood ratio test20. 
Due to sample size constraints, analysis of the adult population is carried out 
as a whole. However, I have checked that social inequalities in access to the 
service class are highly stable across three birth cohorts (1930-45, 1946-60; 1961-
80).21  
After selecting respondents aged 25 to 74, the cumulative sample for these 
four countries comprises 35,443 cases with valid information for origins and 
destinations22. The following version of the Erikson-Goldthorpe schema is used: 
higher service class (I), lower service class (II), skilled white collar (IIIa), routine 
non-manual workers (IIIb), self-employed workers (IVab), farmers (IVc), skilled 
manual workers, low-level supervisors and technicians (V-VI), and unskilled 
manual workers (VIIab). The higher service class is articulated into three meso-
classes: entrepreneurs (with at least 10 employees), high-level managers and high-
level professionals. The latter category is further disaggregated into the following 
micro-classes using the four-digit ISCO titles:  
• legal professionals (i.e., lawyers, notaries and judges); 
• accountants; 
• architects;  
                                                 
20 See Appendix A Section 6 
21 In Germany and Great Britain, the likelihood ratio test prefers models of constant association over 
models incorporating the interactions among cohorts, origins and destinations. The former are 
marginally preferred (p-value: 0.12) also in Sweden, and only in Denmark do the latter display a better 
fit. Even in Denmark and Sweden cross-cohort variations in the role of origin for access to the upper 
class are quite limited. Therefore, aggregating cohorts does not make too much torture to the data.  
22 I include people aged 65-74 in order to gain statistical power by enlarging the number of valid cases. 
I take into consideration these people (even if it is unusual for a study of social mobility) because the 
main purpose of this chapter is linking professional entry-market regulation, which is practically 
unchanged since the first half of the nineteenth century, with levels of intergenerational immobility of 
licensed professionals. A control analysis on a restrictive sample has been conducted to be sure that 
including people these age are not affected the estimates. 
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• engineers;  
• medical science professionals (i.e., doctors, pharmacists and 
veterinarians);  
• other science professionals (e.g., physicists, mathematicians, 
biologists);  
• professionals in the social sciences (e.g., sociologists, communication 
experts)23. 
Hence, the first five categories refer to regulated professions of the higher 
service class, while the last two comprise the non-regulated professions of the 
same class. These distinctions match with the same occupational categories of the 
OECD index of professional regulation presented in section 1.4., with two minor 
exceptions24. 
The analytical strategy concerning levels of professionals’ social immobility 
proceeds as already explained in the introduction.  
Then, logistic regression analysis is used to assess whether professional 
regulation affects immobility in the higher service class. Moreover, binomial 
logistic regression is also used to analyze the most rewarding field of study, i.e., to 
have a propensity for being part of the higher service class.  
Finally, linear regression models are employed for each field of study, and 
thus, by using a dichotomous variable to study the propensity in graduating in a 
field of study in line with the professional domain of the father. These models are 
run employing macro-, meso-, and micro-class approaches.  
The first step involves the specification of a sequence of log-linear models 
that control the marginal distributions of origins and destinations in order to 
estimate relative immobility propensities. These models are specified in order to 
analyze the association Origin-Destination on the 16x16x2x4 cross-tabulation 
between origins, destinations, gender and country. The 16 categories of origins 
and destinations comprise the above seven micro-classes of professionals, the two 
other meso-classes of the higher service class (entrepreneurs and high-level 
                                                 
23 See Appendix A –section 1. 
24 Ideally, we may want to differentiate the single detailed occupations of legal and medical science 
professionals, but there are not enough cases for this kind of analysis. These additional distinctions are 
of little significance for our results because: a) doctors account for about 90% of medical science 
professionals in all countries; b) lawyers account for at least 70% of legal professionals (and notaries 
exist only in Germany). We impute to these two professional groups the scores of the OECD index for 
their modal occupations (doctors and lawyers).  
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managers) and the remaining seven macro-classes (II, IIIa, IIIb, IVab, IVc, V-VI, 
VIIab). This nested structure, with greater detail at the top of the class hierarchy, 
was used because my research questions focus on immobility in the higher service 
class of children of professionals. 
For the same reason, a sequence of log-linear models is specified pertaining 
to the diagonal cells of the mobility table, i.e., intergenerational immobility is 
modeled (see Xie 1992). These models incorporate macro-, meso- and micro-class 
rigidities alone and altogether. Macro-class rigidities are captured by a design 
matrix that specifies one different parameter for each cell that refers to immobility 
within a big-class; all mobility cells are set to 0 (see section 1 of the appendix A). 
Meso-class rigidities are expressed by a second matrix that specifies one different 
parameter for each cell that refers to immobility within a meso-class, i.e., either 
within entrepreneurs, within managers, or within professionals. Micro-class 
rigidities are described by a third matrix that specifies one different parameter for 
each cell that refers to immobility within each of the seven professional groups.  
For each of these three matrices, cross-national variations are assessed using 
three types of models. The models are illustrated with reference to the macro-class 
specification. I start with a model of homogeneous quasi-perfect mobility that 
incorporates the macro-class rigidity matrix and that does not interact with 
country. 
Hence, this model does not allow for cross-national variations in social 
fluidity. The next model of heterogeneous quasi-perfect mobility freely interacts 
with the country of each macro-rigidity parameter, thus allowing for different 
levels of macro-class immobility across countries in an unconstrained form. The 
third specification is a log-multiplicative model of quasi-perfect mobility that 
estimates a common basic pattern of immobility parameters for all countries and 
captures cross-national differences with one uniform association parameter 
(unidiff) per country that summarizes the overall strength of social immobility in a 
given country.  
Hence, the comparison between models of homogeneous and heterogeneous 
quasi-perfect mobility informs us of the importance of country differences, and 
the comparison between the former and the log-multiplicative specification tells 
us whether country differences involve only the overall strength of immobility or 
its qualitative pattern as well. Following the same logic, these three types of 
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models can be used to assess cross-country variations in meso- and micro-class 
rigidities. 
 
 
2.4. Results: the contribution of micro-, meso- and macro-class rigidities to 
immobility in the higher service class 
 
 
Table 2.1. reports the fit indices of the above-described sequence of log-linear  
models. For comparisons among nested models, likelihood ratio tests (column 3) 
which contrast models in terms of their fit (expressed by the deviance in column 
1) and parsimony (degrees of freedom in column 2) are used. The dissimilarity 
index (the percentage of cases misclassified by each model, column 4) can be 
used for comparisons among non-nested models, but it does not take parsimony 
into account. 
The purpose of the first step of this analysis, reported in the upper panel A of 
table 2.1., is to assess whether macro-, meso- and micro-class rigidities display 
independent influences on social immobility in the higher service class and 
whether these influences vary cross-nationally. In a second step (panel B), I assess 
whether these mechanisms are gendered by interacting the corresponding design 
matrices with gender. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
48 
 
Table 2.1. Fit indices of log-linear models of quasi perfect mobility with macro, meso and 
micro-class rigidities 
Model description L2 d. f. Significance ∆ 
PANEL A 
0.Conditional Independence Model  
 
6677 
 
1800 
 
- 
 
0.148 
Big-rigidities only     
1a. Homogeneous 4407 1792 0,000 (M.0) 0,113 
1b. Heterogeneous 4345 1768 0,000 (M.1a) 0,110 
1c. Log-multiplicative 4379 1789 0,000 (M.1a) 0,111 
Big- and Meso-rigidities     
2a. Homogeneous 4179 1789 0,000 (M.1a) 0,111 
2b. Heterogeneous 4113 1756 0,001 (M.2a) 
0,000 (M 1b) 
0,108 
2c Log-multiplicative 4146 1783 0,000 (M.2a) 
0,000(M 1c) 
0,109 
Big- and Micro-rigidities     
3a. Homogeneous 4110 1785 0,000 (M.1a) 0,111 
3b. Heterogeneous 4022 1740 0,001 (M.3a) 
0,000 (M.1b) 
0,108 
3c. Log-multiplicative 4073 1779 0,000 (M.3a) 
0,000 (M.1c) 
0,109 
Big-, Meso- and Micro-rigidities      
4a. Homogeneous 4005 1782 0,000 (M.2a) 
0,000 (M.3a) 
0,110 
4b. Heterogeneous 3903 1728 0,001 (M.4a) 
0,000 (M.2b) 
0,000 (M.3b) 
0,106 
4c Log-multiplicative 3954 1773 0,000 (M.4a) 
0,000 (M.2c) 
0,000 (M.3c) 
0,108 
PANEL B: Big-, Meso- and Micro-
rigidities with gender interactions  
    
Models of heterogeneous quasi-perfect 
mobility 
4dA Big-rigidities interacted with gender 
 
3815 
 
1696 
 
0,000(M.4b) 
 
0.103 
4dB. Meso- rigidities with gender 3886 1716 0,000(M.4b) 0,106 
4dC Micro- rigidities interacted with 
gender 
3860 1700 0,000(M.4b) 0,106 
4dD Big- and meso- rigidities interacted 
with gender 
3798 1684 0,149 (M.4dA) 
0,000 (M.4dB) 
0,102 
4dE. Big-, micro- rigidities interacted with 
gender 
3770 1668 0,000 (M.4dA) 
0,000 (M.4dC) 
0,102 
4dF Meso- and micro- rigidities interacted 
with gender 
3837 1688 0,000 (M.4dB) 
0,000 (M.4dC) 
0,106 
4dG. Big-, meso- and micro- rigidities 
interacted with gender 
3748 1656 0,006 (M.4dD) 
0,037 (M.4dE) 
0,000 (M.4dF) 
0,101 
Source: ESS 2002-2010, EVS 2008, ISSP 2009 
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I start with a baseline model of conditional independence that unrealistically 
assumes that origins and destinations are unrelated25. This model is used only as a 
yardstick for comparison with more realistic models. Models 1a to 1c add only 
macro-class rigidities to this model. As shown in table 2.1., they display huge 
improvements over the model of conditional independence, thus confirming the 
strength of social immobility in these four countries. For instance, model 1a adds 
eight macro-class immobility parameters that are kept constant across country and 
thus loses only eight degrees of freedom relative to the conditional independence 
model, but it reduces the deviance by more than one third. However, models 1b 
and 1c, which allow for cross-national variations in macro-class rigidities, 
improve on model 1a, as indicated by the likelihood ratio tests. 
Models 2a to 2c add meso-class rigidities to macro-class rigidities, while 
models 3a to 3c add micro-class rigidities, and models 4a to 4c incorporate all 
three immobility mechanisms26. If the homogeneous model specifications of these 
series of models are contrasted, I can see that model 4a is unequivocally preferred 
over models 3a and 3b, which in turn are preferred over model 1a. The 
comparisons among the heterogeneous specifications, or among the log-
multiplicative specifications, lead to the same conclusion. In other words, this 
evidence indicates that immobility in the higher service class is jointly produced 
by micro-, meso- and macro-class rigidities, in line with my hypotheses. Hence, 
the immobility of children of professionals reflects not only standard macro-class 
effects but also their disproportionate chances of following in their parents’ 
footsteps or, at any rate, remaining within professional employment27.  
Moreover, models 4b and 4c are preferred over model 4a, which indicates 
that these three rigidities vary cross-nationally. The corresponding comparisons 
among models 2a to 2c and among models 3a to 3c lead to the same conclusion. 
The heterogeneous specifications always display the best fit also when looking at 
the dissimilarity index. In other words, there are indications that the qualitative 
pattern of these rigidities is not always the same across nations. 
                                                 
25 See mobility table in Section 2 in the Appendix A. Mobility table are divided from gender and 
countries, thus the analyses can also be conducted separately. 
26 See design matrixes in Section 3 of the Appendix A.  
27 Similarly, children of managers (entrepreneurs) enjoy disproportionate chances of becoming 
managers (entrepreneurs) on top of their higher chances of persistence in the higher service class. In 
other words, meso-class rigidities operate also for the two other fractions of this class.  
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In figure 2.1. I plot for each country the immobility parameter that refers to 
(big-class) immobility in the higher service class across three heterogeneous 
model specifications. The first one incorporates only macro-class rigidities (model 
1b) and therefore describes the overall level of immobility at the top.  
As shown in table 2.1., immobility is particularly strong in Germany. The 
second column plots the same parameter, but purged by micro-class effects 
(model 3b)28. I can see that it is significantly reduced in Germany and Denmark, 
but much less so in Sweden and Great Britain. The third column shows that 
immobility in the higher service class is greatly reduced when purged by meso-
class rigidities (model 4b), particularly in Germany and Sweden. Hence, 
immobility within the professional class is a key driver of immobility at the top. 
Moreover, in all countries the immobility parameter purged by both meso- and 
micro-class rigidities is far from negligible, which indicates the strength of pure 
macro-class rigidities.  
As a result of these parameters being taken from nonlinear models, the effect 
changes across models should not be over-interpreted. However, it is quite clear 
that these results disconfirm the general claim that 'big class' immobility is largely 
driven by micro-class rigidities. These micro-class rigidities play a relevant role, 
at least in Germany and Denmark, but meso-class and macro-class rigidities are 
more important. It may be noted that also in the analysis by Jonsson et al. (2009), 
the strong immobility of the liberal professions is not predominantly mediated by 
micro-class rigidities.  
Interestingly, in the third specification, big-class effects are not any stronger 
in Germany, which indicates that the greater immobility at the top in Germany is 
entirely attributable to the stronger micro- and meso-class rigidities in this 
country. 
 
 
                                                 
28. By definition, micro-class rigidities enhance immobility at the top only through immobility in 
professional employment. Therefore, when looking at changes of big-class effects across models, 
micro-class rigidities must be fitted first; otherwise, by construction, they cannot further reduce big 
class effects. 
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Figure 2.1. Big class parameters for social immobility in the higher service class across 
three model specifications and across countries. Beta parameters extrapolated from 
models 1b, 3b, 4b. Source: ESS 2002-2010, EVS 2008, ISSP 2009 
 
 
Panel B of table 2.1 assesses gender differences in immobility patterns. The 
previous model 4b is taken as a starting point. This model jointly incorporates the 
three rigidities and allows them to freely vary across countries.  
Then, the models in panel B incorporate gender interactions with one design 
matrix by one, with a combination of two matrices and finally, with all three 
matrices together. As seen, the last model is preferred, which implies that the 
influences of the macro-, meso- and micro-classes of origin are gendered.  
However, while the big-class immobility parameters vary significantly across 
gender only in Great Britain (0.56 for women and 0.42 for men); gender 
differences are stronger and more systematic for meso- and micro-class rigidities. 
Immobility within professional employment is higher for women in Germany 
(1.10 versus 0.82 for men), Denmark (0.98 versus 0.29) and Great Britain (0.56 
versus 0.23), and it is equally high in Sweden (0.79 versus 0.82). Conversely, as 
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regards micro-class immobility in professional employment, I detect 
systematically stronger effects for men in regulated professions in all countries 
but Sweden.  
The magnitude of these differences is noticeable. The mean of these micro-
class parameters in Germany is 2.02 for men and 1.28 for women, in Denmark 
2.49 for men and 0.42 for women, in Great Britain 1.81 for men and 0.29 for 
women, while in Sweden I detect comparatively low values for both genders (0.50 
and 0.95, respectively).  
On the whole, it is apparent that meso-class rigidities operate for both genders 
but in a stronger form for women, while micro-class immobility is strong for men 
and of limited importance for women. These gender differences will be 
highlighted more in the concluding remarks. For, whether social closure explains 
the pattern of micro-class immobility parameters is considered.  
 
 
2.5 Results: social closure and micro-class immobility in comparative 
perspective  
 
 
Figure 2.2. plots for each country the relationship between the micro-class 
immobility parameters for men (taken from the preferred model 4dG in table 2.1) 
and the scores of the index of professional regulation.  
The large size of these immobility parameters is noteworthy. For instance, a 
value of 3.02 for medical professions in Germany indicates that children of this 
profession enjoy e3.02 = 20.5 higher chances of gaining access to the same 
occupation as their parents than of leaving it.  
Overall, relative micro-class immobility propensities are huge. Moreover, in 
Germany, Denmark and Great Britain, a positive relationship between 
professional closure and immobility is detected. Immobility is systematically the 
lowest for the two fields of science and social science, where regulation is 
virtually absent. It is highest among doctors, legal professionals and accountants; 
architects and engineers are located in an intermediate position.  
Differences between micro-classes appear particularly strong in Germany and 
Denmark. In Sweden, professional closure occurs to a very limited extent, and it is 
evident that differences between micro-classes are much more compressed. These 
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results confirm previous hypotheses, but only for men, as the line representing the 
relationship between social closure and immobility for women is virtually flat29.. 
A limitation of this analysis is that the index of professional regulation refers 
to the late ‘90s, while the occupational careers of respondents have developed 
between the late ‘50s and 2010. Unfortunately, no index of professional regulation 
is available before 1998. I have therefore rerun the analyses only for individuals 
aged 25 to 45 to reduce this time discrepancy, and results are virtually identical 
(see section 5 the appendix A). This stability is unsurprising, because regulations 
of the traditional liberal professions have been enforced at least since the mid-20th 
century and have remained largely untouched until the ‘90s (Patterson et al. 
2003).  
Hence, regulated professions display a much higher degree of micro-class 
immobility than unregulated professions. I next consider to what extent this 
tendency affects chances of intergenerational persistence at the top of the 
occupational hierarchy.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
29 However, in Germany, the most regulated country, we detect a clear positive relationship also for 
women. In Sweden, the most unregulated country; it is unsurprising that we do not find any relationship 
either for men or for women. Denmark and Great Britain are the true exceptions. 
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Figure 2.2. The relationship between entry market regulations in professional occupations 
and immobility parameters for each micro-class. Source: ESS 2002-2010, EVS 2008, ISSP 
2009 
 
 
In particular, I present the results of a model of binomial logistic regression 
for the total effect of social origins on the probability of gaining access to the 
higher service class. I compare the eight big-classes, the three meso-classes, and I 
incorporate the distinction between licensed and non-licensed professionals. I run 
the models separately for each country, and I control for socio-demo variables 
(cohort and gender), for survey effects and for their two-way interactions. 30  
 
 
 
                                                 
30. These logistic regression models are less parsimonious than the log-linear models; therefore, I 
contrast regulated professions altogether versus non-regulated professions to save statistical power. 
Moreover, gender interactions with origins are unexpectedly non-significant, and I do not incorporate 
them. However, given the previous pattern of results, I suspect that this lack of significant is largely a 
matter of statistical power.  
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Figure 2.3. Average marginal effects for the probability of being in the higher service class according to the 
big class, the meso-class and micro-class of origin (ref. cat. unskilled working class). Source: ESS 2002-
2010, EVS 2008, ISSP 2009 
 
 
Figure 2.3. displays the average marginal effects for the influence of family 
background. Class VIIab of unskilled manual workers (VII) is the reference 
category. For each country, the panel on the left refers to differences between big 
classes of origin. As seen, in all countries children of skilled manual workers (V-
VI), farmers (IVc) and routine non-manual workers (IIIb) enjoy similar 
probabilities of upward mobility to the higher service class as the reference 
category, whereas children of the urban petty bourgeoisie (IVab) and of skilled 
white collars (IIIa) enjoy a competitive advantage of approximately 10 percentage 
points in all countries but Sweden, where the advantage is smaller. Children of the 
lower and of the higher service classes exhibit much higher chances of access to 
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the top of the class hierarchy in all countries. The influence of the big-class of 
origin looks more pronounced in Germany, particularly as regards white collars 
and the higher service class, and looks weaker in Sweden, in line with previous 
comparative research on social mobility (Breen 2004). 
The bottom panel on the right for each nation refers to meso-class differences 
between entrepreneurs, managers and professionals of the higher service class. As 
seen, children of managers enjoy less favorable prospects than those of 
professionals and entrepreneurs, but the confidence intervals for these three social 
groups overlap for all countries except Germany.  
However, from the top panel on the left of figure 2.3. emerges a pattern 
between countries: the distinction between the group of licensed professionals and 
the one of unlicensed professionals is similar for Germany and Denmark, and the 
missing distinction between these two different groups of professionals links 
Great Britain and Sweden. As previously illustrated and as the theoretical 
framework suggests this can be the result of different institutional arrangements, 
starting with educational systems link to the access of occupations through 
vocational certifications and licenses for professionals.  
Moreover, regulated professions enjoy higher immobility prospects than 
unregulated professionals in Germany and Denmark, indeed confident intervals do 
not overlap. As expected, in Sweden and Great Britain no difference between 
regulated and unregulated professions is detected. Overall, there is evidence that 
variations between and within countries in the degree of social closure are 
consequential for immobility at the top. 
To control whether differences between regulated and unregulated 
professions are simply driven by differential success in Higher Education, a rerun 
of the analyses presented in figure 2.3. is carried out with an additional dummy 
variable that refers to the attainment of tertiary degrees (categories 5 and 6 of the 
ISCED classification). Thus the direct effects of social origins are estimated. I 
briefly comment on these results. 
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Table 2.2. Binomial logistic regression models predicting the probability of being 
in the Higher Service Class. Average Marginal Effect of having a father in same 
big-class (Mode1), in the same meso-class (Model 2), in the same licensed or non-
licensed professional group (Model 3), considering the OED association in each 
country. Reference category: working class (VIIab) 
Country Big-class: 
higher service 
class   
Meso-classes  Average 
marginal 
effects 
Professionals Average 
marginal 
effects 
Germany 0.10*** H. Entrep. 0.12* Non-licensed 0.04 
 (0.01)  (0.04)  (0.02) 
  H. Man. 0.05 Licensed 0.13*** 
   (0.02)  (0.02) 
  Profession. 0.10***   
   (0.01)   
Denmark 0.09*** Entrep. 0.11** Non-licensed 0.05 
 (0.02)  (0.04)  (0.02) 
  Man. 0.08** Licensed 0.15*** 
   (0.03)  (0.03) 
  Profession. 0.9***   
   (0.02)   
Great 
Britain 
0.10*** Entrep. 0.17*** Non-licensed 0.09*** 
 (0.02)  (0.05)  (0.02) 
  Man. 0.08 Licensed 0.11*** 
   (0.03)  (0.03) 
  Profession. 0.09***   
   (0.02)   
Sweden 0.09*** Entrep. 0.12* Non-licensed 0.11*** 
 (0.02)  (0.05)  (0.02) 
  Man. 0.06** Licensed 0.10** 
   (0.02)  (0.03) 
  Profession. 0.11***   
   (0.02)   
Significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 – Standard errors in parentheses.  
Source: ESS 2002-2010, EVS 2008, ISSP 2009 
 
 
As expected, the overall influence of family background is considerably 
reduced after I control for education. This reduction is stronger for Germany, 
where education is a stronger mediator of the total effect of family background for 
both professionals and managers, in line with previous research on German 
credentialism (Bol and Weeden 2014).  
Most importantly for the hypotheses, in Germany and Denmark, I still detect 
a marked advantage for children of licensed professionals over those of non-
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licensed professionals, while this is not the case in Great Britain and Sweden. 
Indeed, in the former countries no social group enjoys better prospects of 
persistence at the top than the regulated professions.  
 
 
2.6 Results: credentialism and micro-class immobility in comparative 
perspective  
 
 
As I have seen, regulated professions display a much higher degree of micro-
class immobility than unregulated professions. Thus I expect that the same 
association is visible when looking at the fields of study of the respondent.  
The most rewarding fields of study are considered in terms of 
intergenerational persistence at the top of the occupational hierarchy. In particular, 
presented in figure 2.4. are the results of a model of binomial logistic regression 
for seven fields on the probability of gaining access to the higher service class. 
The models are run separately for each country with a control for socio-demo 
variables (cohorts and gender), and for survey effects. 
Figure 2.4. displays the average marginal effects for the influence of different 
fields of study. Some of them give access to a licensed profession in each country, 
such as Law, health-related fields, economics.  
According to these results, Germany has the highest propensity to gain access 
to the top of the hierarchy with regards to graduates in a field of study that allows 
one to become a licensed professional. In Denmark the trend is very similar to the 
German’s. In Great Britain just Law and scientific fields seem to give more 
chances in being part of the Service Class (I). In Sweden, Architecture, 
Engineering, and Law are indeed the most rewarding fields of study.  
Next taken into consideration, is the propensity of having graduated in each 
field of study by social origins by using linear regression models on a binary 
dependent variable, as explained in the methods section.  
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Figure 2.4. Average marginal effects for the probability of being in the higher service 
class according to fields of study (ref. cat. Social Studies). Source: ESS 2002-2010, EVS 
2008, ISSP 2009 
 
 
Again, the models are run separately for each country employing the big-, the 
meso- and the micro-class approaches, using the previous controls. Considering 
micro-classes, architects and engineers are aggregated as dictated by the pre-
existing categories of the variable regarding fields of study. This way a proper 
match is gained with the technical field of study. In figure 2.5., the summary of 
the results is presented: for each country and for each field of study the parameter 
concerning the higher service class is plotted as the light gray horizontal bar (from 
the model considering big-classes), the gray bar represents the parameter of the 
meso-class of professionals and black bar concerns the micro-class of affinity 
with the field of study considered. For example, for the field of health, the result 
concerning medical professionals is plotted. 
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Results remark previous finding of the Origin-Destination association. In 
Sweden micro-classes are suppressed and there is no difference between fields 
which lead to a licensed or an unregulated profession except for health fields. 
Great Britain is the only exception of a high influence of the micro-class of origin 
with regards to the field of Law. For all the other fields of study31 the bars 
concerning the three approaches are similar.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.5. Parameters of probability models of being graduated in a field of study 
measured by big, meso and micro-class approaches. Source: ESS 2002-2010, EVS 2008, 
ISSP 2009 
 
 
Micro-classes of affinity are generally very pronounced in Denmark. It is 
clear that affinities of micro-classes of licensed professionals are very high, but 
                                                 
31 See section 6 in the appendix A for fields of study distribution of frequencies. 
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emphasis has to be made on the affinity of humanities with the micro-class of 
social studies. It is the highest affinity between fields of study.  
Finally, the results obtained for Germany validate the previous findings as 
well, but with some exceptions. It seems that the technical field has more appeal 
for lower social classes and again the affinity with humanities is very high from 
all the three approaches. This result is not in line with the previous theories on 
educational inequalities for which humanities is often chosen by the lowest social 
classes, because these fields give access to a wide range of opportunities on the 
labour market (see Goldthorpe 2002). 
 
 
2.7. Conclusion 
 
 
These analyses indicate that sons of licensed professionals display a 
particularly strong relative propensity to inherit the specific occupation of their 
fathers and that this stronger micro-class immobility translates into higher chances 
of persistence in the higher service class. Variations among countries and among 
professions in the degree of regulation of professional services are systematically 
related to micro-class rigidities.  
The interpretation is that, on the one hand, social closure enhances the 
economic profitability of professions and thus accrues incentives to follow in 
parents’ footsteps. On the other hand, access barriers to regulated professions, 
such as long university studies, professional practice and selective entry exams 
increase the costs and risks of failure for outsiders. 
Of course, these results are only suggestive of genuine causal relationships. 
Given the small number of professions and of countries that were compared, only 
bivariate correlations between the index of professional closure and the 
immobility parameters could be detected. Nevertheless, these results corroborate 
the predictions of social closure theory.  
To my knowledge, this is the first study based on nationally representative 
samples that provides systematic evidence relating to direct measures of 
professional closure with social immobility in a wide range of professions. 
Previous qualitative and quantitative studies of the liberal professions provided 
rich in-depth descriptions of the functioning of social closure.  
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However, because these studies were largely based on case studies of single 
professions, they could not systematically relate social closure and 
intergenerational reproduction. These results also contribute to social mobility 
research and to its growing quest for explanatory mechanisms of intergenerational 
reproduction.  
Finally, these findings illustrate the fruitfulness of the micro-class approach, 
as social closure is a typical instance of an explanatory mechanism operating at 
the level of specific occupations but with macro-level consequences for the 
broader processes of social immobility. The few previous studies based on this 
approach have mapped micro-class immobility across the occupational ladder 
rather than directly testing specific micro-class mechanisms (widely discussed in 
the theoretical framework). 
However, these results suggest that micro-class reproduction fueled by social 
closure works predominantly for men (in all countries but Germany), while for 
women it appears to be of limited importance. This gendered pattern was 
unexpected, though it may be noted that Jonsson et al. (2009) reported a similarly 
attenuated micro-class pattern for women. 
It is worth stressing again that in the analyses only the father’s occupation 
was considered and that the mother’s occupation may be more relevant for 
daughters. Selection into employment is another potential limitation of the 
analyses concerning women. However, this gendered pattern may have a more 
substantive interpretation.  
The economic profitability of regulated professions is considerably reduced if 
sons and daughters have to share the family professional business and the client 
portfolio, and if parents have to choose, boys may be privileged. Moreover, men 
attach high importance to economic rewards, prestige and career opportunities 
that make liberal professions particularly attractive to them, while women are less 
instrumental and more sensitive to intrinsic rewards (Barone 2012).  
As already noted, I should not take for granted the willingness of children to 
pursue the same career as their parents, particularly if their family resources 
provide access to many other attractive options. An important advantage of meso-
class reproduction is that it works for a broad variety of occupations. Indeed, I 
have found that in addition to micro- and macro-class rigidities, children of 
professionals display a strong propensity to move into other professional 
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occupations rather than into the ranks of managerial and entrepreneurial 
employment.  
This tendency is stronger for women. This work has argued that professionals 
share a set of skills, cultural resources and social networks that differentiate them 
substantially from the managerial cultures of the other two fractions of the service 
class.  
Hence, on the one hand, processes of social closure erect barriers between 
professions and fuel micro-class immobility at the top. On the other hand, the 
cultural proximity of different professional groups drives intense intergenerational 
exchanges between them. These analyses indicate that these two mechanisms are 
complementary, as they jointly contribute to the immobility of professional 
children in the upper class.  
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3. Social closure and micro-class immobility of the upper class in Italy 
 
 
3.1. Introduction 
 
 
In Italy professionals are highly regulated in terms of both entry- and conduct 
regulation, therefore understanding the processes behind their intergenerational 
social reproduction is very important. Specifically, Italy displays one of the 
highest levels of professionals’ regulation across Europe.  
It has to be pointed out that this chapter replicates and extends findings of the 
previous one regarding four European countries that did not consider Italy 
(Ruggera and Barone, forthcoming). Indeed, I extend these previous findings, 
firstly taking into consideration the Italian case, secondly adding the intra-
generational mobility analysis and thus considering the conduct regulation and its 
effect on professionals’ intra-generational mobility (missing in most of the 
previous studies on social mobility). Moreover, to my knowledge this is the first 
study that uses a micro-class approach for studying this kind of mobility in Italy.  
This chapter indeed give another contribution to the debate illustrated in the 
theoretical framework and in the comparative chapter. As already mentioned, the 
vats literature on social mobility in Italy shows a persistence intergenerational 
immobility of big-classes (see Barone and Schizzerotto 2011); this suggests that 
this chapter can shed light on which analytical levels social immobility is 
produced (big-, meso-and micro-levels). In other words, it uses the analytical 
strategy previously employed, knowing that big-class rigidities in Italy are 
supposed to be very strong. Of course, this also concerns the upper class. Upper 
class social immobility can probably linked to the safety-nets which are supposed 
to work very well in Italy (Barone 2012). 
The analytical strategy explained in the second chapter is also used to study 
the intra-generational mobility of professionals micro-classes. 
 
The structure of this chapter is the following: I derive the hypotheses 
(paragraph 3.2.) and explain data, variables and methods of the analysis 
(paragraph 3.3.); results section is composed by three main part, starting with the 
analysis of the contribution of the micro-class intergenerational immobility to 
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those of the meso-, and big-classes (paragraph 3.4.); then I focus on the 
association between professionals’ micro-classes immobility and their specific 
level of professional regulation (paragraph 3.5.); before concluding, I study the 
intra-generational immobility of high level professionals of the higher service 
class (paragraph 3.6.). 
 
 
3.2 Previous research and hypotheses 
 
 
Previous studies show that a high level of professional regulation, specifically 
the entry-market regulation, produces a reduced competition in the professional 
market and consequently higher benefits for professionals operating in this 
market, such as higher wages (Patterson et al. 2003; Weeden 2002; Pagliero 
2010).  
According to the two dimensions concerning the micro-class reproduction 
and professionals regulations across Europe, in the scheme reported in Figure 1.2. 
(chapter 1), I expect Italy to be placed right next to Germany. 
As specify in the introduction, the literature on social mobility in Italy still 
focuses on the OED association by using a big- and meso-class approach, and 
generally results of research show a high level of social immobility (Fabbri and 
Rossi 1997, Barbagli and Schizzerotto 1997, Barone 2012). To the reader this 
may be unsurprising. 
Moreover, social mobility in Italy has also studied with the same data I am 
using in this chapter, confirming that social immobility is high also for the upper 
class (see Schizzerotto 2002). This is the reason why I do not expect to find a 
different picture according to the big-class approach. Furthermore, social mobility 
studies, even by using this data, have disregarded the micro-class immobility of 
high level professionals and filling this lack is the aim of this chapter. Indeed, as 
the analytical strategy already employed, big-class rigidities are purged by the 
meso-class effects, and meso-class rigidities are purge by the micro-class ones. In 
this way I obtain the net social micro-class immobility that can be linked to the 
index of legal closure and the comparison of regulated and unregulated 
professionals can take place.  
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At this point a limitation of this chapter has to be revealed to the reader. 
Aiming to go into details of the micro-class immobility, the analysis has to be 
reduced to men only (see the next section for the details). Thus, the reader has to 
keep in mind that the inference concerns men only. 
Various studies have suggested that in Italy big-classes intra-generational 
immobility is very high too (Pisati 2000; Schizzerotto 2002; Barone and 
Schizzerotto 2011)32. Moreover, licensed professionals’ intra-generational 
mobility can also be affected by high levels of professional conduct regulation. 
Thus, I do not expect any difference in studying professionals career stability by 
using a big-class approach, but the picture can change by using micro-classes. 
As mentioned in the introduction, this chapter replicates part of the analysis 
of chapter two; indeed, also the previous two hypotheses are the same. I just 
report the main hypotheses to facilitate the reader in following the guide line of 
this work. 
 
Hypothesis 3.1. among children of professionals, who leave their micro-
classes of origin, immobility in the higher service class is further enhanced by 
strong meso-class rigidities; 
 
Hypothesis 3.2. micro-class immobility is stronger in more regulated 
professions; 
 
Hypothesis 3.3. the stronger the professional conduct regulation, the greater 
is the intra-generational immobility of licensed professionals. 
 
 
3.3 Data, variable and methods 
 
 
The major social stratification survey in Italy is the “Indagine longitudinale 
sulle famiglie italiane (ILFI, 1997-2005)”. It is a retrospective survey that 
includes detailed information on subjects’ current and first job (with four digits 
Isco88 titles) and the other variables needed to construct the EGP class scheme. 
This is valid for social origins too. 
As already mentioned, this study focuses on men only. Data limitation does 
not allow a proper micro-class analysis of professional women, neither with the 
                                                 
32 I do not go into details of qualitative studies concerning one profession because they do not allow for 
any comparison with all the other main professions (see Santoro 1998, Checchi 2010). 
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aggregation of some professionals groups33. This can be due to selection into 
employment and the low activity rate of women in Italy. However, in the next 
chapter, by using a recent and large sample that represents Italian graduates, also 
women can be analysed into details at both educational and occupational level 
(considering the beginning of professionals careers). 
In analysing these data there is the impossibility to build micro-classes with a 
sufficient number of observations. Thus, I analyse men from 25 to 74 years old34. 
After age selection the sample comprises 3,501 cases with valid information for 
origins and destinations and 3,758 for the analysis of the intra-generational 
mobility. 
I use the same version of the EGP scheme of the previous chapter, except for 
the aggregation of skilled white collar and routine non-manual workers (IIIab)35. 
Again the higher service class is divided into three meso-classes: 
entrepreneurs, managers and professionals. Also the last category is further 
disaggregated into micro-classes as in the previous chapter, except for the 
aggregation of the engineer and architects due to data constraints. 
Moreover, professional micro-classes correspond to the same occupational 
categories of the OECD index of professional regulation, with three minor 
exceptions36. 
I analyze the Origin–Destination association by using a sequence of log-linear 
models that control for the marginal distributions of the variables, thus estimating 
relative immobility propensities (see Xie 1992). This study considers both the first 
and last occupation of male respondents.  
Log-linear models are specified on the 14 x 14 cross-tabulation between 
origins and destinations or first and last occupation. The 14 categories for these 
variables comprise the above six micro-classes of professionals, the two other 
                                                 
33 See Appendix B (table 6). 
34 As in chapter two I include people aged 65-74 in order to gain statistical power by enlarging the 
number of valid cases. The purpose is the same as the control analysis conducted to be sure that 
including people these age are not affected the estimates. Results are robust, but given the little space 
this analysis is not included in the chapter. .  
35 Distribution of frequencies are reported in Section 1 of Appendix B. 
36. For data constrains I had to aggregate pharmacists, veterinarian and doctor, as well as notaries and 
lawyer, but these additional distinctions are of little practical significance for the results because: a) 
doctors account for about 80% of medical science professionals; b) lawyers accounts for at least 75% of 
legal professionals. Thus I impute to these two professional groups the scores of the OECD index for 
their modal occupations (doctors and lawyers). To engineers and architects I impute the score of 
technical professions as the OECD index suggests. 
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meso-classes of the higher service class (entrepreneurs and high-level managers) 
and the remaining six macro-classes (II, IIIab, IVab, IVc, V-VI, VII)37.  
Macro- meso- and micro-class rigidities are captured by three design matrixes 
as specified in the previous chapter (see Appendix B). 
In this chapter I also test if professionals groups behave differently with other 
three design matrixes: firstly only regulated professions are considered (with one 
parameter for each cell that refers to immobility of these groups); secondly, only 
unregulated professions are considered; thirdly, an equality constraint on the 
parameters regarding all regulated professions is imposed. This is to see whether 
they could be collapsed into a single category meaning that regulated professions 
do not behave differently. 
After these analyses based on unscaled models, the Goodman-Hauser model 
is also considered for the Origins – Destinations association assuming that there is 
no specific order in the categories of the variables (Goodman, 1979; Hauser, 
1984). It orders the categories a posteriori. This model is utilized to verify the 
similarities of professionals’ immobility or mobility, using a very parsimonious 
model such as RC II of Goodman 38. Thus, it is also useful to confirm the 
robustness of the result obtained with the previous unscaled models (see again 
Appendix B). 
As already mentioned, after this decomposition exercise, the intra-
generational immobility is considered. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
37 To be clear “O” is the variable of “fathers’ professional group”, to “D” corresponds the “son” 
professional group”. The first model usually used as based model is called “Independence model and its 
formula is the following:                      ln Fij = λ + λiO + λJD  
for all i = 1, …, 14;  j = 1, .., 14;   
For a better understanding of this topic it is crucial to put constraints on different sets of association 
parameters (λijOD), basically pertaining the diagonal cells in the origin-destination table. This is done 
through the design matrix included in the log-linear models. Design matrixes are reported in the 
appendix B.  
38 Its formula follows: 
ln Fij = λ + λiO + λjD + µ i νj,     where µ i  = µ l for  i ∈ (i)  and i = 1, …, 14;  
 νj = ν for j  ∈ (j) and j = 1,….,14 
The category scaling µi  and νj can be interpreted as measures of relative distance between or relative 
similarity among occupational categories with respect to the O-D association, at net of social class 
immobility. 
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3.4. Results: contribution of micro-, meso- and big-class rigidities to 
immobility in the higher service class 
 
 
The purpose of this part of the Origin-Destination analysis is to assess 
whether macro-, meso-, and micro-class rigidities display independent or 
complementary influences on social immobility in the higher service class in the 
case of men.  
 
 
   Table 3.1. Fit indices of log-linear models to the model Origin – Destination association 
at the first occupation employing the Big-, Meso-, Micro-class approach (men only, n. 
obs. 3501)39. 
       
Model description L2 d.f. Significance Significance Significance ∆ 
0. Independence Model  1454 169 - - - 0.242 
1.Big-class rigidities  538 162 0.0000 (M.2) 0.0062 (M3) 0.0000 (M5) 0.126 
2.Big- and meso-class rigidities  514 159 1.0000 (M.4) 0.0620(M.5) - 0.125 
3.Big-and micro-class rigidities 520 156 0.0062 (M.5) - - 0.124 
4.Meso- and micro-class rigidities 1318 160 0.0000 (M.5) - - 0.231 
5.Big-, meso- and micro-class 
rigidities 
 
502 
 
153 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.123 
Models RC II of Goodman: row and 
column parameters are constraint to 
be equal 
  
   
 
6.Big-class rigidities 144 149 0.0001 (M.7) 0.0002 (M.8)  0.036 
7.Big- and meso-class rigidities 122 146 0.1247 (M.8)   0.034 
8.Big-, meso-, and micro-class 
rigidities 
112 140 
 
 
  
0.032 
Model description: adding a design 
matrix to model micro-classes 
rigidities in more detail way 
L2 d.f. 
Significance Significance Significance 
∆ 
9.Micro-class rigidities - regulated 
professionals 
502 155 
   
0.123 
10. Micro-class rigidities - 
unregulated professionals 
512 157 
0.0067 (M.1)   
0.126 
11. Micro-class rigidities - regulated 
professionals with an equality 
constraint 
506 158 
0.2615 (M.1)  - 
0.124 
Source: ILFI (1997-2005)       
 
 
                                                 
39 Fit indices of log-linear model for current occupation (Panel B) are in the appendix. This is why 
results of current occupation do not differ from the first job ones. This will be clear in the section of 
intra-generational mobility. 
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The first model of independence displayed in table 3.1. unrealistically 
assumes that origins and destinations are unrelated. This model is used only as a 
yardstick for comparisons with the following models. These models impose 
constraints on different sets of association parameters (λijOD), basically 
pertaining the diagonal cells in the mobility table. This procedure improves model 
fit by adding diagonal constraints that reflect immobility propensities at the 
micro-, meso- and macro level. 
Model 1 adds only big-class rigidities to the baseline model. As can be seen, 
it displays huge improvements over the baseline model, thus confirming the 
strength of social immobility of the upper class in Italy40.  
Models 2 adds meso-class rigidities to macro-class rigidities, and model 3 
adds micro-class rigidities. Model 4 adds micro-class rigidities to meso-class 
rigidities. Finally model 5 incorporates all three immobility mechanisms.  
From the fit indices of these models, the evidence indicates that immobility in 
the higher service class is jointly produced by big- and meso-class rigidities. 
Comparing model 2 with models 3, 4 and 5, micro-classes do not improve the fit 
of any of these models as reported in table 3.1. (see significance columns). This 
means that meso-class and big-class rigidities are very strong and the contribution 
of micro-class rigidities is not significant. Big-class and meso-class rigidities 
could be linked to the safety nets; it seems they work very well and they 
distinguish results of the unscaled log-linear analysis from those reported in the 
previous chapter, at least for men. But, given the high level of professional 
regulation in Italy, some differences in professionals’ social immobility can be 
expected. Indeed, at this point, model 9, 10 and 11 are considered. The evidence 
shows that regulated professionals behave differently from unregulated 
professionals and that regulated professionals cannot be collapsed in a single 
category. This is shown in the next paragraph when the level of professional 
regulation is linked to professionals’ micro-classes intergenerational immobility. 
Figure 3.1. plots the immobility parameters to the first and the current job that 
refers to immobility in the higher service class across three different model 
specifications41.  
                                                 
40 See Section 2 and 3 in the Appendix B to see the main mobility table for men of this chapter in. See 
also the additional materials regarding binomial logit regression for the probability to remain in the 
upper service class for licensed professionals’ children. 
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Figure 3.1. Parameters for social immobility in the higher service class across three 
model specifications. Beta parameters extrapolated from models 1, 3, and 5. Source: 
ILFI (1997-2005) 
 
 
The first row refers to big-class rigidities only (model 1) and therefore 
describes the overall level of immobility in the upper service class. As it can be 
seen, big-class immobility is very strong in Italy. The second row plots the same 
parameter, purged by micro-class effects (model 3). The big-class rigidities are 
not substantially reduced. This confirm results of table 3.1. in which clearly 
emerges that adding micro-classes do not improve log-linear model fits. The third 
row shows that immobility in the higher service class is not largely reduced, even 
if purged by meso- and micro rigidities (model 5). This is valid at the first job and 
at the current occupation of male respondents. 
Moreover, if we link parameters (bars in figure 3.1.) concerning big-, meso- 
and micro-class rigidities at first and at current occupation we obtain a proxy of 
the intra-generational mobility. However, the analysis of professionals career 
stability is useful, firstly, because it allows to go into details of different 
professionals groups behaviour and, secondly, because of the necessary 
comparison between professionals and the other fractions of the upper class (see 
paragraph 3.6.). 
                                                                                                                                     
41 Models’ fits of current occupation are in the Appendix B, because they provide very similar 
information, as it is visible in Figure 3.2. 
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The first hypothesis is not falsified, but it is incomplete when using scaled 
log-linear models. Indeed, according the second set of log-linear models, micro-
class rigidities do not appear stronger than fluxes within professionals’ meso-class 
and within the whole upper class (these models are widely discussed in the next 
section).  
Moreover, results are in line with the analysis of Jonsson et al. (2009), when 
concerning the relevant role played by big-classes. Nevertheless, it is worth 
paying attention to the micro-mechanisms behind professionals’ micro-classes, 
which determine heterogeneous professionals’ micro-classes rigidities, such as the 
index of entry market legal closure. 
 
 
3.5 Results: social closure and micro-class immobility  
 
 
Figure 3.2. plots the relationship between the micro-class immobility 
parameters for men (taken from model 5 in table 3.1.) and the scores of the index 
of professional regulation (reported in the first chapter). Compared to unregulated 
professions, the immobility parameters of licensed professions are larger. 
Immobility is low for unregulated professions regarding scientific fields and 
social science and highest among legal professionals and accountants. Architects, 
engineers and doctors are located in intermediate positions; however their social 
reproduction is still higher than unregulated professions. These results help us to 
better understand micro-mechanisms also concerning micro-classes and they also 
support the second hypothesis; indeed results of Figure 3.2. remark the 
importance of micro-classes for the understanding of occupational inequalities 
horizontally (within the meso-class of high level professionals) 42. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
42 The plot for current occupation provides highly similar results. 
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Figure 3.2: The relationship between entry market regulations in professional 
occupations in the case of men and immobility parameters for each micro-class 
(architects and engineers in 1998 shared the same legal closure index, thus it is possible 
to aggregate them). Legend: higher service class (I); lower service class (II); white 
collars and routine non–manual workers (IIIab); petite bourgeoisie (IVab); farmers (IV 
c); skilled working class (V-VI); unskilled working class (VIIab). Source: ILFI (1997-
2005). 
 
 
Thus, even if in the previous section micro-classes did not purge the macro-
class immobility effects, relating professionals’ immobility with their level of 
regulation shows that without micro-classes an important part of social 
inequalities would remain unexplained. This is also proved by the last set of log-
linear models in table 3.1.. The reason why regulated professionals parameters of 
immobility cannot be collapsed in a single parameter can be better understood by 
considering model 8 (or model 5 of the unscaled log-linear models). 
Table 3.2. presents the RCII Goodman model of scaled association (model 8 
of table 3.1.). This model is based on the restricted Uniform Association Model 
that assumes all contiguous associations in a table to be identical (ln θ = ϕ; θij 
being the odds ratio). This stringent assumption can be meaningfully relaxed by 
scaling the distances between the row-social origin (µi ) and column-social 
destination (vj ) categories: (ln θ = ϕµi+1−µi )(vj+1−vj), where µi and vj are 
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scaling parameters, while ϕ is the scaled uniform association parameter that 
describes the association throughout the table, conditional upon the scaling 
parameters; scaling parameters µi and vj can be interpreted as measures of 
distance between, or similarity among, occupational categories with respect to the 
Origin-Destination association. If these categories were identically scaled, 
different classes would be regarded as a single class (e.g., µ1 = µ2). 
In this scaled association model equal scaling parameters within classes are 
assumed; and row and column are assumed to be equal (as shown in table 3.2., 
column 3, parameters of µi). This is because there is no ex ante knowledge to 
claim that the distances between categories of fathers and sons should be 
different. 
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Table 3.2. Parameter estimates of RC log-multiplicative model n. 8 
EGP class scheme using 
Big-,meso-, and micro-
classes of professionals 
Parameters 
of immobility 
– big-classes 
Social origins and 
destination Scaling 
parameters (µ i) – 
big-classes 
Parameters 
of immobility 
–meso-classes 
Social origins and 
destination Scaling 
parameters (µ i) – 
meso-classes 
Parameters 
of immobility –
micro-classes 
Social origins and 
destination Scaling 
parameters (µ i) – 
micro-classes 
VIIab -0.3 0.51     
V – VI 0.6 0.36     
IVc 3.28 0.47     
IVab 1.52 0.12     
IIIab -0.04 0.05     
II 0.28 -0.05     
I 0.45 -     
Entrepreneurs   3.33 0.01   
Managers   -0.53 -0.16   
Professionals   0.39 -   
Scientific professionals     0.37 -0.06 
Architects & Engineers     1.58 -0.18 
Accountants     1.81 -0.24 
Medical professionals     1.33 -0.15 
Social science professionals     -0.42 -0.33 
Legal professionals     0.97 -0.35 
Source: ILFI (1997-2005) 
Legend: higher service class (I); lower service class (II); white collars and routine non–manual workers (IIIab); petite bourgeoisie (IVab); farmers (IVc); skilled working 
class (V-VI); unskilled working class (VIIab). 
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Taking into consideration both immobility and mobility, the robustness of 
results in figure 3.2 can be verified in another way. Indeed, the results of 
immobility in Goodman Hauser-RC model are in line with those of unscaled 
model 5 in Table 3.1. Again, micro-classes do not improve the fit of models 6 and 
7. However, I show results of model 8 because of the comparison between models 
9, 10 and 11 highlighting differences within licensed and between licensed and 
unlicensed professionals intergenerational immobility. 
Net of immobility, scaled parameters of social mobility do not follow a clear 
pattern within professional’s micro-classes. Professionals are more similar in 
terms of mobility, while greater differences exist for licensed professionals in 
terms of social immobility. Hence, regulated professions display a much higher 
degree of micro-class immobility than unregulated professions. These results 
indicate that legal closure can affect the intergenerational immobility of licensed 
professions. 
 
 
3.6. Results: social closure and intra-generational mobility employing big-, 
meso-, micro- class approaches. 
 
 
According to the theoretical framework and previous studies on intra-
generational mobility in Italy, the level of immobility is also high (see 
Schizzerotto 2002).  
Concentrating on the upper service class and following the analytical 
strategies used above, differences in intra-generational immobility for 
professionals can emerge. Indeed, considering all the limitations of the 
competition implemented by controlling professionals’ behavior generate higher 
levels of licensed professionals’ career stability.  
These regulations, indeed, penalize newcomers who need to create their own 
clients-portfolio and give an advantage to professionals (definable as insiders) 
who have been practicing the profession for a long time. 
Unfortunately, data constraints do not allow for the separation of self-
employed from employees within each professional group. Thus, intra-
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generational mobility can be a bit underestimated for self-employed licensed 
professionals. 
Table 3.3. shows that the model which fits the data best is the one including 
micro-classes in the higher service class (Model 4). 
 
 
 Table 3.3. Fit indices of log-linear models of quasi perfect mobility with big-, 
meso and micro-class rigidities for the intra-generational mobility (men only, 
n. obs. 3758) 
Model description L2 d.f. Significance  ∆ 
0.Independence Model  6152 169 - 0.478 
1.Big class-rigidities only 1536 162 0.0000(M.1) 0.138 
2.Big- + meso-class rigidities 1410 159 0.0000(M.2) 0.133 
3.Big- + micro-class rigidities 1123 156 0.0000(M.1) 0.113 
 
4. 
eso- and micro-class 
rigidities 
1061 153 
0.0000(M.1) 
0.0000(M.2) 
0.0000(M.3) 
 
0.109 
 
 Source: ILFI (1997-2005) 
 
 
From model 1 (table 3.3.) I extrapolated the beta parameter of the higher 
service class, which is 4.5 (big-class). This is undoubtedly high, but net of big-
class immobility, it is possible to understand which meso- or micro-classes 
characterized this strong intra-generational immobility of the higher service class.  
Indeed, figure 3.4. shows results that in a way can be considered unexpected 
even if distinguishing employed and self-employed professionals career stability 
could be very different. Property, indeed, is very important since it explains the 
high intra-generational mobility of entrepreneurs.  
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Figure 3.4. Meso-classes and professionals micro-classes parameters for the intra-
generational immobility in the service class (I). Beta parameters extrapolated from 
model 4. Source: ILFI (1997-2005). 
 
 
Doctors, legal professionals, and accountants show high levels of career 
stability, while architects and engineers have slightly lower intra-generational 
immobility. These results are in line with those of Barone et.al (2011) who clearly 
explain that professions have remained one of the most regulated segments of the 
Italian labour market with a little internal competition. Hence, the liberal 
professions have benefited from a noticeable degree of occupational stability, thus 
further increasing the rigidity of the Italian labour market. 
However, unregulated professionals (professionals in social science and in 
scientific fields) and managers display lower intra-generational mobility.  
These results are valuable because, firstly, they show how heterogeneous the 
intra-generational immobility is within the upper service class and, secondly, that 
career stability of some licensed professionals is even higher than it is for 
entrepreneurs. 
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3.7. Concluding remarks 
 
 
The analyses indicate that big- and meso-class rigidities in Italy are elevated 
at least for men; this is in line with the social mobility literature. 
Moreover, professionals’ micro-class rigidities do not significantly contribute 
to produce the intergenerational immobility of the upper class in the case of men. 
Indeed, sons of professionals do not seem to follow in their father footsteps 
disproportionally; social mobility, instead, concerns all professionals’ micro-
classes (both licensed and unlicensed professionals). 
Professionals’ meso-class immobility can be interpreted from opposite points 
of view. From one hand, sons of professionals show high propensities to change 
their positions for brand new ones not in line with those of their fathers. On the 
other hand, safety nets within this meso-class work very well (Barone 2012).  
Furthermore this chapter analysis shown that the higher the legal closure, the 
stronger is micro-class immobility of licensed professionals and the lower is 
social reproduction of unregulated professionals. It also provided evidence that, in 
terms of social immobility, licensed professionals groups behave differently and 
that these groups cannot be aggregated in a single category. 
To my knowledge this is the first study in Italy that uses this analytical 
strategy to asses professionals’ micro-classes immobility.  
Professional associations in Italy are powerful authorities recognized by the 
state which are able to influence professionals’ behavior also through conduct 
regulation. This chapter also contributed to a better understanding of the intra-
generational mobility of the upper service class in the case of men. Of course, 
with a larger sample, the best way to capture micro-explanatory mechanisms 
regarding licensed professionals would be articulating the micro-classes in self-
employed and employed professionals. However, these results are in line with 
those of other studies on this topic which claim that job mobility occurs rarely, or 
it predominantly involves movements within the same social big- class (see 
Schizzerotto 2002; Barone et. al 2011;). 
According to the theoretical framework (see chapter 1) conduct regulation 
should increase the career stability of self-employed professionals, especially for 
those self-employed who can inherit the professional practice of the parent.  
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Also results, referring to figure 3.2. (as in the previous chapter), are only 
suggestive of genuine causal relationships, which should be considered by future 
studies with a quasi-experimental design.  
Given the data limitation, the analysis concerned men only. Future studies, 
with bigger sample sizes should go into details of micro-class analysis also 
considering women and distinguishing self-employed and employed professionals 
to study the intra-generational mobility of professionals; this could allow a proper 
comparison between (regulated and unregulated) self-employed professionals and 
entrepreneurs social immobility. Of course, the latest distinction could also help 
intergenerational mobility studies and the corroboration of prediction of social 
closure theory. 
In the next chapter, I try to overcome data limitation and extend analyses to 
women too, considering both the educational and the occupational career of 
Italian graduates. Also, the distinction of employed and self-employed 
professionals is considered for both men and women. 
Finally, these findings illustrate that the micro-class approach is useful also to 
assess the broader processes of social fluidity. The few previous studies based on 
this approach have mapped micro-class immobility across the occupational 
hierarchy, rather than directly testing specific micro-class mechanisms, such as 
linking licensed professionals social immobility with the level of professions 
regulations (Jonsson et. al 2009). How safety-nets work in Italy at the top of the 
hierarchy is another topic that should be considered from future studies of social 
mobility. 
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4. The intergenerational social reproduction of licensed professionals in 
Italy: analysing micro-dynamics from graduation to the labour market  
 
 
4.1. Introduction 
 
 
It has long been known that educational inequalities are prevalent in many 
western societies. Social advantages are largely reproduced from parents to 
children through education (Shavit and Blossfeld 1993).  
This chapter takes into consideration social inequalities from tertiary 
education to the labour market. Indeed, it has been shown that also educational 
fields of study are relevant in the process of social stratification (Van de 
Werfhorst et al., 2001, 2005, 2007; Van de Werfhorst and Luijkx 2010). In Italy 
this is exacerbated for those fields of study which give access to the main licensed 
professions (Chiesi 2008, Tignali 2009). 
However, up to now most of the literature has focused on the Origin 
Education association with no specifications of different professional groups (e.g. 
Stocké 2007; Barone et.al 2010); accordingly, no specific attention has been given 
to the intergenerational transmission of professionals’ micro-classes. Indeed, this 
chapter contributes to the literature filling this lack. 
As widely explained in the previous chapters, I disaggregate the high 
professionals meso-class into micro-classes to understand educational and 
occupational trajectories of licensed professionals’ children – comparing them 
with other unlicensed professionals and the other fractions of the upper class. 
With this analytical strategy, well known to the reader, social inequalities can 
emerge through horizontal specifications. Fields of study at tertiary educational 
level are considered, while micro-classes are employed in order to study 
intergenerational mobility. 
For such credentialed fields, the system of skill acquisition is actively created 
and maintained and, hence, institutionalizes a particular dynamic of stratification 
(Grusky 2005, Weeden 2002, Sorensen 1996, 2000). From the analysis of this 
chapter it emerges how the family background can affect children’s educational 
attainment and its implications for access to the first job.  
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This chapter is structured as follows: firstly I discuss previous studies and 
literature and then I elaborate specific hypotheses (paragraph 4.2.); secondly I 
consider data, variables and methods (paragraph 4.3.) that I employ in the analysis 
of professionals’ children educational career and their entry into the labour market 
(par. 4.4.); thirdly I illustrate results which lead to my concluding remarks 
(paragraph 4.5.). 
 
 
4.2. Previous findings and hypotheses 
  
 
In this chapter I show that there are enormous differences in employing 
different social class approaches to disclose educational inequalities. Indeed, in 
Italy the main entry barriers to licensed professions is a very long and expensive 
educational path (see chapter 1). When studying licensed professionals employing 
the micro-class approach, also horizontal educational inequalities should be taken 
into account.  
It is arguable that having a professional parent pays off across all professional 
occupations, but it can be especially beneficial if parental occupation matches the 
field of study of the child (e.g. having an architect as a father and studying 
architecture). 
Moreover, when children of licensed professionals follow in their parent 
footsteps they need to obtain higher educational credentials than children of high 
entrepreneurs and high managers, because of the entry barriers of regulated 
professions.  
According to social closure theory the entry barriers of licensed professions, 
differ from one profession to another. Thus, it can be expected that the effect of 
having a licensed professional father on micro-class reproduction varies according 
to the restrictiveness of the corresponding educational barriers. This is studied in 
this chapter taking into consideration gender. According to Chiesi (2008) this is 
worth investigating, particularly when considering technical fields, such as 
engineering or architecture. Indeed, these fields cannot be aggregated as in the 
previous chapter because part of social inequalities would be obscured. 
Furthermore, liberal professionals (in other words self-employed 
professionals) and employed professionals are also differentiated within each 
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micro-class. According to Pellizzari and Orsini (2012), indeed, intergenerational 
social reproduction of licensed professionals in Italy is very high when the father 
is a liberal professional. 
I summarize below this chapter hypotheses: 
 
Hypothesis 4.1. sons and daughters of licensed professionals are more likely 
to graduate in the same field of study as their fathers, but with gender differences. 
 
Hypothesis 4.2. children of self-employed professionals show a higher 
propensity to become a member of the same profession as their father than 
children of employed professionals. 
 
Hypothesis 4.3. men inherit more than women the professional business of 
their licensed professionals fathers. 
 
 
4.3. Data, variables and methods 
  
 
4.3.1. Data 
 
The «Sbocchi professionali dei laureati» is a survey which was run in 2011 
by the Italian National Institute of Statistics (ISTAT) that targeted university 
graduates who had obtained their degrees four years prior to the survey. It 
includes information required in order to conduct our analysis. The survey 
includes: information regarding educational attainment in vertical and horizontal 
dimensions; information on fields of study; information on parents’ educational 
level and parents’ occupational position (including differences between self 
employed and simply employed). 
Additionally, the survey also reports background information on secondary 
education, including type of schools attended and grades, as well as demographic 
information (place of birth, age, gender and nationality). Since this survey regards 
just graduates an implicit sample selection is present; indeed these data do not 
represent the entire Italian population. Thus, the reader must be kept in mind that 
results from the analyses can only be generalized to 2007 graduates43. 
                                                 
43 It is not possible to study upper secondary students because of a lack of information about social 
origins. Isco code is not entirely provided and thus micro-classes cannot be extrapolated. It would 
useful to study the choice of fields of study of upper secondary students in future studies; but at moment 
the analysis of micro-classes of professionals can be conducted only on graduates. 
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Additionally, as the vast literature on inequality of education has show that in 
Italy upper-class children are more likely to graduate, than their socio-
economically disadvantaged peers (Schizzerotto 2002; Barone and  Schizzerotto 
2011). 
Moreover, in order to consider credentials which give access to a licensed 
profession, I take into consideration Master degrees and a full tertiary educational 
level. Therefore, another sample selection is implied in this survey. 
 
 
4.3.2. Variables 
 
The first outcome variable, fields of study, is a ten category classification 
including: humanities (clustered with, philosophy, literature, etc.), scientific fields 
(including chemistry, natural science, physics, maths, agrarian, and so on), 
veterinarian clustered with pharmaceutical science, architecture, engineering, 
medicine, health science (expect medicine including professional nurses, etc) law, 
social and political science, and economics44. 
This classification differs from the one used in other academic articles where 
fields of study were shown to be a relevant predictor of labour market 
performance (Torche, 2011; Davis and Guppy 1997; Hansen, 1996), because the 
main emphasis regards highly regulated fields of study that give access to specific 
professions45. This classification gives us the opportunity to study in more depth 
the effect of social class of origin and thus focusing on finer distinctions for 
profession of parents in family of origin. 
The second outcome variable refers to graduates’ social class or occupational 
position at the beginning of the professional carrier of respondents. This variable 
is measured at big- and meso-class level, and then through micro-classes of 
professionals as in the previous chapters expect for the more detailed 
classification of meso-classes; this is also valid for social origins. Big- and meso-
class classification is as follows: 
• high level entrepreneurs (I); 
• high level managers (I); 
                                                 
44 Table C1, shows the distribution of frequencies of the outcome variable with 10 categories used in 
the multinomial logistic regression models. 
45 See the appendix C for the distribution of the outcome and the explicative variables of this chapter; 
Including the frequency distribution of the cross-tabulation of fields of study and social origins. 
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• high level professionals (I);  
• low managers(II); 
• low professionals (II); 
• teachers – except for university professors (II) 
• skilled white collars (IIIa); 
• routine non-manual (IIIb);  
• self-employed with no or few employees (IVab); 
• farmers (IVc); 
• skilled manual working class (V-VI); 
• unskilled manual working class (VIIab); which are aggregated in the 
reference category because of the few number of respondents in these 
lower social classes46.  
Micro classes of high level professionals are classified as follows:  
• professionals in scientific fields, such as physicists, chemists, 
mathematicians, geologists;   
• architects; 
• engineers; 
• professional in life science and veterinarian; 
• professionals in medical science;  
• legal professionals, such lawyers and notaries; 
• professionals in social science, including political science; 
• professionals in economics science47.  
The explicative variables concern the occupational position of the father and 
refers to the occupational situation when the respondent was 14 years old. 
Due to a data limitation, pharmacists and veterinarians, are clustered with 
other numerically little categories of professionals, such as biologist, or 
pharmacologists48;  
                                                 
46 Table A2 shows distribution of frequencies of the aggregate and disaggregate level of social class of 
origin.  
47 Other professionals which miss important information for a classification in these groups are or 
artists and actors which are far away from the research interest of this thesis, and are aggregate (even if 
this could be a unconventional choice to make) with the meso class of lower level professionals. 
48 In order to approximate the composition of these two professional groups codified with Isco code at 
4 digits, it can be useful to use another other data sets, such as ILFI, in which father’s occupation is 
codified with this code. Thus, looking at graduates’ professional fathers, pharmacists are 83% of 
professionals in life science. Accountant as well are the major group of professional in economics 
science. 
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The differentiation between employed and self-employed professional fathers 
characterizes the last outcome variable of this chapter. In order to simplify the 
results illustration I focus on the service class49 (as well as for the explicative 
variable). As control variables I use, gender, geographical areas (North East, 
North West, Centre, South, Islands), age50, nationality, secondary educational path 
and grades, and education of the father 51.  
 
 
4.3.3. Methods 
 
In order to verify this chapter hypotheses, multinomial logistic regression 
models are employed. Indeed, I have two dependent categorical variables: the first 
concerning 10 fields of study and the second regarding 18 categories social 
destinations (at disaggregated level). This is to assess the influence of social 
origin over the likelihood to obtain a degree a specific field of study or o reach a 
specific class of destination52. Thus, model 1 takes into consideration social origin 
at aggregate level and the fist outcome variable, whereas models 2 considers 
social origin at disaggregated level. Model 2 run with men and women separately.  
Model 3 concerns the second outcome which is a 8-categories concerning 
professionals micro-classes within the respective meso-class. 
These models do not control for professionals employment situations; 
whereas in model 4 the employment situation is considered separately by using 
the second outcome variable (social destinations). 
Results are shown in graphical form to enable an easier interpretation of the 
coefficients and the related significance. 
Furthermore, in order to overcome problems which may arise in confronting 
the magnitude of logit coefficients between different groups (Pisati 2003), I 
                                                 
49 For this analysis the baseline category is not Humanistic field or lower social classes, but 
professionals in social science, including political science, and professionals in humanities ( as high 
level professors). This is valid also for social origin. Moreover, this choice is suggested by the other 
big- and meso- classes composed by self-employed only, such as higher entrepreneurs or IVab. 
50 Given the pre-existing aggregation 4 classes, and the analysis of graduates with Master degrees, (or a 
4 - 6 years degree) age can be inserted in the model just in a dichotomous form.   
51 Distributions of frequencies are reported in the appendix C in Table C3 and in Table C4. 
52 Multinomial logistic regressions results can be claimed as robust because I also tried to use the same 
variables with different models, such as multinomial probit. Again results remain almost the same. This 
is why I decided to report in the thesis just the multinomial regression results. 
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present Average Marginal Effects (AME henceforth), exploiting their easier 
interpretation in terms of average differences in probability to graduate in a field 
of study between classes, calculated in percentage points .  
 
 
4.4. Models and results 
 
 
4.4.1. The association between social origins and of fields of study: 
disaggregating the professionals meso-class into micro-classes. 
 
Figure 4.1 shows the effect of social origin, measured at an aggregate level, 
on the probability of graduating in fields of study which are required for access to 
professions in Italy, such as pharmaceutical science, medicine, pharmacy and 
veterinarian, and law.  
 
 
 
Figure 4.1. Average marginal effects53 from multinomial logistic regression model for the probability of 
graduating in medical science, pharmacy and veterinarian and law, according to the big- and meso-classes of 
origin (ref. cat. working class V-VIIab). Estimates are at net of controls (gender, age, parental education, 
nationality, geographical area, type of high school, high school grade). Black dots denote the AME of social 
classes and black lines denote 95% confidence intervals. Legend: white collars (IIIa), routine non–manual 
workers (IIIb); petite bourgeoisie (IVab); farmers (IVc). Source: ISAT- Sbocchi professionali dei laureati 
(2011). 
                                                 
53 AME, reflects the probability of graduating in a field due to a marginal change in the independent 
variable of interest, social class, depending on the reference category employed. The baseline category 
of the dependent variable is humanistic fields. This is not reported in the next plots legend because it 
can be considered as implicit. 
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As graphically illustrated children of the higher classes, especially those of 
professionals meso-class, have a greater propensity than children of the other 
social classes to graduate in medicine. In the case of pharmacy and veterinarian or 
law there is no significant difference among social classes. 
When referring to the net of controls, the highest AME in medicine for 
graduates whose fathers are high professionals is that of 12.7 percentage points. 
 
 
 
Figure 4.2. Average marginal effects from multinomial logistic regression model for the probability of 
graduating in architecture, engineering and economics, according to the big- and meso-class of origin (ref. 
cat. working class V-VIIab). Estimates are at net of controls (gender, age, parental education, nationality, 
geographical area, type of high school, high school grade). Black dots denote the AME of social classes and 
black lines denote 95% confidence intervals. Legend: white collars (IIIa), routine non–manual workers (III 
b); petite bourgeoisie (IVab); farmers (IV c). Source: ISAT- Sbocchi professionali dei laureati (2011). 
 
 
As for architecture, the higher propensity is found among the meso-class with 
graduates who have fathers belonging to the low level professionals (service class 
II). Concerning engineering the AME of the high level professionals is even 
negative comparing with other non-significant social classes. 
No significant AME are found among social classes in the field of economics. 
The same picture is also regarding figure 4.3. and therefore scientific fields, social 
and political science and health science (except for medicine). 
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Figure 4.3. Average marginal effects from multinomial logistic regression model for the probability of 
graduating in scientific fields, social and political science, health science (except medicine), according to the 
big- and meso-class of origin (ref. cat. working class V-VIIab). Estimates are at net of controls (gender, age, 
parental education, nationality, geographical area, type of high school, high school grade). Black dots denote 
the AME. of social classes and black lines denote 95% confidence intervals. Legend: white collars (IIIa), 
routine non–manual workers (IIIb); petite bourgeoisie (IVab); farmers (IVc). Source: ISAT- Sbocchi 
professionali dei laureati (2011). 
 
Overall, big-class and meso-classes seem to suggest that social origins plays a 
very limited role on graduating in a specific field of study. At this point it is worth 
introducing micro-classes of professionals in the analysis. Indeed, a different 
representation emerges considering medicine, law, pharmacy and veterinarian. 
 
 
 
Figure 4.4. Average marginal effects from multinomial logistic regression model for the probability of 
graduating in medicine, pharmacy and veterinarian, law, according to the micro-class of origin (ref. cat. 
working class V-VIIab). Estimates are at net of controls (gender, age, parental education, nationality, 
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geographical area, type of high school, high school grade). Black dots denote the AME of social classes and 
black lines denote 95% confidence intervals. Legend: white collars (IIIa), routine non–manual workers 
(IIIb); petite bourgeoisie (IVab); farmers (IVc). Source: ISAT- Sbocchi professionali dei laureati (2011). 
 
 
Figure 4.4. shows that children of high professional fathers in life science 
(such as pharmacists or veterinarians) have a high propensity to graduate in a field 
in line with the professional positions of their fathers. Indeed, the AME for 
pharmacy and veterinarian is 17.9, whereas for all the other classes of origin AME 
does not reach more than 1.5 percentage points. The evidence indicates that a 
similar pattern is also found when considering medical fields. As for as law: 
having a father who operates as a professional in the field of legal science, leads 
to a high AME of 30 percentage points. 
It is also useful comparing the evidence as illustrated by figure 4.5. with of 
the big- and meso-class analysis. 
 
 
 
Figure 4.5. Average marginal effects from multinomial logistic regression model for the probability of 
graduating in economics, engineering and architecture, according to the micro-class of origin (ref. cat. 
working class-VIIab). Estimates are at net of controls (gender, age, parental education, nationality, 
geographical area, type of high school, high school grade). Black dots denote the AME of social classes and 
black lines denote 95% confidence intervals. Legend: white collars (IIIa), routine non–manual workers (IIIb); 
petite bourgeoisie (IVab); farmers (IVc). Source : ISAT- Sbocchi professionali dei laureati (2011). 
 
 
Specifically, when we take into consideration the class and field affinity in 
architecture, the AME is that of 22.4 percentage points; whereas the AME do not 
reach a very high level for the class and field affinity in engineering and 
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economics fields. However, AME are significant if compared with those of the 
big- and meso-classes. 
While the big-class approach does not show a significant propensity for a 
precise social class of origin, a specific perspective does. Furthermore, big-classes 
seem to partially cover the intergenerational transmission of professional 
positions. I remind to the reader that here inference can regard Italian graduates 
only (specifically MA graduates). 
In the case of fields of study that do not give access to a licensed profession, 
both big- and micro-classes show a similar picture. I do not report in this 
paragraph AME, but I show them graphically in figure 4.6. in Appendix C. 
In the next paragraph gender differences are considered, aiming to partially 
fill the lack of the previous chapter. 
 
 
4.4.2. Analyzing the association between big-,meso- and micro-classes of 
high level professionals and fields of study separately by gender 
 
As previously discussed there is a higher propensity in graduating in more 
generalist fields for women belonging to lower social class of origin, rather than 
for men. But, according to the focus of this chapter and the evidence of the 
previous paragraph, it is necessary to concentrate the attention on micro-classes. 
Indeed, after the comparison between big- and micro-classes we need to know 
how gender differences are articulated within micro-classes of professional 
fathers. 
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Figure 4.7. Average marginal effects from multinomial logistic regression model for the probability of 
graduating in medicine, pharmacy and veterinarian, law by gender, according to the micro-class of origin (ref. 
cat. working class V-VIIab). Estimates are at net of controls (age, parental education, nationality, 
geographical area, type of high school, high school grade). Black dots denote the AME of social classes and 
black lines denote 95% confidence intervals. Legend: white collars (IIIa), routine non–manual workers (IIIb); 
petite bourgeoisie (IVab); farmers (IVc). Source: ISAT- Sbocchi professionali dei laureati (2011). 
 
 
As figure 4.7. shows for medicine, pharmacy and veterinarian, and law the 
affinity between social origins and fields of study is relevant for both men and 
women. 
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Figure 4.8. Average marginal effects from multinomial logistic regression model for the probability of 
graduating in economics, engineers and architecture by gender, according to the micro-class of origin (ref. 
cat. working class V-VIIab). Estimates are at net of controls (age, parental education, nationality, 
geographical area, type of high school, high school grade). Black dots denote the AME of social classes and 
black lines denote 95% confidence intervals. Legend: white collars (IIIa), routine non–manual workers (IIIb); 
petite bourgeoisie (IVab); farmers (IVc). Source: ISAT- Sbocchi professionali dei laureati (2011). 
 
 
On the contrary figure 4.8. shows that respondents follow in the father 
footsteps in different ways. Between men and women in architecture there is just a 
little difference; but, for women having a architect as a father makes the 
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difference, and it does not when considering men. In economics having a father in 
the same field is statistically important for both men and women.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.9. Average marginal effects from multinomial logistic regression model for the probability of 
graduating in scientific fields, social and political science, and health science - except medicine by gender, 
according to the micro-class of origin (ref. cat. working class V-VIIab). Estimates are at net of controls (age, 
parental education, nationality, geographical area, type of high school, high school grade). Black dots denote 
the AME of social classes and black lines denote 95% confidence intervals. Legend: white collars (IIIa), 
routine non–manual workers (IIIb); petite bourgeoisie (IVab); farmers (IVc). Source: ISAT- Sbocchi 
professionali dei laureati (2011). 
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Figure 4.9. illustrates that for fields of study which do not give access to a 
licensed profession, there are no statistically significant differences for any social 
class. 
At this point I summarize the gender composition of fields of study and I link 
it with the results reported above.  
 
 
Tab. 4.1. Gender composition of field of study and related summary of AME for the 
affinity between micro-class of origin and graduates’ field of study 
Field of study Male 
% 
Female 
% 
% total Absolute 
total  
Male  
AME 
Female 
AME 
Medicine 39.89 60.11 100 5009 32.5% 27.1% 
Phrm.+veteran. 36.35 63.65 100 1026 20.1% 15.4% 
Law 39.77 60.23 100 2756 32% 28.2% 
Architecture 46.93 53.07 100 1854 20% 23% 
Engineer 19.03 8.02 100 4042 0.01% 0.7% 
Economics 49.81 50.19 100 3391 11.9% 10.9% 
Scientific fields 52.38 47.62 100 3549 0.07% 1.14% 
Soc+pol.science 47.96 52.04 100 2550 3.5% 1.4% 
Health (except 
medicine) 
31.58 68.42 100 2058 0.4% 0.01% 
 
As table 4.1. shows when the majority of students that attend a field of study 
is female, such as for medicine, pharmacy and veterinarian, and law the influence 
of a professional father is more important for men than women; on the contrary, 
such as for engineering having a engineer as a father is central (and statistically 
significant) for women. When a field of study is gender proportionate AME do 
not present a great difference between men and women. This is as figure 4.9. that 
shows results for fields of study that do not give access to a licensed profession. 
It seems that professional micro-classes are able to weaken some gender 
stereotypes (or common thoughts), such as engineering for men. 
 
 
4.4.3. The analysis of the Origin-Destination association considering the 
employment condition of the fathers’ micro-class.  
 
The last part of the analysis concerns the Origin-Destination association, 
considering the second outcome variable (with no distinction between the 
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employment situation of professional respondents) and the usual explicative 
variable at disaggregated level54. 
Figure 4.10. shows that results are very similar to the ones in the previous 
section regarding the analysis of Origin-Education in a horizontal dimension. The 
association between fathers’ professions and respondents’ fields of study very 
often conduces the respondent to practice the same professions as their parents. 
Results of this chapter illustrate that education can be seen as a means that leads 
to a specific licensed profession rather than just increase social equality and 
modernization.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
54
 I do not show results in graphical form for professionals in the scientific fields because, as 
already shown above, they do not present any social class that differs in propensity from the others. 
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Figure 4.10. Average marginal effects from multinomial logistic regression model for the probability of being 
a professional in medicine, in pharmacy and veterinarian, and in law, in architecture, in engineering and in 
economics, according to the micro-class of origin (ref. cat. working class-VIIab). Estimates are at net of 
controls (gender, age, parental education, nationality, geographical area, type of high school, high school 
grade). Black dots denote the AME of social classes and black lines denote 95% confidence intervals. 
Legend: white collars (IIIa), routine non–manual workers (IIIb); petite bourgeoisie (IVab); farmers (IVc). 
Source: ISAT- Sbocchi professionali dei laureati (2011). 
 
 
When the field of study gives access just to a specific profession, such as 
medicine or pharmacy and veterinarian, these results seem a perfect match 
between the professional fathers’ micro-classes and the tertiary educational level, 
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managerial positions. Looking at graduates, the core prediction of the social 
closure theory seems to characterize the Italian case. 
In illustrating results of the OD association I start from figure 4.11. in which I 
separate the employment situation of the professional fathers, specifically 
employed and liberal professional (self-employed). This analysis is important for 
the focus of the chapter because it allows to demonstrate that inheriting the 
professional business of fathers increase the propensity of their children to follow 
in their footsteps. Then, if Italian graduates are considered, it helps to partially 
cover the lack of the previous chapter. 
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Figure 4.11. Average marginal effects from multinomial logistic regression model for the probability of being a professional in architecture, in engineering, and in 
economics, according to the micro-class of origin (ref. cat. in social, political and humanities). Estimates are at net of controls (gender, age, parental education, 
nationality, geographical area, type of high school, high school grade). Black dots denote the AME of social classes and black lines denote 95% confidence intervals. 
Source: ISAT- Sbocchi professionali dei laureati (2011). 
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As Figure 4.11. illustrates when there is the opportunity to inherit the 
professional business of the father professionals’, children are more inclined to 
graduate and become full members of a professional group as their parents. 
This figure does not differ by gender but just by the employment situation of 
the professional fathers. The most impressive results regard medicine for which 
having a liberal professional father increases the affinity with children’s 
destination of an AME of 44 percentage points. In this case also having an 
employed doctor as a father makes the difference reaching an AME of 21.1 and it 
is statistically significant in comparison with all the other social classes. This 
situation is also very similar for professionals in pharmacy and veterinarian and 
for legal professionals; for the former, having a liberal professional as a father 
conduces to an AME of 48.5 percentage points, for the latter the AME reach 44. 
For employed professionals in both these cases AME are about 21. 
Concerning accountants AME are statistically significant compared to the 
other social classes just in the case of liberal professional fathers, whereas for 
engineers and architects there are no differences between liberal professional and 
employed professional fathers (indeed confidence intervals overlap). 
Below, by using the same model, I separate men from women. 
 
 
Tab. 4.2. AME for the affinity between professional micro-class of origin and 
professional micro-class of destination by employment situation of the 
respondent’s professional father (as micro-class of professionals) and by gender.  
Field of profession Male 
AME % 
Female  
AME % 
Liberal professionals in medicine 45.89 37.52 
 
(0.04) (0.05) 
Employed professionals in medicine 20.1 23.71 
 
(0.03) (0.04) 
Liberal professionals in pharmacy and veterinarian 49.31 51.76 
 
(0.09) (0.09) 
Employed professionals in pharmacy and veterinarian 28.99 13.66 
 
(0.08) (0.07) 
Liberal professionals in law 40.71 49.21 
 
(0.09) (0.07) 
Employed professionals in law 28.28 10 
 
(0.06) (0.09) 
Liberal professionals in architecture 21.23 54.41 
 
(0.06) (0.05) 
Employed professionals in architecture 34.37 11.70 
 
(0.15) (0.11) 
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Liberal professionals in engineering 27.07 15.87 
 
(0.03) (0.04) 
Employed professionals in engineering 17.25 15.02 
 
(0.03) (0.05) 
Liberal professionals in economics 33.43 30.37 
 
(0.07) (0.07) 
Employed professionals in economics 15.84 12.40 
 
(0.05) (0.05) 
Standard errors in parenthesis. 
Source: ISAT- Sbocchi professionali dei laureati (2011). 
 
 
Although, according to the literature that claims that inheriting a professional 
business (see Orsini and Pellizzari 2012) is more likely for men, results show that 
also women are reducing the gap with men. Even if AME for men are higher than 
women. The only exception for which women are more incline than men to inherit 
the business of the professional father is in the field of architecture. This is still in 
favor of men when fathers are employed architects. 
 
 
4.5. Conclusive remarks 
 
 
The chapter examined the Origin-Education-Destination triangle in a more 
detailed way than the others traditional studies. Indeed, I combined big-classes, 
meso-classes and micro-classes of professionals in order to better understand the 
educational and occupational inequalities. By using a large sample of Italian 
graduates, this chapter went through arguments that previous one could not 
consider because of data limitations. Indeed it analysed gender differences and it 
took into consideration the employment conditions of both respondent and fathers. 
What I did not examine to get a more complete picture of educational inequalities 
is the choice of the fields o study by looking at students in the upper secondary 
education. This is because of a lack of information about father occupational 
positions. Thus, as a first suggestions for future studies is to consider students 
choice of tertiary field of study. 
The evidence shown that when professionals are licensed the level of their 
intergenerational immobility is very high, whereas for all the others professionals 
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this immobility is low. This emerged by considering both respondent education 
and occupation. 
Considering gender differences, when the majority of students attended a 
field of study is female, such as for medicine, pharmacy and veterinarian, and law 
the affinity with a professional father in such fields is more important for men 
than women, on the contrary, in engineering having an engineer as a father is 
more important (and statistically significant) for women. 
As illustrated in the last part of the chapter when there is the opportunity to 
inherit the professional business of the father professionals’ children are more 
incline to graduate and become full member of the professional group as their 
parent. 
The most impressive results regarded medicine for which having a father 
liberal professional increases the affinity with children’s destination. This 
situation is very remarkable for professionals in medicine, pharmacy and 
veterinarian and legal professionals. Whereas for engineers and architects there 
were no differences between liberal professionals and employed professionals.  
I also studied the gender differences in the Origin-Destination association and 
even if the literature claims that inheriting a professional business (Orsini and 
Pellizzari 2012) is much pronounced for men, results shown that women are 
reducing the gap with men. The gender difference does not seem unlikely to 
disappear in next future. I also illustrated that women were more incline than men 
to inherit the professional business of the father when considering the field of 
architecture. This was in favour of men in the case of employed architects. 
This chapter analysis demonstrated that social closure and credentialism are 
useful theories to interpret this evidence. As for the micro-class approach with 
which professionals social reproduction can be discovered. By using this sample, 
this chapter illustrated that big- and meso- class approach does not allow shedding 
light on social inequalities concerning licensed professionals.  
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Conclusions 
 
 
This thesis has focused on the role of social closure for the intergenerational 
reproduction of regulated professionals in five European countries. Indeed, social 
closure theory demonstrated to be a fruitful theory able to capture social class 
inequalities in their horizontal dimension, such as immobility processes within 
micro-classes of licensed professionals and fields of study at tertiary educational 
level. Moreover, credentialism theory was useful to frame the phenomenon of 
educational inequalities considering fields of study. 
The combination of these theories and the micro-class approach of Grusky 
and associates allowed to disentangle different groups of professionals and to 
analyse into details their dynamics of social reproduction. Indeed, these 
professionals reproduction is strictly linked to the transmission of the four kinds 
of resources as discussed in the theoretical chapter. Moreover, another mechanism 
linked to social closure is the legal closure for which the level of 
institutionalization varies across European countries. As in chapter two and three, 
the correlation between the social reproduction of licensed and unlicensed 
professionals and the level of regulation shown that it varies according to the 
profession and to the country institutions characteristics. The stronger the 
structure of the education and labour market the higher is professional regulation 
and professionals’ intergenerational immobility. An example can be illustrated 
with two countries to the extreme of social openness and structuration of country 
institution, such as Sweden and Germany (see chapter two). When considering 
correlation, explained above, in Germany and in Sweden results are very different. 
In Germany, licensed professionals immobility linked to the level of regulation 
shown a strong pattern, while for unlicensed professionals no pattern emerged 
(intergenerational immobility for these professions was very low); no such gap 
between licensed and unlicensed professionals was found in Sweden.  
Moreover, chapter two demonstrated that in each of the four countries 
considered, Sweden, Great Britain, Denmark and Germany, there are strong big- 
and meso-class rigidities, but micro-classes strongly contribute to the upper class 
immobility. Thus, micro-classes are able to reveal that different fractions of the 
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upper class have distinctive characteristics, especially when considering micro-
classes of professionals. 
The second chapter results suggested that micro-class reproduction fuelled by 
social closure works predominantly for men (in all countries but Germany), while 
for women it appears to be of limited importance. This gendered pattern was 
unexpected, though it may be noted that Jonsson et al. (2009) reported a similarly 
attenuated micro-class pattern for women. It is worth stressing that in the 
empirical analyses only the father’s occupation was considered and that the 
mother’s occupation may be more relevant for daughters. I also mentioned that 
selection into employment was another potential limitation of the analyses 
concerning women. Future studies by using large samples should go into details 
of micro-class patterns for women across European countries, including mothers’ 
occupational positions.  
This chapter considered two complementary mechanisms that are in place to 
the immobility of professional children (meso-class rigidity) in the upper class: 
first, processes of social closure erect barriers between professions and fuel micro-
class immobility at the top, second, the cultural proximity of different professional 
groups drives intense intergenerational exchanges between them. 
Chapter three, concerning Italian men, shown a different picture. From one 
hand, the transmission of resources can take place in a more abstract dimension. 
Indeed, a relevant result for the literature on social mobility in Italy was added 
because the analysis of this chapter indicated that in Italy safety-nets work very 
well for sons of the upper class at both meso- and big-class levels. From the other 
hand, it also demonstrate that it is important not to take for granted the willingness 
of children to pursue their parents’ career, especially if it provides access to many 
other attractive options. Indeed, Italian men seem to find attractive other positions 
within the whole upper class. Both these two mechanism could increase the social 
immobility of son of the upper class. 
In Chapter four, I examined the Origin-Education-Destination triangle in a 
more detailed way considering Italian graduates. I combined big-, meso- and 
micro-classes of professionals in order to understand the educational and 
occupational inequalities at the top of the hierarchy in Italy thorough a micro-level 
perspective. Results shown that when a profession is licensed the level of 
intergenerational immobility is very high, whereas for all the others professions 
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this immobility is low. This can be seen since graduation in a specific field of 
study: the strongest OE association regarded medicine, pharmacy and 
veterinarian, law and architecture. 
Considering gender differences, when the majority of students that attend a 
field of study is female, such as for medicine, pharmacy and veterinarian, and law 
the influence of a professional father is more important for men than women; on 
the contrary, such as for engineering, having a engineer as a father is more 
important for women. In my opinion these processes take place because micro-
classes reinforce occupational preferences of licensed professionals’ children. 
This remind the cultural reproduction theory as in chapter one. These gendered 
results seem to suggest that micro-classes are able to weaken some gender 
stereotypes (or common thoughts) for which people give gendered representations 
of occupations, as for engineering that is more suitable for men than women, or 
vice-versa, midwives are more appropriate occupational position for women than 
men. Step by step, some social changes can occur when considering gender 
differences as in chapter four. 
I also found that when there is the opportunity to inherit the professional 
business of the father, professionals’ children are more inclined to graduate and 
become full members of the professional group of their parents. In medicine, 
having a father liberal professional increases the affinity with children’s 
destination. This situation is also very remarkable for professionals in pharmacy 
and veterinary and for legal professionals. No such results were found considering 
professionals in economics in the employed situation. This evidence could be 
unsurprising for the reader, but at least this thesis, in this case chapter four, sheds 
light on the magnitude of this social phenomenon, which it has been disregarded 
for a long time by social mobility studies in Italy.  
Along with the results of these chapter, I also studied graduates gender 
differences in the Origin-Destination association and even if the literature claims 
that inheriting a professional business (see Orsini and Pellizzari 2012) is much 
pronounced for men, results shown that women are reducing the gap with men. 
The gender difference does not seem unlikely to disappear in next future.  
Then, parent’s occupation influence is more important for women than men 
to inherit the professional business of the liberal professional father is in the field 
of architecture. This is still in favour of men in the case of employed architects. 
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To my knowledge, studies on gender difference combined with the employment 
condition of licensed professionals are really few or they do not exist.  
Future studies should get in depth of the focus of this thesis, for example 
employing statistical methods which allow finding a causal relationship between 
the level of restrictiveness of licensed professional service and rates of 
intergenerational immobility and of course considering professional women. 
According to the transmission of resources to professionals’ children, when 
professional closure expands the economic profitability of these professions, it 
enhances the incentives for these children to follow in their parents’ footsteps. 
This mechanism is reinforced considerably if parents can transfer a family 
professional business to their children and, most importantly, a client portfolio; 
And licensed professionals parents seem to be open to give these kinds of chances 
to their daughters too. 
To sum up, the mainstream, big-class explanations focus on the amount of 
generalised resources relevant for a broad range of occupations, while the micro-
class approach focuses on occupation-specific resources valued in a narrow set of 
occupations, where they ensure strong competitive advantages, when 
professionals’ children are willing to follow in their parents’ footsteps. However, 
tertium datur: meso-class rigidities reflect resources that are qualitatively 
differentiated, but relevant for a broader set of occupations. So, rather than 
engaging in a contest between micro- and big-class approaches, I illustrated three 
distinct sets of rigidities operating at different levels that work as complementary 
routes to social immobility. 
The analytical strategy, indeed, included big-, meso- and micro-level in the 
analysis of the upper class immobility. This strategy allowed to consider the 
cultural, cognitive, social and economic resources for each level: from the broader 
abstract knowledge to the occupation-specific capital.  
Additionally, this thesis gave attention to that the connection between micro-
dynamics of intergenerational transmission of specific occupational skills and the 
level of institutionalization of professional groups because it plays a key role in 
the investigation of the mobility regime of these regulated professionals.  
As well, when institutionalization of profession is well defined, such in the 
case of Italy, the regulation can affect the social reproduction of licensed 
professionals since tertiary education. Thus, even if big-class remains a useful and 
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important approach in social mobility studies this thesis aims to contribute to the 
literature shedding light on social inequalities by using micro-classes. In other 
words, this thesis analyses indicated that the children of licensed professionals 
display a particularly strong relative propensity to inherit the specific profession 
of their fathers and also that this stronger micro-class immobility translates into 
higher chances of persistence in the higher service class. 
The interpretation I provided takes two factors into account: the first one 
regards social closure, which enhances the economic profitability of professions 
and thus produces incentives to follow into the parents’ footsteps. The second one 
regards access barriers to regulated professions, such as long university studies, 
professional practice and selective entry exams, which increase the costs and risks 
of failure for outsiders. 
When meso- and big-class shown strong rigidities (see chapter three) the 
interpretation included safety-nets and professionals children willingness children 
not to pursue the same career as their parents, if their family resources provide 
access to many other attractive options specifically in the whole upper class. 
Of course, by considering results of chapter four, the analyses of the previous 
one should be rerun with a bigger sample, including women, and finally 
maintaining the same analytical strategy.  
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APPENDIX A 
 
Section 1: Distribution of frequencies of variables employed in the analysis of chapter 2. 
Source: ESS 2002-2004-2006-2008-2010, EVS 2008, ISSP 2009 (I do not repeat the source for 
tables and plots in Appendix A) 
 
Table A.1. Social class of origin at disaggregate level: GERMANY 
EGP scheme – (with micro-classes) % 
High level entrepreneur (I) 0.6 
High level manager(I) 1.5 
Prof. in scientific fields (I) 0.8 
Engineers (I) 3.1 
Architects (I) 0.7 
Medical professionals (I) 1.1 
Prof. in economics (I) 0.3 
Prof. in social and political science (I) 0.7 
Legal Professionals (I) 0.6 
Lower service class (II) 14.7 
Skilled white collars (IIIa) 4.7 
Routine non-manual (IIIb) 1.7 
Self-employed with no or few employees (IVab) 7.2 
Farmers (IVc) 5.5 
Skilled manual working class (V-VI) 33.5 
Unskilled manual working class (VIIab) 23.35 
Total (N) 100 
 (12246) 
 
 
Table A.2. Social class of origin at disaggregate level: DENMARK 
EGP scheme – (with micro-classes) % 
High level entrepreneur (I) 2.1 
High level manager(I) 3.2 
Prof. in scientific fields (I) 1.4 
Engineers (I) 1 
Architects (I) 0.3 
Medical professionals (I) 1.3 
Prof. in economics (I) 1.1 
Prof. in social and political science (I) 0.5 
Legal Professionals (I) 0.3 
Lower service class (II) 17.6 
Skilled white collars (IIIa) 2.1 
Routine non-manual (IIIb) 3.7 
Self-employed with no or few employees (IVab) 13.2 
Farmers (IVc) 14.9 
Skilled manual working class (V-VI) 14.5 
Unskilled manual working class (VIIab) 21.9 
Total (N) 100 
 (8088) 
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Table A.3. Social class of origin at disaggregate level: GREAT BRITAIN  
EGP scheme – (with micro-classes) % 
High level entrepreneur (I) 1.2 
High level manager(I) 3.3 
Prof. in scientific fields (I) 1.6 
Engineers (I) 2.2 
Architects (I) 1.7 
Medical professionals (I) 0.9 
Prof. in economics (I) 1 
Prof. in social and political science (I) 0.8 
Legal Professionals (I) 0.1 
Lower service class (II) 20.9 
Skilled white collars (IIIa) 2.3 
Routine non-manual (IIIb) 2.7 
Self-employed with no or few employees (IVab) 9.7 
Farmers (IVc) 3.6 
Skilled manual working class (V-VI) 20 
Unskilled manual working class (VIIab) 27.9 
Total (N) 100 
 (8858) 
 
 
Table A.4. Social class of origin at disaggregate level: SWEDEN 
EGP scheme – (with micro-classes) % 
High level entrepreneur (I) 1 
High level manager(I) 3.6 
Prof. in scientific fields (I) 0.7 
Engineers (I) 1.8 
Architects (I) 0.5 
Medical professionals (I) 1.2 
Prof. in economics (I) 0.5 
Prof. in social and political science (I) 0.9 
Legal Professionals (I) 0.5 
Lower service class (II) 19.8 
Skilled white collars (IIIa) 2.1 
Routine non-manual (IIIb) 3.7 
Self-employed with no or few employees (IVab) 13.1 
Farmers (IVc) 10 
Skilled manual working class (V-VI) 21.2 
Unskilled manual working class (VIIab) 38.9 
Total (N) 100 
 (8064) 
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Table A.5. Social class of destination at disaggregate level: GERMANY 
EGP scheme – (with micro-classes) % 
High level entrepreneur (I) 0.7 
High level manager(I) 7.0 
Prof. in scientific fields (I) 1.7 
Engineers (I) 2.7 
Architects (I) 0.6 
Medical professionals (I) 0.9 
Prof. in economics (I) 0.4 
Prof. in social and political science (I) 1 
Legal Professionals (I) 0.5 
Lower service class (II) 23.6 
Skilled white collars (IIIa) 12.5 
Routine non-manual (IIIb) 8.4 
Self-employed with no or few employees (IVab) 5.7 
Farmers (IVc) 1.2 
Skilled manual working class (V-VI) 16 
Unskilled manual working class (VIIab) 17.2 
Total (N) 100 
 (13521) 
 
 
Table A.6. Social class of destination at disaggregate level: DENMARK 
EGP scheme – (with micro-classes) % 
High level entrepreneur (I) 1.6 
High level manager(I) 10.4 
Prof. in scientific fields (I) 1.5 
Engineers (I) 1.15 
Architects (I) 0.4 
Medical professionals (I) 1.5 
Prof. in economics (I) 0.7 
Prof. in social and political science (I) 1.5 
Legal Professionals (I) 0.5 
Lower service class (II) 27.9 
Skilled white collars (IIIa) 9.3 
Routine non-manual (IIIb) 9.6 
Self-employed with no or few employees (IVab) 4.1 
Farmers (IVc) 1.9 
Skilled manual working class (V-VI) 10.6 
Unskilled manual working class (VIIab) 17.5 
Total (N) 100 
 (8343) 
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Table A.7. Social class of destination at disaggregate level: GREAT BRITAIN 
EGP scheme – (with micro-classes) % 
High level entrepreneur (I) 1.3 
High level manager(I) 12.7 
Prof. in scientific fields (I) 1.7 
Engineers (I) 0.5 
Architects (I) 0.8 
Medical professionals (I) 0.7 
Prof. in economics (I) 0.6 
Prof. in social and political science (I) 1.4 
Legal Professionals (I) 0.4 
Lower service class (II) 22.8 
Skilled white collars (IIIa) 7.5 
Routine non-manual (IIIb) 13.3 
Self-employed with no or few employees (IVab) 7.6 
Farmers (IVc) 3.61.2 
Skilled manual working class (V-VI) 8.3 
Unskilled manual working class (VIIab) 20 
Total (N) 100 
 (9265) 
 
 
 
Table A.8. Social class of destination at disaggregate level: SWEDEN 
EGP scheme – (with micro-classes) % 
High level entrepreneur (I) 1 
High level manager(I) 7 
Prof. in scientific fields (I) 2.8 
Engineers (I) 1.2 
Architects (I) 0.6 
Medical professionals (I) 1.4 
Prof. in economics (I) 1.2 
Prof. in social and political science (I) 1.2 
Legal Professionals (I) 0.5 
Lower service class (II) 30.1 
Skilled white collars (IIIa) 7.7 
Routine non-manual (IIIb) 14.1 
Self-employed with no or few employees (IVab) 5.6 
Farmers (IVc) 1.4 
Skilled manual working class (V-VI) 10.2 
Unskilled manual working class (VIIab) 14.1 
Total (N) 100 
 (8064) 
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Section 2– Log-linear models – mobility tables ORIGINS-DESTINATIONS 
 
Table A.9: Origin – Destination - Germany- Men only number of observations 5931    
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 Tot % (N) 
1.Entrepreneurs 9.1 21.2 9.1 0 3 3 0 6.1 0 21.2 0 0 9.1 3 12.1 3 100 33 
2.Managers 2.1 12.6 3.2 1 9.5 0 2 1.1 1.1 316 9.5 4.2 2.1 0 11.6 8.5 100 95 
3.Unreg. scientific. 0 13 4.4 2.2 17.4 2.2 0 0 0 26.1 2.2 2.2 8.7 0 15.2 6.5 100 46 
4.Architects 2.5 2.5 2.5 10 17.5 0 0 2.5 2.5 30 2.5 2.5 10 2.5 12.5 0 100 40 
5.Engineers 0.6 9.3 9.3 0.6 17.3 1.2 2.9 3.5 0.6 30.7 2.9 0.6 4.6 1.2 8.7 6.4 100 173 
6.Accountants 0 27.8 5.7 0 0 16.7 0 5.6 0 5.6 5.6 0 11.1 0 11.1 11.1 100 18 
7.Medical prof. 0 7.7 7.7 0 9.2 3 27.7 4.6 1.5 20 1.5 0 4.6 3.1 4.6 4.6 100 65 
8.Unreg. social sc. 0 11.1 8.9 0 4.40 0 2.2 0 2.2 26.7 6.7 0 8.9 0 6.6 22.2 100 45 
9. Legal prof 2.6 12.8 5.1 5.1 0 0 7.7 2.6 15.4 17.9 2.6 5.1 10.3 0 10.7 2.6 100 39 
10.II 1.6 13.4 3.7 1.3 5.5 0.7 1.5 2.6 2 29.2 5.7 1.7 7.2 0.6 15.2 8.1 100 873 
11.IIIa 1.5 11.2 4.5 1.9 6 0.8 1.1 1.9 1.1 27.2 6.3 3.4 6 0.8 15.3 11.2 100 268 
12.IIIb 1 7.1 1 3 4 0 0 1 0 28.3 5 1 6.1 0 25.3 17.2 100 99 
13.IVab 3.3 11.4 2.4 1.2 2.9 0.7 0.7 0.5 0.7 21.9 5.5 2.1 19.1 0.7 15.5 11.4 100 420 
14.IVc 2.8 7.3 3.1 0.6 2.8 0.3 0.6 0.6 0.3 12.3 3.9 1.7 3.1 17.3 22.4 21.2 100 358 
15.V-VI 0.7 8.3 1.4 0.7 4.5 0.3 0.2 0.7 0.3 16.4 4.2 2 5.7 0.5 34.5 19.83 100 1962 
16.VIIab 0.4 6.9 1.2 0.1 2.4 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.1 14.9 3.8 1.8 5.7 1.6 29.5 30.6 100 1397 
Legend: II: lower service class; IIIa: skilled white collars; IIIb: routine non-manual workers ; IVab: self-employed workers, IVc: farmers; V-
VI: skilled manual workers, low-level supervisors and technicians; VIIab: unskilled manual workers. 
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Table A.10. Origin – Destination - Germany- Women only number of observations 5800 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 Tot % (N) 
1.Entrepreneurs 5.3 7.9 0 0 0 0 0 2.6 0 52.6 13.2 5.3 10.5 0 2.6 0 100 38 
2.Managers 1.2 10.9 1.2 0 0 0 0 0 1.2 41.5 23.7 9.8 2.4 0 4.9 3.7 100 82 
3.Unreg. scientific. 0 7.3 1.8 3.6 1.8 0 1.8 0 0 56.4 16.4 5.5 0 1.8 0 3.7 100 55 
4.Architects 0 7.9 0 7.9 0 0 7.9 2.6 2.6 39.5 7.9 13.2 2.6 0 0 7.9 100 38 
5.Engineers 0 7.1 4.9 2.7 3.8 1.6 2.2 2.7 0.5 42.2 16.7 6.5 4.3 0 1.1 3.8 100 185 
6.Accountants 0 0 10 0 0 0 10 0 0 55 10 5 10 0 0 0 100 20 
7.Medical prof. 1.6 8.1 4.8 1.6 0 0 14.5 4.8 1.6 35.5 11.3 4.9 4.8 0 1.6 4.8 100 62 
8.Unreg. social sc. 0 5.9 2.9 0 0 0 0 5.9 2.9 52.9 20.6 8.8 0 0 0 0 100 34 
9. Legal prof 0 3 6.1 0 0 0 3 0 12.1 30.3 24.2 6.1 9.1 0 3 3 100 33 
10.II 0.4 5.6 1.9 0.8 1.1 0.5 1.8 2.6 0.7 39.4 21.4 10.3 3.9 0.4 3.7 5.6 100 842 
11.IIIa 0.7 3.3 1.1 1.1 0 0.4 0.7 1.1 0 35.9 27.5 12 5.1 0.4 2.5 8.3 100 276 
12.IIIb 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 24 26 20 4 0 9 13 100 100 
13.IVab 0.5 5.8 0.5 0.5 1.4 0 1.6 1.2 0.7 31.7 18.8 11.3 9.5 0.5 5.1 11.1 100 432 
14.IVc 0 4.9 1.4 0.4 0.4 0 0.4 0.4 0.4 24.6 15.1 7 7 3.9 4.2 18.3 100 285 
15.V-VI 0.5 3.9 0.4 0.1 0.9 0.3 0.5 0.4 0.1 24.3 17.8 4.2 4.2 0.9 7.8 16.4 100 1969 
16.VIIab 0 4 0.4 0.2 0.4 0.1 0.1 0.3 0.2 19.7 17.3 4.2 4.2 0.5 8.8 24.4 100 139 
Legend: II: lower service class; IIIa: skilled white collars; IIIb: routine non-manual workers ; IVab: self-employed workers, IVc: farmers; V-VI: skilled manual 
workers, low-level supervisors and technicians; VIIab: unskilled manual workers. 
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Table A.11. Origin – Destination - Denmark- Men only number of observations 3873 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 Tot % (N) 
1.Entrepreneurs 3.7 23.2 4.9 1.2 2.4 0 4.9 0 0 25.6 2.4 1.2 7.3 0 9.8 13.4 100 82 
2.Managers 1.5 18.1 3 0 3 1.5 2.3 3.8 0.8 36.8 3.7 3 6 0 10.5 6 100 133 
3.Unreg. scientific. 3.2 15.9 3.2 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6 30.2 3.2 1.6 11.1 1.6 14.6 6.4 100 63 
4.Architects 0 10 0 10 0 0 0 0 0 40 0 0 0 0 20 20 100 10 
5.Engineers 0 17.1 5.7 5.7 5.7 0 2.8 0 0 25.7 0 0 2.9 0 17.1 17.1 100 35 
6.Accountants 4.8 26.2 4.7 0 0 9.5 2.4 0 0 33.3 4.8 0 2.4 0 2.4 7.1 100 42 
7.Medical prof. 1.8 3.6 3.6 3.6 3.6 0 25 3.6 5.4 37.5 5.4 0 1.8 0 0 8.9 100 56 
8.Unreg. social sc. 0. 9.5 0 9.5 9.6 4.8 0 4.7 0 28.6 9.5 4.8 9.5 0 4.8 14.3 100 21 
9. Legal prof 9.1 27.3 0 0 0 0 0 0 36.4 27.3 0 0 0 0 0 0 100 11 
10.II 2.8 18.6 3.9 0.9 2.3 0.3 3.5 2.8 0.6 29.1 4.1 2.4 4.3 0.9 11.2 12.3 100 667 
11.IIIa 1.1 13.9 3.2 0 2.2 1.1 0 3.2 0 36.6 4.3 2.2 3.2 2.2 9.7 17.2 100 93 
12.IIIb 1.3 5.3 1.3 0 2 0.7 0.7 1.3 0.7 34 3.3 4 2.7 1.3 16 25.3 100 150 
13.IVab 3.4 14.3 2 0.4 2.6 0.6 0.4 1.4 0 23.1 3.4 1 10.4 1.4 18.5 17.1 100 498 
14.IVc 1.8 9.3 1.7 0.2 2 1.5 1.3 0.7 0.3 14.5 1.7 1.5 6.8 15.1 15.8 25.9 100 602 
15.V-VI 2 9.7 1.5 0 1.7 0 0.9 1.1 0 23.6 3.4 2.4 5.4 0.6 25.3 22.5 100 538 
16.VIIab 1.7 9.9 0.9 0.3 2 0.6 0.6 1.2 0.1 19 3.6 2.1 4.6 0.9 23.5 29.6 100 872 
Legend: II: lower service class; IIIa: skilled white collars; IIIb: routine non-manual workers ; IVab: self-employed workers, IVc: farmers; V-VI: skilled manual 
workers, low-level supervisors and technicians; VIIab: unskilled manual workers. 
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Table A.12. Origin – Destination - Denmark- Women only number of observations 3901 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 Tot % (N) 
1.Entrepreneurs 6.3 6.3 1.3 0 0 0 1.3 2.5 3.8 40 11.3 8.8 5 0 2.5 11.3 100 80 
2.Managers 1.8 8.9 1.8 0.9 0 0 2.7 5.4 3.6 45.5 15.2 8 2.7 0 1.8 1.8 100 112 
3.Unreg. scientific. 0 11.4 4.6 0 2.3 0 4.6 4.6 2.8 273 11.4 18.2 0 2.3 2.8 9.1 100 44 
4.Architects 0 7.1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 42.9 21.4 28.6 0 0 0 0 100 14 
5.Engineers 0 5 5 2.5 0 2.5 5 7.5 0 45 10 7.5 2.5 0 2.5 5 100 40 
6.Accountants 0 2.5 2.5 0 2.5 5 0 2.5 5 47.5 10 12.5 0 2.5 7.5 0 100 40 
7.Medical prof. 0 15.9 6.8 0 0 0 9.1 6.8 0 34.1 13.6 6.8 0 0 2.3 4.6 100 44 
8.Unreg. social sc. 0 4.8 0 0 0 0 0 14.3 0 38.1 23.8 14.3 0 0 0 4.8 100 21 
9. Legal prof 0 13.3 0 0 0 0 13.3 0 0 40 13.33 6.7 0 6.7 0 6.7 100 15 
10.II 0.3 10.6 1.3 0.6 0.4 0.3 1.6 2.6 1 40.7 16.1 14.3 1.58 0.4 2.2 6.2 100 698 
11.IIIa 0.9 5.6 0 0 0 0.9 1.9 1.9 0 38.9 15.7 14.8 0.9 0.9 0.9 16.7 100 108 
12.IIIb 1.2 2.9 1.2 0 0 1.2 0.6 0 0.6 35.9 20 15.9 0.6 0 2.4 17.7 100 170 
13.IVab 1.5 8.8 0.6 0.2 0.2 1.2 1.2 0.9 0.2 30.3 18.2 16.3 4.4 1 4 11.1 100 522 
14.IVc 0.5 9.7 0.4 0.2 0.2 0.5 0.7 0.7 0 28.1 15 19.8 3 2.5 4.1 14.51 100 565 
15.V-VI 0.7 7.7 0.9 0 0 0.3 0.9 0.3 0.2 32.3 16.2 19.6 2.7 0.2 4.3 13.4. 100 586 
16.VIIab 0.5 7.4 0.1 0 0 0.4 0.6 0.7 0.1 25.9 13.1 20 2.5 0.1 4.8 24 100 842 
Legend: II: lower service class; IIIa: skilled white collars; IIIb: routine non-manual workers ; IVab: self-employed workers, IVc: farmers; V-VI: skilled manual 
workers, low-level supervisors and technicians; VIIab: unskilled manual workers. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
135 
 
Table A.13. Origin – Destination – Great Britain - Men only number of observations 3709 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 Tot % (N) 
1.Entrepreneurs 12.7 23.6 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 12.7 1.8 1.8 16.4 0 9.1 9.1 100 55 
2.Managers 3.7 21.5 2.8 1.9 0 1.9 0.9 3.7 0 21.5 1.9 0 8.4 1.8 0 8.4 100 107 
3.Unreg. scientific. 3.7 14.8 7.4 1.9 0 0 1.9 0 0 25.9 5.6 1.9 13 0 9.3 14.8 100 54 
4.Architects 1.6 22.2 0 4.8 1.6 1.6 0 1.6 0 26.9 1.6 0 9.5 1.6 9.6 17.5 100 63 
5.Engineers 3.8 20.7 7.6 3.8 0 0 3.8 0 0 15.1 3.8 3.8 9.4 0 13.1 15.1 100 53 
6.Accountants 5.4 16.2 10.8 2.7 0 8.1 2.7 2.7 0 27 5.4 5.4 2.7 0 8.1 2.7 100 37 
7.Medical prof. 2.6 17.9 5.1 5.1 0 0 7.7 5.1 2.6 30.8 0 2.6 12.9 0 0 7.7 100 39 
8.Unreg. social sc. 0 4.4 8.7 0 4.4 0 0 4.4 0 26.1 0 4.35 13 0 21.7 13 100 23 
9. Legal prof 0 20 0 0 0 0 20 0 40 0 0 0 20 0 0 0 100 5 
10.II 1 19.8 3.4 1.4 1.8 1.1 1 2.1 0.8 24.4 2.8 3.2 10.3 1.3 10 15.7 100 794 
11.IIIa 1.2 13.9 2.5 2.5 0 2.5 2.5 1.3 0 17.7 5.1 0 10.1 0 6.3 34.2 100 79 
12.IIIb 1.1 13.9 1.1 1.1 0.5 0 0 0 0 20.9 1.1 3.3 11 1.1 15.4 30.8 100 91 
13.IVab 3.5 15.5 3.5 2.1 0 0 1.6 1.1 0.3 14.4 2.7 2.4 20 3.2 11.8 17.4 100 374 
14.IVc 0.7 9.2 2.1 0.7 0 2.1 1.4 0.7 0 17.6 2.11 2.8 14.8 18.3 5.6 21.8 100 142 
15.V-VI 1.3 13.7 2.4 1.5 0.9 0.7 0.3 1.5 0 15.9 2.4 3.5 8.5 2.1 18.1 27.21 100 746 
16.VIIab 1.6 11.4 1.4 1.3 0.6 0.2 0.4 0.5 0.4 11 2.2 3.6 11.5 1.9 16.5 35.4 100 1047 
Legend: II: lower service class; IIIa: skilled white collars; IIIb: routine non-manual workers ; IVab: self-employed workers, IVc: farmers; V-VI: skilled manual 
workers, low-level supervisors and technicians; VIIab: unskilled manual workers. 
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Table A.14. Origin – Destination – Great Britain - Women only number of observations 4346 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 Tot % (N) 
1.Entrepreneurs 0 22.2 0 0 0 0 0 4.4 0 31.1 8.9 15.6 2.2 0 2.2 13.3 100 45 
2.Managers 0 13.6 1.1 1.1 0 0 1.1 1.1 1.1 38.6 7.9 17.1 9.1 0 1.1 6.8 100 88 
3.Unreg. scientific. 2.4 18.3 3.7 1.1 0 1.2 2.4 3.7 0 29.3 10.9 9.7 4.9 0 1.2 9.7 100 82 
4.Architects 3.9 13 0 2.4 0 1.3 1.3 5.2 1.3 31.2 6.5 19.5 9.1 0 1.3 6.5 100 77 
5.Engineers 1.7 16.8 4.2 0.80 0 1.7 0.8 2.5 0 31.9 13.5 12.6 5.9 0 1.7 5.9 100 119 
6.Accountants 0 16.7 0 0 0 0 0 2.4 2.4 47.6 19.1 7.1 2.4 0 0 2.4 100 42 
7.Medical prof. 3 15.2 0 3 0 0 6.1 6.1 3 33.3 15.2 9.1 3 0 0 3 100 33 
8.Unreg. social sc. 2.6 15.4 0 0 0 2.6 0 7.7 0 46.2 7.7 7.7 2.6 0 5.1 2.6 100 39 
9. Legal prof 0. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 50 0 25 25 0 0 0 100 4 
10.II 0.9 14.1 1.3 0.1 0 1 1.1 1.9 0.5 35.5 12.7 15.7 4.7 0.1 2.7 7.7 100 931 
11.IIIa 0 9.3 1 1 0 0 0 1 2.1 25.8 9.28 29.9 4.1 0 5.15 11.3 100 97 
12.IIIb 0 8.6 0.8 0 0 0 0 0.8 0 31.3 11.7 22.7 2.4 0.7 1.6 19.5 100 128 
13.IVab 1.4 13.3 0.7 0.2 0 0.7 0.9 1..6 0.2 27 11.4 18.4 8.4 0 4.9 10.7 100 429 
14.IVc 0 10.2 0.7 0 0 1.4 0 0 0 35.4 7.5 16.3 3.4 6.8 1.4 17 100 147 
15.V-VI 0.8 8.7 0.9 0.1 0 0.1 0.2 1.1 0.4 24 13.2 24.2 3.2 0 4.6 18.5 100 854 
16.VIIab 0.9 8.2 0.2 0 0.1 0.3 0.5 0.7 0.1 18.9 10.7 26.1 4.9 0 5.7 22.9 100 1231 
Legend: II: lower service class; IIIa: skilled white collars; IIIb: routine non-manual workers ; IVab: self-employed workers, IVc: farmers; V-VI: skilled manual 
workers, low-level supervisors and technicians; VIIab: unskilled manual workers. 
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Table A.15. Origin – Destination – Sweden - Men only number of observations 3946 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 Tot % (N) 
1.Entrepreneurs 14.6 2.4 12.2 2.4 4.9 0 0 0 0 26.8 2.4 2.4 14.6 2.4 7.3 7.3 100  
2.Managers 0.65 8.4 5.8 3.3 0.7 1.3 5.2 1.9 1.3 37 2.6 6.5 7.8 0 5.8 11.4 100  
3.Unreg. scientific. 0 4.2 12.5 0 0 0 4.2 12.5 4.2 33.3 0 12.5 0 4.2 4.2 8.3 100  
4.Architects 2.3 11.6 4.2 0 9.4 0 2.3 2.3 2.3 34.9 0 2.3 4.7 2.3 9.3 11.6 100  
5.Engineers 1.6 18 8.2 4.9 6.6 0 3.3 1.6 4.9 26.2 3.3 1.6 4.9 0 3.3 11.5 100  
6.Accountants 0 0 6.3 0 0 0 6.3 0 0 62.5 0 2.3 4.7 2.3 9.3 12.5 100  
7.Medical prof. 2.1 8.3 12.5 0 8.3 2.9 8.3 6.3 0 39.6 2.1 4.2 2.1 0 0 4.2 100  
8.Unreg. social sc. 0 8.3 2.8 5.6 8.3 5.6 2.8 2.8 2.8 38.9 0 5.6 0 0 2.8 13.9 100  
9. Legal prof 0 10.5 0 0 0 0 10.5 0 5.3 47.4 5.3 5.3 0 0 5.3 10.5 100  
10.II 1.7 11.9 5.4 1.2 2.6 0.8 1.8 2.4 1.2 36.4 3 4.9 5.6 0.5 10.4 10.4 100  
11.IIIa 0 7.7 1.3 0 2.6 0 2.6 1.3 0 32.1 6.4 5.1 3.9 0 15.4 21.8 100  
12.IIIb 0 8.7 4.8 0.8 0.8 0 0 0.8 0.8 39.6 0.7 7.9 2.4 0.8 16.7 15.1 100  
13.IVab 3.8 7 2.7 0.4 2.1 0.8 0.4 1.1 0 28.5 2.3 3.6 13.6 1.5 15.5 16.7 100  
14.IVc 2.3 7.4 2 1.1 1.3 0 1 0.5 0 19.9 2.6 2 8.4 17.1 17.1 17.4 100  
15.V-VI 0.9 9.7 3.7 0.6 1.3 0.9 0.6 0.5 0.2 26.1 3.1 3.5 5.2 0.35 24.7 18.6 100  
16.VIIab 1.4 5.5 1.9 0.1 1.5 0.1 0.3 0.5 0.5 22.8 3 4.6 6.8 0.9 28.2 21.8 100  
Legend: II: lower service class; IIIa: skilled white collars; IIIb: routine non-manual workers ; IVab: self-employed workers, IVc: farmers; V-VI: skilled manual 
workers, low-level supervisors and technicians; VIIab: unskilled manual workers. 
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Table A.16. Origin – Destination – Sweden - Women only number of observations 3937 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 Tot.% (N) 
1.Entrepreneurs 5.3 5.3 0 0 0 5.3 5.3 2.6 0 42.1 13.2 15.8 0 0 0 5.3 100 38 
2.Managers 0 5.7 2.4 0.8 0.8 2.4 1.6 3.3 0.8 39 14.6 17.1 0.8 0 1.6 8.9 100 123 
3.Unreg. scientific. 0 3.4 13.8 3.5 3.5 0 0 3.4 0 34.5 20.7 13.7 0 0 0 3.5 100 29 
4.Architects 0 8.3 0 2.7 0 0 0 2.8 0 50 8.3 13.8 5.5 0 0 8.3 100 36 
5.Engineers 0 4.9 6.2 1.3 2.5 1.2 7.4 0 1.2 50.6 7.4 13.6 3.7 0 0 0 100 81 
6.Accountants 0 4.2 8.3 0 0 4.2 4.7 4.2 1.14 35.2 19.3 17.1 7.9 0 0 4.17 100 24 
7.Medical prof. 0 4.8 4.8 2.4 0 0 9.5 9.5 2.4 47.6 7.1 9.5 0 0 0 2.4 100 42 
8.Unreg. social sc. 0 2.8 8.3 0 0 0 8.3 8.3 2.8 47.2 2.8 8.3 0 2.8 0 8.3 100 36 
9. Legal prof 0 11.1 5.6 5.6 0 0 5.6 0 0.5 44.4 11.1 11.1 0 0 0 0 100 18 
10.II 0.1 7.3 2.8 0.5 1 2.6 2.9 1.7 0.4 40.6 9 17.6 3.8 0.9 1.4 7.2 100 778 
11.IIIa 0 2.3 0 0 0 0 0 3.4 1.1 35.2 19.3 17.1 8 1.1 1.1 11.4 100 88 
12.IIIb 0.6 2.5 2.5 0 0 0.6 1.8 0.6 0 37.4 12.3 23.3 0 0.6 4.9 12.9 100 163 
13.IVab 0.6 6.9 0.4 0.8 0.8 0.6 0.8 0.6 0.2 31.8 16.9 21 7.3 0.6 2.6 8.3 100 509 
14.IVc 0.3 4.6 1 0.5 0.3 0.8 0.3 1 0.5 27.5 12.4 26.3 3 1.5 3.3 16.9 100 396 
15.V-VI 0.6 4.1 1.6 0.3 0.2 1.6 0.7 0.9 0.1 29.9 13.2 26.9 3.6 0.2 3.4 12.5 100 824 
16.VIIab 0.4 4 1.2 0 0.1 0.4 0.8 0.5 0.1 22.7 11.9 31.3 4.6 1.1 2.7 17.9 100 752 
Legend: II: lower service class; IIIa: skilled white collars; IIIb: routine non-manual workers ; IVab: self-employed workers, IVc: farmers; V-VI: skilled manual 
workers, low-level supervisors and technicians; VIIab: unskilled manual workers. 
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Section 2 – log-linear models- mobility tables 
 
Tab B 4– 3544 observations for the ORIGIN –DESTINATION association in ITALY 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 Tot % (N) 
1.Entrepreneurs 15.2 0 0 0 0 6.1 0 0 24.2 18.2 9.1 3 0 24.2 100 33 
2.Managers 1.5 1.5 1.5 3 3 3 0 10.5 32.8 19.4 3 0 7.5 13.4 100 67 
3.Unreg. scientific. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 50 0 0 0 50 100 2 
4.Engineers-Architects 0 0 0 25 0 0 0 12.5 37.5 0 12.5 0 0 12.5 100 8 
5.Accountants 0 0 0 0 25 0 0 12.5 25 25 12.5 0 0 0 100 8 
6.Medical professionals 0 0 4.2 4.2 0 20.8 8.3 0 20.8 20.8 12.5 0 0 8.3 100 24 
7.Unreg. social sc. 0 0 16.7 0 0 16.7 0 0 33.3 16.7 0 0 0 16.7 100 6 
8. Legal professionals 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 28.6 14.3 57.1 0 0 0 0 100 7 
9.II 0 0.8 0.8 2.5 0 2.5 2.5 0.8 40.5 19 7.4 0 14.5 9.9 100 121 
10.IIIab 0.7 0.3 1.7 2.3 1 2.7 2.7 0.7 25.5 22.9 4.3 0.3 18.5 18.9 100 302 
11.IVab 0.3 0.7 0.8 0.9 0.4 1.5 1.5 0.3 16.7 16.3 23. 0.7 18.7 18.7 100 689 
12.IVc 0.2 0.6 0.4 0 0 1 1 0.4 4.4 5.8 4 28.6 22.5 32.3 100 521 
13.V-VI 0 0 0.7 0.2 0.4 0.7 0.7 0 11.3 12.2 4 0.7 42.7 27.2 100 452 
13.VIIab 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.1 7.4 10.5 3.1 1.9 34.4 41.4 100 1304 
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Section 3 - Design matrices for the Big-, Meso- and Micro-class rigidities 
 
Table A.17: Design Matrix for the Big-class rigidities 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 
1.Entrepreneurs 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2.Managers 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
3.Legal prof. 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
4.Architects 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
5.Engineers 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
6.Accountants 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
7.Health prof. 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
8.Unreg. social sc. 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
9.Unreg. scientific 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
10.II 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 
11.IIIa 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  3 0 0 0 0 0 
12.IIIb 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 0 0 0 0 
13.IVab 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 0 0 0 
14.IVc 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 0 0 
15.V-VI 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 7 0 
16.VIIab 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 8 
Legend: II: lower service class; IIIa: skilled white collars; IIIb: routine non-manual workers ; 
IVab: self-employed workers, IVc: farmers; V-VI: skilled manual workers, low-level supervisors 
and technicians; VIIab: unskilled manual workers. 
 
 
 
 
Table A.18: Design Matrix for the Meso-class rigidities 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 
1.Entrepreneurs 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2.Managers 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
3.Legal prof. 0 0 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
4.Architects 0 0 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
5.Engineers 0 0 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
6.Accountants 0 0 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
7.Health prof. 0 0 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
8.Unreg. social sc. 0 0 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
9.Unreg. scientific 0 0 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
10.II 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
11.IIIa 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
12.IIIb 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
13.IVab 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
14.IVc 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
15.V-VI 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
16.VIIab 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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Table A.19.: Design Matrix for the Micro-class rigidities 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 
1.Entrepreneurs 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2.Managers 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
3.Legal prof. 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
4.Architects 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
5.Engineers 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
6.Accountants 0 0 0 0 0 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
7.Health prof. 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
8.Unreg. social sc. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
9.Unreg. scientific 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
10.II 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
11.IIIa 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
12.IIIb 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
13.IVab 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
14.IVc 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
15.V-VI 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
16.VIIab 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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Section 4 – Fields of study 
 
Table A.20. Distribution of frequencies of fields of study 
Field of study – MA only % 
Humanities 14.1 
Technical and engineering 17.3 
Science and computing 14.9 
Medicine 13.6 
Economics  18.9 
Social and political science 12.6 
Law and legal services  8.5 
Total 100 
(N) (2873) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
144 
 
Section 5 – controlling for a lower age – Results do not change 
 
 
 
Figure A1: The relationship between entry market regulations in professional occupations and 
immobility parameters for each micro-class, considering 25-45 years old respondents. 
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Section 6 – Binomial logistic regressions  
 
 
Table A.21.: Likelihood-ratio test: the significance of interactions using a big-class 
approach to model OD association.  
Country M2: Sig. int. 
Origin*Survey 
M2: Sig. int. 
Origin*cohort 
Germany 0.26 0.26 
Denmark 0.23 0.01* 
Great Britain 0.41 0.55 
Sweden 0.95 0.13 
 
 
Table A.22.: Likelihood-ratio test: the significance of interactions using a meso-class 
approach to model the OD association. 
Country M2: Sig. int. 
Origin*Survey 
M2: Sig. int. 
Origin*cohort 
Germany 0.13 0.35 
Denmark 0.40 0.01 
Great Britain 0.58 0.69 
Sweden 0.93 0.16 
 
 
Table A.23.: Likelihood-ratio test: the significance of interactions using a distinction 
between licensed and non-licensed professionals to model OD association. 
Country M2: Sig. int. 
Origin*Survey 
M2: Sig. int. 
Origin*cohort 
Germany 0.20 0.46 
Denmark 0.50 0.0* 
Great Britain 0.72 0.73 
Sweden 0.93 0.23 
 
 
Table A.24.: Likelihood-ratio test: the significance of interactions using a big-class 
approach to model OED association. 
Country M2: Sig. int. 
Origin*Survey 
M2: Sig. int. 
Origin*cohort 
Germany 0.87 0.81 
Denmark 0.35 0.01 
Great Britain 0.16 0.63 
Sweden 0.88 0.20 
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Table A25 Likelihood-ratio test: the significance of interactions using a meso-class 
approach to model OED association. 
Country M2: Sig. int. 
Origin*Survey 
M2: Sig. int. 
Origin*cohort 
Germany 0.8144 0.9291 
Denmark 0.5601 0.0594 
Great Britain 0.4797 0.8061 
Sweden 0.8956 0.3691 
 
 
Table A.26. Likelihood-ratio test: the significance of interactions using a meso-class 
approach and the distinction between licensed and non-licensed professionals to model 
OED association. 
Country M2: Sig. int. 
Origin*Survey 
M2: Sig. int. 
Origin*cohort 
Germany 0.20 0.46 
Denmark 0.49 0.01 
Great Britain 0.72 0.73 
Sweden 0.93 0.24 
 
 
 
Section 7 - Note on the institutional level: social class structure and 
educational characteristics in five European countries (Great Britain, 
Sweden, Denmark, Germany and Italy).  
 
Through the comparison among the countries mentioned above, I shed light 
on professionals’ intergenerational mobility considering both different levels of 
professional regulations and different class structures.  
It is well documented that the common denominator between these countries 
is that they have a strong big-class structure because of institutional assets, such as 
big-class organizations and unions (Breen 2004)55. On the contrary, describing 
these European countries in terms of micro-classes is much more difficult.  
The micro-class structure refers to occupational identities and processes of 
reproduction in which specific skills and knowledge are transmitted from parents 
to children. Moreover, Jonsson et. al (2009) suggest Germany and Sweden as two 
ideal-types in terms of the whole micro-class structures: the former with a strong 
one, while in the latter it is suppressed. Specifically: in Germany the micro-classes 
                                                 
55
  It is not a coincidence that proponents of the micro-class approach are from USA. 
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are stronger because the educational system is highly stratified: children have to 
choose which school to attend at the early age of 10, whereas in Sweden this 
choice is significantly postponed in comparison. 
However, in their research there are no explicit references for licensed 
professionals’ social reproduction. To fill this gap in the literature, by combining 
the approaches of big-, meso-, and micro-classes and by using the level of 
professional regulations as main dimensions, I classify and investigate 
professionals’ social mobility in a comparative perspective.  
Then, the Italian case is considered into details to improve the understanding 
of this phenomenon. Italy is characterized by high level of big-class social 
immobility, as well as by one of the highest levels of professional closure in 
Europe (Patterson et. al 2003; Breen 2004). This closure concerns both entry-
market and conduct-market regulations. Thus, the attention is given to both 
educational and occupational attainments of children of licensed professionals.  
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APPENDIX B – Source: ILFI (1997-2005). I do not repeat it under the appendix tables of 
plots 
 
 
Section 1: Distributions of frequencies of variables employed in the chapter 
 
Table B.1.  Distribution of frequencies of social class of origin at disaggregate 
level 
EGP Scheme – (with micro-classes)                % 
High level entrepreneur (I) 0.8 
High level manager (I) 1.5 
Prof. in scientific fields (I) 0.1 
Engineers - Architects (I) 0.1 
Medical professionals (I) 0.6 
Professionals in economics (I) 0.3 
Professionals in social and political science (I) 0.3 
Legal Professionals (I) 0.2 
Lower service class (II) 2.7 
Skilled white collars and routine non-manual (IIIab) 7.8 
Self-employed with no or few employees (IVab) 17.1 
Farmers (IVc) 14.7 
Skilled manual working class (V-VI) 13.2 
Unskilled manual working class (VIIab) 40.7 
Total (N) 100 
(13719) 
 
 
Table B.2.: Distribution of frequencies of social class of destination at 
disaggregate level (first job) 
EGP Scheme – (with micro-classes)                % 
High level entrepreneur (I) 0.6 
High level manager (I) 1.1 
Prof. in scientific fields (I) 0.6 
Engineers - Architects (I) 0.4 
Medical professionals (I) 1 
Professionals in economics (I) 0.5 
Professionals in social and political science (I) 0.6 
Legal Professionals (I) 0.4 
Lower service class (II) 14.8 
Skilled white collars and routine non-manual (IIIab) 22.4 
Self-employed with no or few employees (IVab) 14.3 
Farmers (IVc) 2.4 
Skilled manual working class (V-VI) 14.7 
Unskilled manual working class (VIIab) 25.6 
Total (N) 100 
(3773) 
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Table B.3. Distribution of frequencies of social class of destination at 
disaggregate level  
EGP Scheme – (with micro-classes)                % 
High level entrepreneur (I) 0.2 
High level manager (I) 0.3 
Prof. in scientific fields (I) 0.2 
Engineers - Architects (I) 0.1 
Medical professionals (I) 0.1 
Professionals in economics (I) 0.2 
Professionals in social and political science (I) 0.2 
Legal Professionals (I) 0.3 
Lower service class (II) 3.9 
Skilled white collars and routine non-manual (IIIab) 5.9 
Self-employed with no or few employees (IVab) 3.7 
Farmers (IVc) 0.6 
Skilled manual working class (V-VI) 6.7 
Unskilled manual working class (VIIab) 26.3 
Total (N) 100 
(8176) 
 
 
   Table B.4. Fit indices of log-linear models to the model Origin – Destination association at the first 
occupation employing the Big-, Meso-, Micro-class approach (men only, n. obs. 3501)56. 
       
Model description X2 d.f. Significance Significance Significance ∆ 
0. Independence Model  2031 169 - - - 0.242 
1.Big-class rigidities  593 162 0.0000 (M.2) 0.0012 (M3) 0.0000 (M5) 0.126 
2.Big- and meso-class rigidities  551 159 1.0000 (M.4) 0.0620(M.5) - 0.125 
3.Big-and micro-class rigidities 571 156 0.0000 (M.5) - - 0.124 
4.Meso- and micro-class rigidities 1753 160 0.0000 (M.5) - - 0.231 
5.Big-, meso- and micro-class 
rigidities 
 
539 
 
153 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.123 
Models RC II of Goodman: row and 
column parameters are constraint to 
be equal 
  
   
 
6.Big-class rigidities 173 149 0.0000 (M.7) 0.0000 (M.8)  0.036 
7.Big- and meso-class rigidities 136 146 0.1736 (M.8)   0.034 
8. Big-, meso-, and micro-class 
rigidities 
127 140 
 
 
  
0.032 
    
                                                 
56 Fit indices of log-linear model for current occupation (Panel B) are in the appendix. This is why 
results of current occupation do not differ from the first job ones. This will be clear in the section of 
intra-generational mobility. 
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Section 2 – log-linear models- mobility tables 
 
Tab B.5. Distribution of frequency for the ORIGIN –DESTINATION association of men in ITALY (3544 observations) 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 Tot % (N) 
1.Entrepreneurs 15.2 0 0 0 0 6.1 0 0 24.2 18.2 9.1 3 0 24.2 100 33 
2.Managers 1.5 1.5 1.5 3 3 3 0 10.5 32.8 19.4 3 0 7.5 13.4 100 67 
3.Unreg. scientific. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 50 0 0 0 50 100 2 
4.Engineers-Architects 0 0 0 25 0 0 0 12.5 37.5 0 12.5 0 0 12.5 100 8 
5.Accountants 0 0 0 0 25 0 0 12.5 25 25 12.5 0 0 0 100 8 
6.Medical professionals 0 0 4.2 4.2 0 20.8 8.3 0 20.8 20.8 12.5 0 0 8.3 100 24 
7.Unreg. social sc. 0 0 16.7 0 0 16.7 0 0 33.3 16.7 0 0 0 16.7 100 6 
8. Legal professionals 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 28.6 14.3 57.1 0 0 0 0 100 7 
9.II 0 0.8 0.8 2.5 0 2.5 2.5 0.8 40.5 19 7.4 0 14.5 9.9 100 121 
10.IIIab 0.7 0.3 1.7 2.3 1 2.7 2.7 0.7 25.5 22.9 4.3 0.3 18.5 18.9 100 302 
11.IVab 0.3 0.7 0.8 0.9 0.4 1.5 1.5 0.3 16.7 16.3 23. 0.7 18.7 18.7 100 689 
12.IVc 0.2 0.6 0.4 0 0 1 1 0.4 4.4 5.8 4 28.6 22.5 32.3 100 521 
13.V-VI 0 0 0.7 0.2 0.4 0.7 0.7 0 11.3 12.2 4 0.7 42.7 27.2 100 452 
13.VIIab 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.1 7.4 10.5 3.1 1.9 34.4 41.4 100 1304 
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Tab. B.6. Distribution of frequency for the ORIGIN –DESTINATION association of professional women in ITALY (3544 observations) 
 3 4 5 6 7 8 (total) N 
3.Unreg. scientific. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
4.Engineers-Architects 0 0 12.5 12.5 0 0 2 
5.Accountants 25 0 0 0 0 0 1 
6.Medical professionals 0 0 0 9 4.5 0 3 
7.Unreg. social sc. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
8. Legal professionals 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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Section 3 - Design matrices for the Big-, Meso- and Micro-class rigidities 
employed in the log-linear analysis of chapter 3 
 
Table B.7. Design Matrix for the Big-class rigidities 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
1.Entrepreneurs 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2.Managers 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
3.Legal prof. 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
4.Arch. & Eng. 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
5.Accountants 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
6.Health prof. 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
7.Unreg. social sc. 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
8.Unreg. scientific 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
9.II 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 
10.IIIab 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  3 0 0 0 0 
11.IVab 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 0 0 0 
12.IVc 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 0 0 
13.V-VI 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 0 
14.VIIab 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 7 
Legend: II: lower service class; IIIab: skilled white collars and routine non-manual workers ; 
IVab: self-employed workers, IVc: farmers; V-VI: skilled manual workers, low-level supervisors 
and technicians; VIIab: unskilled manual workers. 
 
 
Table B.8. Design Matrix for the Meso-class rigidities 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
1.Entrepreneurs 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2.Managers 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
3.Legal prof. 0 0 3 3 3 3 3 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 
4.Arch. & Eng 0 0 3 3 3 3 3 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 
5.Accountants 0 0 3 3 3 3 3 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 
6.Health prof. 0 0 3 3 3 3 3 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 
7.Unreg. social sc. 0 0 3 3 3 3 3 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 
8.Unreg. scientific 0 0 3 3 3 3 3 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 
9.II 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
10.IIIa 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
11.IVab 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
12.IVc 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
13.V-VI 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
14.VIIab 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Legend: II: lower service class; IIIab: skilled white collars and routine non-manual workers ; 
IVab: self-employed workers, IVc: farmers; V-VI: skilled manual workers, low-level supervisors 
and technicians; VIIab: unskilled manual workers. 
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Table B.9. Design Matrix for the Micro-class rigidities 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
1.Entrepreneurs 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2.Managers 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
3.Legal prof. 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
4.Arch. & Eng 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
5.Accountants 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
6.Health prof. 0 0 0 0 0 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
7.Unreg. social sc. 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
8.Unreg. scientific 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 
9.II 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
10.IIIab 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
11.IVab 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
12.IVc 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
13.V-VI 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
14.VIIab 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Legend: II: lower service class; IIIab: skilled white collars and routine non-manual workers ; 
IVab: self-employed workers, IVc: farmers; V-VI: skilled manual workers, low-level supervisors 
and technicians; VIIab: unskilled manual workers. 
 
 
Section 4 
 
 
Table B.10. Fit indices of log-linear models to the model Origin – Destination association and at current 
occupation employing the Big-, Meso-, Micro-class approach. (men only, n.obs. 3482) 
Panel B    
Model description L2 d.f. ∆ 
0. Independence Model  1157 169 0.212 
1.Big-class rigidities  577 162 0.133 
2.Big- and meso-class rigidities  550 159 0.132 
3.Big-micro-class rigidities 556 156 0.135 
4.Big-, meso- and micro-class rigidities 537 153 0.129 
5. Meso-, micro-class rigidities 1019 160 0.205 
Source: ILFI (1997-2005) 
 
 
Section 5: additional material – LOGISTIC REGRESSION 
 
By using a binomial logistic regression Figure 3.3 displays the average 
marginal effects for the influence of family background in being in the upper 
class. Social classes V-VIIab of skilled and unskilled manual workers are the 
reference category. 
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Figure B.1 Average marginal effects for the probability of being in the higher service class according to the 
big class, the meso-class, and the micro-class of origin (ref. cat. Skilled and unskilled working class V-
VIIab). Legend: higher service class (I); lower service class (II); white collars and routine non–manual 
workers (IIIab); petite bourgeoisie (IVab); farmers (IVc). 
 
 
The results are clear. Children of skilled farmers (IVc) have the lowest propensity to gain 
a position in the higher service class according to the big-class approach, whereas 
children of the urban petty bourgeoisie (IVab) and higher social classes have competitive 
advantages.  
The second panel on the right refers to meso-class differences between 
entrepreneurs, managers, and professionals (employed and self-employed) of the higher 
service class. Unregulated professionals do not present a significant propensity to be in 
the upper service class. Children of professionals enjoy favorable prospects comparable 
to entrepreneurs, even if the propensity of self-employed professionals is a bit higher. 
However, the panel on the right of Figure 3.3 indicates that professionals are not a 
homogeneous category with respect to their chances of immobility at the top. In line with 
the hypotheses, licensed professionals enjoy higher immobility prospects.  
Overall, there is evidence that variations between professions in the degree of social 
closure are consequential for there to be immobility at the top. 
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APPENDIX C 
 
Section 1: Distribution of frequencies of variables employed in chapter 4. 
Source: ISTAT, Sbocchi professionali dei laureati (2011). I do not repeat the source for tables 
and plots in appendix C. 
 
Table C.1. Distribution of frequencies of fields of study 
Field of study % 
Humanities 15.2 
Scientific fields 11.4 
Pharmaceutical science  
and veterinarian 
3.3 
Medicine 16.2 
Engineering.  13.0 
Architecture 6.0 
Economics 11.0 
Social and political science 8.3 
Law  8.9 
Health science (except 
medicine) 
6.7 
Total 100 
(N) (26760) 
 
Table C.2. Distribution of frequencies of social class of origin firstly considering meso-classes into the upper service 
class and secondly considering micro-classes into the meso-class of high level professionals – EGP scheme  
EGP scheme – (with meso-classes) % EGP Scheme – (with micro-classes) % 
High level entrepreneur (I) 1,8 High level entrepreneur (I) 1.5 
High level manager(I) 5,4 High level manager(I) 5.0 
High level professionals (I) 23,6 Prof. in scientific fields (I) 0.6 
Low managers(II) 10,9 Engineers (I) 2.4 
Low professionals (II) 20,4 Architects (I) 0.6 
Teachers (II) 16,4 Prof. in pharm. and veterinarian (I) 0.6 
Skilled white collars (IIIa) 2,1 Medical doctor (I) 4,6 
Routine non-manual (IIIb) 19,4 Prof. in economics (I) 1.9 
Self-employed - no or few employees (IVab)  Prof. in social and political science (I) 1.4 
Farmers (IVc)  Legal Professionals (I) 1.1 
Skilled manual working class (V-VI)  Teachers(II) 4.6 
Unskilled manual working class (VIIab)  Low level professionals(II) 7.5 
  Low level manager (II) 2 
  Skilled white collars (IIIa) 16,4 
  Routine non-manual (IIIb) 9.3 
  Self-employed - no or few employees (IVab) 16.9 
  Farmers (IVc) 1.9 
  Skilled and unskilled manual working class (V-
VI-VIIab) 
21.8 
Total (N) 100 Total (N) 100 
 (26760)   (26760)  
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Table C.3: Distribution of frequencies of control variables employed in each regression model of the 
chapter 
Father education % Geogr. 
areas 
% Gender % Citizensh
ip 
% Age % 
Until lower secondary 34,4 North-
West 
27,0 Male 45,6 Italian 98,3 Untill 
30 
76,9 
Upper secondary  41,3 North - 
East 
11,5 Female 54,4 Not 
italian 
1,7 More 
than 30 
23,1 
University (BA) 24,3 Centre 31,6       
University (MA)  South 20,7       
  Islands 9,3       
Total   100 Total  100 Total  100 Total  100 Total  100 
(N) (26760) (N) (26760) (N) (26760) (N) (26760) (N) (26760) 
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Section 2 
 
 
 
Figure C.1. Average marginal effects from multinomial logistic regression model for the probability of 
graduating in social and political science, scientific science and health science - except medicine, according to 
the micro-class of origin (ref. cat. working class-VIIab). Estimates are at net of controls (gender, age, parental 
education, nationality, geographical area, type of high school, high school grade). Black dots denote the AME 
of social classes and black lines denote 95% confidence intervals. Legend: white collars (IIIa), routine non–
manual workers (IIIb); petite bourgeoisie (IVab); farmers (IVc).  
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Section 3: Cross-tabulation of Origin-Education of Italian Graduates  
 
Tab C.4. Distribution of frequency of the OE association (28779 observations) 
 
 
 Hum. Scient Pharm. Med-. Eng. Arc.. Econ. Soc  Law Health Tot.% (N)      
1. Ent. 11.4 8.6 3.4 10.5 12.8 8.1 16.2 10.7 14.5 3.6 100 475  
2. Man. 11.6 9.2 2.8 18.9 12.6 6.0 11.8 11.7 10.3 5.1 100 1694  
3.Unreg. 
scientific. 
14.1 18.5 3.9 20.5 13.7 2.9 8.8 9.7 3.9 4.4 100 205  
4. Engineers 9.1 9.3 2.5 22.7 24.9 11.6 8.1 4.7 5.0 2.4 100 799  
5. Architects 11.3 6.5 2.2 22.4 10.8 29.0 6.4 3.8 6.5 1.6 100 186  
6. Life sc.prof. 9.3 9.7 24.7 23.4 7.9 5.2 6.6 3.0 5.7 4.4 100 227  
7. Medical prof  6.3 6.8 3.1 55.7 7.1 3.5 5.0 3.7 6.6 2.5 100 1835  
8. Accountants 10.4 8.3 1.4 16.2 10.4 4.4 18.0 11.6 15.3 4.1 100 588  
9. Legal prof. 12.1 6.1 2.0 13.0 4.9 4.6 7.5 4.6 42.7 2.6 100 347  
10.Soc. prof. 14.9 14.0 4.3 21.9 11.9 4.5 7.7 7.7 8.4 4.5 100 464  
11.Teachers 16.8 12.8 3.6 19.7 14.2 5.4 8.3 6.8 8.6 3.8 100 1552  
12.Low managers 15.0 11.1 2.6 16.9 14.5 4.7 12.2 10.3 9.3 3.4 100 621  
13.Low prof. 13.9 12.5 3.1 13.5 18.2 10.0 8.2 9.2 6.4 5.1 100 2298  
14.IIIa 16.2 11.7 3.1 14.6 13.7 5.6 11.8 8.2 89.3 6.0 100 4460  
15.IIIb 17.9 12.6 2.8 12.0 12.0 5.0 11.1 10.3 8.5 7.3 100 2477  
16.IVab 16.8 10.7 3.1 11.7 11.6 7.0 13.5 8.5 8.8 7.8 100 4534  
17.IVc 19.3 16.8 4.0 9.6 14.3 4.2 9.0 5.4 5.4 12.1 100 554  
18.V-VI-VIIab 17.5 13.7 3.5 9.0 13.6 4.9 11.5 7.9 7.7 10.8 100 5463  
